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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Argument Priority 15
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah corporation,
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, McCONKIE &
BUSHNELL, a Utah corporation, MICHAEL
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
corporation, TERRY HARMON and
DOREEN HARMON,

Case No. 950300

Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from orders of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting defendants'
Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant Samuel L. Boyd's ("Boyd")
fourth cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, and dismissing Boyd's remaining claims with
prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Boyd filed this appeal in this Court, which has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1992).1
Addenda K-T.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Although trial courts have broad discretion in adjudicating a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, where there is an abuse
of that discretion and a likelihood that an injustice has occurred,
reversal

is warranted.

Charlie

Brown Constr. Co. v.

Leisure

Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
When considering a motion to dismiss with prejudice under Rule
41(b), the trial court's discretion

is constrained

factors in addition to the mere passage of time.
outlined at least five such additional factors:

by

several

This Court has

(1) the conduct of

both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move
the case forward;

(3) what each party has accomplished in moving

the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice resulting to the
opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal with prejudice.
Westinohouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul H. Larsen Contractors, Inc.,
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).

In applying these factors, the

trial court must consider the "totality of the circumstances."

Id.

Because evaluation of a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
is fact intensive, this Court should carefully scrutinize the facts
underlying the present action in light of the factors set forth
above to determine whether dismissal of Boyd's claims worked an
injustice and therefore constituted an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.

Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Department of

Health, 851 P.2d

1212, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Meadow Fresh
2

Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) .
In reviewing a trial court's adjudication of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court reviews only the facts alleged in the complaint.
Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).
accepts the

factual

allegations

in the complaint

Lowe v.
The Court

as true and

considers all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
764,

766

(Utah

1991)

(citing

Prows v. State, 822 P.2d

St. Benedict's

Dev. Co. v. St.

Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)).
With the foregoing standards in mind, appellant presents the
following questions for review by this Court:
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which

abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims
with prejudice and on the merits where the period during which
there was no formal litigation activity was only twenty-one months
long.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which

abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims
with

prejudice

and

on

the

merits

despite

the

occurrence

of

settlement negotiations by the parties within the period during
which there was no formal litigation activity.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which

abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims
3

with prejudice despite the availability of numerous procedures the
trial court have used to move the case along that were less harsh
and more equitable than dismissal with prejudice.
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which

abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims
against Harmon City and the Harmons where Boyd had taken formal
litigation action involving those defendants before the filing of
the Harmon defendants' motion to dismiss.
5.

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in

concluding that there is no private right of action under the Utah
Securities Act, Utah Code Annotated §61-1-1 through -30 (sometimes
referred to as the "Utah Securities Act").
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
This case was decided by the trial court on two types of
motions to dismiss, a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

On the

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Rule 12, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure,2 is determinative.

On the motion to dismiss

for failure to prosecute, Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,3
is determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the trial court's order imposing the
draconian measure of dismissing Boyd's claims with prejudice solely
2

Addendum B.
Addendum E.

4

because twenty-one months passed without formal litigation activity
and notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of dilatory or badfaith

conduct

by

Boyd.

The

trial

court

granted

all

of

the

defendants' various motions to dismiss with prejudice and on the
merits even though Boyd had

filed a request

for a scheduling

conference before defendants Harmon City, Inc. ("Harmon City"),
Terry Harmon, and Doreen Harmon (the "Harmons") filed their motions
to dismiss (Harmon City and the Harmons are sometimes hereinafter
referred to collectively as the "Harmon defendants").

The trial

court also disregarded the settlement discussions Boyd had with
three other defendants during the period of alleged inactivity.
In dismissing Boyd's claims with prejudice under Rule 41(b),
the trial court failed to properly balance the need to control its
docket and expedite the resolution of pending motions with the
harsh penalty of dismissal with prejudice.

The arbitrary and

capricious nature of the trial court's decision is evidenced by the
complete lack of any evidence of either dilatory or bad-faith
conduct by Boyd or the extraordinarily long periods of inactivity
that characterize the circumstances in which dismissals for failure
to

prosecute

have

been

affirmed

by

Utah

appellate

courts.

Furthermore, dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is
particularly inappropriate when, as here, the trial court had at
its disposal an array of less severe measures to police its docket,
none of which

it employed.

Included

among

such

less

severe

measures are entry of a scheduling order under Rule 16, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, issuance an order to show cause as required
5

under

Rule

4-103,

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration,

or

dismissal without prejudice, among others.
The trial court also dismissed Boyd's fourth cause of action
because it concluded that Boyd had no private right of action under
the Utah Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1 through -30.
The

trial

court's

dismissal

of

Boyd's

claims

under

the

Utah

Securities Act is clear error as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The following facts are undisputed in the record from the
trial court:
1.

In

defendants

1986,

for

the

Boyd

signed

purchase

a

of

contract

Harmon

with

City,

a

the

Harmon

grocery

business headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah.4

store

Citicorp had

indicated its willingness to finance Boyd's acquisition of Harmon
City.
2.

Shortly

before

the

acquisition

was

to

close,

Boyd

discovered a material non-disclosure relating to Harmon City's and
Terry

Harmon's

pension/ERISA

mishandling

funds.5

of

A Partial

Harmon
Consent

City's

employees'

Judgment was

entered

against Harmon City and Terry Harmon in an action brought by the
U.S. Secretary of Labor concerning such mishandling, which resulted
in a $4,000,000 liability of Harmon City.
Judgment

was

not

disclosed

Boyd.6

to

A

Record at 12-13, 396.

5

Record at 12-13, 396.

6

Record at 670-700 (Addendum W ) .

6

The Partial Consent

The

Harmon

defendants

admitted this mishandling of such funds in their responses to
Boyd's requests for admissions.7

After receiving notice of this

problem from Boyd, Citicorp conditioned the availability of its
financing upon a satisfactory resolution of the matter.

The issue

was not resolved and, consequently, the acquisition did not close.

3.
defendants

In the course of Boyd's negotiations with the various
for

the

purchase

of

Harmon

City,

Boyd

incurred

significant expenses and attorney fees. The expenses Boyd incurred
were for investment banking consultants, attorneys, accountants,
travel, lodging
approximately

and related

$50,000.00.8

expenses, which
Boyd initially

expenses

totalled

filed suit in Texas

against these defendants, but that action was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Boyd has further incurred attorney fees and expenses
exceeding $100,000.00, most of which were incurred in the Texas
action, seeking recovery for his losses in the aborted purchase of
Harmon City.9
4.

Boyd filed his complaint in this action on March 16,

1992,10 and an amended complaint on July 10, 1992. u
complaint

sought

damages

for

breach

of

Boyd's amended

contract,

promissory

Record at 432-33, Harmon Defendants' Responses to Boyd's First Request for
Admissions No. 6 (Addendum V ) .
8

9

Record at 396, 522; Addendum U.

Record at 39 6, 122; Addendum U.

10

Record at 1-9.

n

Record at 18.

7

estoppel, fraud, and violation of the Utah Securities Act, Utah
Code Section 61-1-1 through -30. The amended complaint also sought
an accounting and imposition of a constructive trust.12

Defendants

Matthew Hilton ("Hilton"), Brinton Burbidge ("Burbidge"), Kirton,
McConkie & Bushnell ("Kirton"), Nielsen & Senior ("Nielsen") and
Michael

Gottfredson

("Gottfredson")(collectively

the

"attorney

defendants") represented various parties to the transaction and
were alleged to have been liable for the damages Boyd incurred as
a result of the refusal of the Harmons to close the transaction
with Boyd.13
5.

On July 31, 1992, the Harmon defendants filed a motion to

dismiss Boyd's fourth cause of action for violation of the Utah
Securities Act.1*

On August 11, 1992, Kirton and Burbidge moved to

dismiss Boyd's amended complaint in its entirety.15
6.

On February 23, 1993 and on April 14, 1993, the trial

court issued memorandum decisions dismissing Boyd's fourth cause of
action for violation of Utah Securities Act against the Harmon
defendants, Kirton, and Burbidge and denying the motions to dismiss
the remaining claims against Kirton and Burbidge.16

Record at 10-18.
'Record at 10-18.
'Record at 38-40.
'Record at 51-53.
'Record at 223-228 (Addendum K); 257-260 (Addendum L ) .

8

On May 27,

1993, the trial court entered its Order dismissing Boyd's fourth
cause of action as against the Harmon defendants.17
7.

On March 10, 1993, based upon the trial court's ruling on

the previous motions to dismiss Boyd's

fourth cause of action

brought by Kirton, Burbidge and the Harmon defendants, Nielsen
moved

for

partial

judgment

Securities Act claim.18

on

the

pleadings

on

Boyd's

Utah

On April 20, 1993, the trial court entered

its ruling granting Nielsen's motion19 and on May 10, 1993, the
trial court entered its order dismissing Boyd's fourth cause of
action against Nielsen.20
8.
counsel

Shortly thereafter, Boyd was sued by Boyd's previous
in this case, David K. Isom.21

Isom subsequently was

granted judgment on November 4, 1993, and Boyd appealed.22

On June

2, 1994, Boyd's counsel filed his appellant's brief in this Court,
Case No.

930598.23

On July

26, 1994, before

the appeal

was

submitted to this Court, Isom and Boyd settled that case.24
9.

During the twenty-one month period between May 10, 1993

and January 26, 1995, settlement negotiations between Boyd and
17

Record at 293-96 (Addendum O)

18

Record at 239-41,

19

Record at 261-62.

20

21

22

23

Record at 270-72 (Addendum N ) .

Record at 393,

Record at 393, 13; 400, 12.

Record at 400, 15.

2A

Record a t 3 9 4 , 18 (Addendum U ) ; 4 0 0 , 15 (Addendum X)

three of the defendants occurred.

Boyd had settlement discussions

with Nielsen, but the parties were unable to agree on terms.23

In

February l r Q 4 , Jeffrey M. Jones, Boyd's present counsel, contacted
Boyd regarding a meeting between Mr. Jones and Mr. Kay, counsel for
Kirton and Burbidge, regarding this action.

Mr. Kay asked Mr.

Jones to provide Mr. Kay with a settlement offer from Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Jones contacted Mr. Boyd, and Mr. Boyd authorized Mr. Jones to
make

a proposal

to Mr. Kay.

Mr. Jones

then called

reaarding the settlement terms proposed by Mr. Boyd.

Mr. Kay
Mr. Kay,

however, never responded to that settlement offer.26
10.

On January 26, 1995, Kirton and Burbidge moved to dismiss

for failure to prosecute.27

On February 1, 1995, defendant Hilton

filed a similar motion.28
11.

On February 9, 1995, Boyd filed a request for scheduling

conference with the trial court pursuant to Rule 16(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.29
12.

That same day, February 9, 1995, Nielsen filed its motion

to dismiss for failure to prosecute.30

Z3

Record at 810f 812-13 (Addendum Y ) .

26
Record at 804-805, 812-13
(Addendum U ) ; 400, f4(Addendum X ) .
27

28

29

30

(Addendum

Record at 297-99.

Record at 307-309.

Record at 327-28.

Record at 307-309.

10

Y

at

7-8,

15-16);

393-94,

57

13.

On February 13, 1995, the Harmon defendants moved to

dismiss .31
14.

On February

16, 1995, Boyd

served

extensive

written

discovery on all defendants.32
15.

On April 6, 1995, the trial court heard oral argument on

all of the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
After oral argument, the trial court granted defendants' motions to
dismiss with prejudice from the bench.33

Thereafter, defendants

submitted their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
Boyd pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
16.

On April 27, 1995, Boyd filed Objections to Defendants'

Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and a
Motion to Reconsider.34
17.

In its Minute Entry of June 1, 1995, the trial court

denied Boyd's Objections to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions

of

Law

and

Judgment

Reconsider without a hearing.35

and

denied

Boyd's

Motion

to

On that same day, the trial court

entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Order
dismissing Boyd's claims with prejudice.36

On June 16, 1995, the

trial court entered its order denying Boyd's Motion to Reconsider
31

Record a t

32

Record a t 3 5 9 - 6 1 ;

33

329-31.

Record a t 790-827

3A

443-579.
(Addendum Y) .

Record a t 4 0 5 - 4 0 6 ;

410-579.

35

Record a t 711-12

36

R e c o r d a t 7 1 3 - 7 2 3 (Addendum R, Addendum S ) .

(Addendum Q ) .

11

and Boyd's Objection to Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment.37
18.

On June 29, 1995, Boyd filed his Notice of Appeal.38

19.

Boyd and his counsel indicated to the trial court that

they would aggressively pursue discovery and the prosecution of
Boyd's claims if given the opportunity.39

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
£a.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING BOYD'S
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE,
Although trial courts have discretion in adjudicating motions

to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, dismissal with prejudice is a harsh and permanent
remedy disfavored by this Court.

Accordingly, Utah courts have

instructed that the trial court must "balance the need to expedite
litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources with the need
to allow parties to have their day in court."

Meadow Fresh Farms,

Inc. v. Utah State Univ. , 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
This Court has instructed that in conducting such balancing the
crucial factor is the injustice that will result from the dismissal
with prejudice.
The record demonstrates that Boyd suffered a severe injustice
by

the

dismissal

of

his

claims

with

prejudice.

Record at 739-41 (Addendum T ) .
Record at 742-786.
Record at 396, 124 (Addendum U); 402, 119 (Addendum X ) .

12

Boyd

had

meritorious claims involving a substantial amount of damages and
significant equitable relief.
is demonstrated

by

That the injustice was unwarranted

(i) the complete

lack of

any evidence

of

dilatory or bad-faith conduct by Boyd; or (ii) the extraordinarily
long periods of inactivity Utah courts have required in affirming
dismissals with prejudice.

Importantly, the defendants can point

to no harm that resulted solely from the passage of time that would
warrant imposition of the trial court's ultimate sanction.
That

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

is

further

evidenced by the availability of an array of procedures to move the
case to trial, all of which would have been less drastic than
dismissal with prejudice.

For example, the trial court could have

entered an order to show cause under Rule 4-103, Utah Code of
Judicial
requested

Administration,
by

Boyd,

fixed

ordered
a

trial

a

scheduling
date

or

set

conference
discovery

as
and

dispositive motion deadlines.
Boyd filed a request for a scheduling conference pursuant to
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on February 9, 1995, before
the Harmon defendants moved for dismissal.

Thus, by the time the

Harmon defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Boyd had filed
pleadings prosecuting his claims against them.

Therefore, any

period of inactivity had ended, and, the trial court abused its
discretion

by

dismissing

Boyd's

defendants.

13

claims

against

the

Harmon

Finally, it was inappropriate for the trial court to dismiss
Boyd's claims with prejudice when Boyd had engaged in settlement
discussions during the period of inactivity.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT.
In dismissing Boyd's claim under Utah Securities Act, the

trial court concluded that the Utah Securities Act simply did
affords

no

private

cause

of

provisions.

This conclusion

language

the

of

statute

and

action

for

is plainly
this

violations

of

its

inconsistent with the

Court's

construction

and

interpretation of the Act.

ARGUMENT

L_

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING BOYD'S
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE.
In adjudicating a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute,

trial courts have broad discretion, the exercise of which will not
be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion and a
likelihood that an injustice has occurred.

Charlie Brown Constr.

Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App.) f
cert,

denied,

765

P.2d

1277

(Utah

1987).

The

trial

court's

discretion is not without limits, however, and several principles
should guide its disposition of a motion under Rule 41(b).
this Court has stated: "Dismissal with prejudice . . .
and

permanent

remedy

when

it

precludes

plaintiff's claims on their merits."

14

a

Indeed,

is a harsh

presentation

of

a

Bonneville Tower Condominium

Mat. Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020
(Utah 1986); see also Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Underwriters, Inc. , 16 Utah 2d 211, 216, 398 P.2d 685, 688
(1965)

(pretrial

dismissal

is

"a drastic

sparingly and with great caution").

action

.

.

. used

This Court has also cautioned

that the trial court's "prerogative [to dismiss] falls short of
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result in injustice."
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors, Inc.,
544 P.2d

876, 879

(Utah 1975).

Similarly, the Utah Court of

Appeals has held that the trial court must "balance the need to
expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources with
the need to allow parties to have their day in court."

Meadow

Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

In sum, because affording parties an opportunity

to be heard is, of course, the raison

d'etre

of the

judicial

system, and thus Utah courts have subordinated concerns of judicial
economy to the need to provide a forum for the redress of civil
disputes.
As

Westinghouse, 544 P.2d at 879.

stated

above, this

Court

has

outlined

at

least

five

critical factors, in addition to the mere passage of time, that
Utah courts should consider when deciding whether dismissal with
prejudice is warranted.

Those factors include:

(1) the conduct of

both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move
the case forward;

(3) what each party has accomplished in moving

the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice resulting to the
opposing party by reason of the delay;
15

and (5) most important,

w h e t h e r i n j u s t i c e may r e s u l t from t h e d i s m i s s a l .

W e s t i n a h o u s e , 544

P.2d

trial

at

879.

In

applying

these

factors,

the

c o n s i d e r t h e " t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . "
factors

to

conclusion

the

facts

that

the

of

this

trial

case

court's

leads
orders

id.
to

court

must

Applying t h e s e
the

should

inescapable
be

reversed.

"AN INJUSTICE HAS BEEN WROUGHT"40

A^

The t r i a l

court's

dismissal with prejudice

of B o y d ' s

claims

c o n s t i t u t e d p r e c i s e l y t h e t y p e of u n w a r r a n t e d i n j u s t i c e t h i s
cautioned against in Westinahouse.

Court

Indeed, under Westinahouse,

the

i n j u s t i c e t h a t w i l l r e s u l t from t h e d i s m i s s a l w i t h p r e j u d i c e i s t h e
most

important

factor

to

consider.

id.

at

879.

Affirming

the

t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of B o y d ' s c l a i m s would o n l y compound

that

injustice.
W h i l e Boyd was n e g o t i a t i n g

for

t h e p u r c h a s e of

Harmon

City

w i t h t h e v a r i o u s d e f e n d a n t s , Boyd i n c u r r e d s i g n i f i c a n t e x p e n s e s
investment
lodging
totalled

banking

consultants,

and r e l a t e d

attorneys,

expenses.

approximately

accountants,

Boyd r e c a l l s

$ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . A1

The t r i a l

that

such

court's

travel,
expenses
dismissal

of h i s c l a i m s o b v i o u s l y p r e c l u d e s Boyd from a s s e r t i n g h i s r i g h t
these significant

for

to

damages.

Country Meadows Convalescent Center v . Department of H e a l t h , 851 P.2d
1212, 1213 (Utah App. 1993). Of t h e f i v e Westinqhouse f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h i n t h e
Standard of Review s e c t i o n , i n f r a , Boyd submits t h a t t h e f a c t u a l r e c o r d b e f o r e
both t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h i s Court a d e q u a t e l y a d d r e s s e s t h e f i r s t through t h i r d
f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g t o t h e conduct of t h e p a r t i e s i n ^ i g h t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e
e f f o r t s t o move t h e case forward and t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o do s o . Consequently,
Boyd's argument focuses p r i m a r i l y on t h e o t h e r Westinqhouse f a c t o r s — t h e
i n j u s t i c e t h a t w i l l r e s u l t from d i s m i s s a l and t h e p r e j u d i c e , or l a c k t h e r e o f , t o
t h e defendants r e s u l t i n g from t h e c o n t i n u e d pendency of t h e a c t i o n .
41

Record a t 396, 122 (Addendum U).
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Additionally, Boyd's conduct in the present case is readily
distinguishable from the types of conduct at issue in the Rule
41(b) dismissals Utah appellate courts previously have allowed.
Specifically, as is discussed below, each such case involved either
dilatory conduct or some other type of misconduct, or a period of
inactivity far exceeding the twenty-one months at issue here. Boyd
did not fail to comply with any Rule of Civil Procedure, any other
procedural rule or any court order or discovery request.

Further,

Boyd did not engage in any other type of misconduct such that the
drastic measure of dismissal with prejudice is warranted.

Further,

during that twenty-one month period, defendants suffered no harm as
a consequence of any inactivity so significant that Boyd's right to
access to the courts should be denied.
Finally, Boyd's claims have merit.

Harmon City has admitted

that it failed to make a material disclosure to Boyd relating to
its mishandling of Harmon City's employees' pension/ERISA funds
before the sale of Harmon City's stock to Boyd.A2

Defendants'

failure to disclose this liability breached the parties' agreements
and constituted
City's

securities

employees'

fraud.

pension/ERISA

This mishandling
funds

resulted

in

of Harmon
a

Consent

Judgment being entered against Harmon City, Terry Harmon, F. Ray
Green, and Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc., an affiliate of the
Harmon defendants and Green, in favor of the U.S. Secretary of

Record at 396, 123 (Addendum U); Record at 432-33, Answer to Request for
Admission No. 6 (Addendum V ) .
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L a b o r i n t h e amount of
familiar

with t h i s

a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 000 . 4 3

dispute

as

it

recently

This Court

adjudicated

an

i n v o l v i n g t h e v e r y same ERISA l i a b i l i t y b e t w e e n Harmon C i t y ,

appeal
Terry

Harmon and N i e l s e n .

See Harmon C i t y , I n c . v . N i e l s e n & S e n i o r ,

P.2d

(Utah

1162,

1166-67

1995). A A

Thus,

Boyd h a s

a

notwithstanding

the

l a c k of

any m i s c o n d u c t

p a r t t h a t w a r r a n t s such a harsh r e s u l t .

907

meritorious

c l a i m i n v o l v i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of money w h i c h t h e t r i a l
dismissed,

is

on

court
Boyd's

T h u s , Boyd t h e r e f o r e

has

s u f f e r e d an i n j u s t i c e and a f f i r m i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of
claims
B^.

would

only

compound

injustice.

THERE I S NO UTAH CASE AFFIRMING A DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 4 1 ( b ) MERELY UPON A SHOWING OF
INACTIVITY FOR A PERIOD AS SHORT AS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS.
INDEED. IN CASES SIMILAR TO THIS ACTION, THIS COURT HAS
HELD THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,

During t h e p r o c e e d i n g s below,
case,

that

defendants

and Boyd i s a w a r e of no U t a h c a s e ,

h a v e c i t e d no U t a h

i n which t h i s

Court

has

a f f i r m e d a d i s m i s s a l w i t h p r e j u d i c e s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of a p e r i o d
of

inactivity

as

appellate courts

short

as

twenty-one

have affirmed

dismissals

months.

Although

under Rule 41(b)

t h e p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y was a s s h o r t a s two y e a r s , t h e

Utah
wherd

plaintiffs

i n t h o s e c a s e s , w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n , had r e f u s e d o r f a i l e d t o comply
with

orders

of

the

trial

court

or

had

engaged

in

some

other

Record at 670-700 (Addendum W).
This Court found t h a t ERISA did not preempt the s t a t e law claims of the
Harmon defendants and others against Nielsen and t h a t material issues of fact
precluded entry of summary judgment in favor of Nielsen on Harmon City, Terry
Harmon and o t h e r s ' claims t h a t they had incurred ERISA l i a b i l i t y as a r e s u l t of
Nielsen's alleged legal malpractice. Harmon c i t y . Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior. 907
P.2d at 1172.
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affirmative misconduct.

E.g., Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323

(Utah

dismissal

1975)(affirming

where

plaintiff

moved

continuance on the day of trial because it had failed to
for an expert witness), questioned in

for

arrange

Johnson v. Firebrand, 571

P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure
Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(plaintiffs delayed
two and one-half years to do discovery, failed to appear pursuant
to an order to show cause and then waited eight months before
moving to set aside the dismissal).

Such conduct is conspicuously

absent in this case.
Indeed, this Court has held, in cases similar to the present
case, that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing with
prejudice.

For example, in Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368,

1369 (Utah 1977), this Court reversed the trial court's dismissal
with prejudice as an abuse of discretion, noting:
[I]t seems that neither party had any active interest in
the matter for nearly four years. No reasons are given
for the delay . . . .
Since either party could have
brought the matter to a conclusion it is difficult to see
why the plaintiff should be denied his claim to more than
$38,000 . . . .
* * *

The case of Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins is
of interest. There a matter lay in limbo from June 5,
1950 to May 28, 1958, when a motion was made to dismiss
for lack of prosecution. This Court said:
• Since any party to this action could
have obtained the relief to which it was
entitled at any time it had wanted but both
parties chose to dally for a number of years,
it was an abuse of discretion for the court to
grant respondents' motion to dismiss with
prejudice.
19

Id. at 1370 (emphases added).

The period of i n a c t i v i t y in Johnson

of over four years was considerably longer than the period of
i n a c t i v i t y in the present case, j u s t twenty-one months.
Similarly,

in Westinghouse, t h i s Court reversed the

trial

c o u r t ' s dismissal as an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n because n e i t h e r p a r t y
took

any

inactivity,
plaintiff
requests/5

action

to

advance

the

case

during

the

period

and defendants f a i l e d to respond to p l a i n t i f f
assembled
As

in

records

pursuant

Westinghouse,

in

to

defendants'

this

case

of

after

discovery

there

is

no

i n d i c a t i o n of any e f f o r t by the defendants to push the case any
f a s t e r than p l a i n t i f f . 4 6

In Westinghouse, t h i s Court cautioned:

While acknowledging t h a t p l a i n t i f f s must s h o u l d e r t h e g r e a t e r burden i n
moving t h e i r c a s e s a l o n g , t h e Court n e v e r t h e l e s s o b s e r v e d :
[W]e a r e not impressed t h a t t h e defendants themselves were o v e r l y
d i l i g e n t or m a n i f e s t any p a r t i c u l a r h a s t e i n g e t t i n g t h e p r e t r i a l
d i s c o v e r y procedures completed and on with t h e t r i a l .
Westinghouse, 544 P.2d a t 879.
46

Several of t h e defendants have denied Boyd's a s s e r t i o n t h a t defendants
have done nothing i n t h e p r e s e n t l i t i g a t i o n .
Indeed, defendants below claimed
t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s t h a t f u l f i l l e d t h e i r d u t i e s under Westinghouse were t a k e n i n
a proceeding f i l e d by Boyd a g a i n s t them i n Texas. Record a t 587 ("The Harmon
Defendants have taken not only Boyd's d e p o s i t i o n [ i n t h e Texas a c t i o n ] , but t h e i r
own!"); i d . a t 643-643 ( " F i n a l l y , P l a i n t i f f a l s o overlooks t h e expense of time
and money i n c u r r e d by a l l of t h e Defendants i n t h i s a c t i o n i n defending
themselves a g a i n s t t h e claims a g a i n s t them i n Texas s t a t e c o u r t , i n which
P l a i n t i f f Boyd a c t e d as a t t o r n e y of r e c o r d for NiNi C o r p o r a t i o n , P l a i n t i f f ' s
a s s i g n o r and p r e d e c e s s o r , as w e l l as what Defendants have expended i n t h e p r e s e n t
action.")
S i g n i f i c a n t d i s c o v e r y was conducted i n t h e Texas a c t i o n by a l l
p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g Boyd, and i n c l u d e d t h e following d e p o s i t i o n s : Samuel L. Boyd
(417 p a g e s ) , Doreen Harmon (99 p a g e s ) , F. Ray Green (196 p a g e s ) , Matthew H i l t o n
(253 p a g e s ) , B r i n t o n Burbidge (78 p a g e s ) , Daniel Bushnell (59 p a g e s ) , Michael
Gottfredson (133 p a g e s ) , E a r l Jay Peck (89 p a g e s ) , and N i e l s Pedersen (66 p a g e s ) .
Record a t 661-62. This d i s c o v e r y i s voluminous and i s not f i l e d with t h e Court
for t h a t r e a s o n ; however, i t i s a v a i l a b l e for review by t h e Court upon r e q u e s t .
If defendants a r e allowed t o d i s c h a r g e t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under Westinghouse
by showing t h a t they have d i l i g e n t l y defended t h e claims a g a i n s t them by c i t i n g
t o a c t i o n s they took i n Texas, Boyd's p u r s u i t of h i s claims t h e r e l o g i c a l l y and
e q u i t a b l y must evidence h i s p u r s u i t of h i s claims i n t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n .
Furthermore, i n t h e Texas a c t i o n , t h e p a r t i e s f i l e d and responded t o
v a r i o u s d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t s i n c l u d i n g r e q u e s t s for p r o d u c t i o n of documents. This
(continued...)
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I t i s indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch
and to move calendars with expedition in order to keep
them up to d a t e . But i t i s even more important to keep
in mind t h a t the very reason for the existence of courts
i s to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to
do j u s t i c e between them.
Westinqhouse, 544 P.2d at 879 (emphasis added).

I t should be noted

t h a t Westinqhouse involved a t h r e e year delay from the time the
complaint was filed. 4 7
In Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports, I n c . ,
740 P. 2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court affirmed the t r i a l
c o u r t ' s dismissal of the p l a i n t i f f ' s claim with prejudice because
plaintiffs

delayed responding to pending l i t i g a t i o n

inordinately

long periods

p r e t r i a l proceedings.

at

several

different

issues for

stages

in

the

Then when both p a r t i e s to the l i t i g a t i o n and

t h e i r respective counsel subsequently f a i l e d to appear at a c o u r t ordered p r e t r i a l conference, the t r i a l court dismissed the case.
Unlike the p l a i n t i f f

in Charlie Brown, Boyd n e i t h e r

failed

to

attend hearings nor f a i l e d to respond to motions pending before the
t r i a l court.
In Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah S t a t e Univ. Dept. of
Agriculture and Applied Science,

813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App.

1991), the Court of Appeals affirmed the t r i a l c o u r t ' s dismissal

46

( . . .continued)
d i s c o v e r y was performed when t h e w i t n e s s e s ' memories were f r e s h and has p r e s e r v e d
a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of t h e evidence n e c e s s a r y t o t h i s c a s e .
Accordingly,
d e f e n d a n t ' s claims t h a t t h i s a c t i o n should be dismissed because t h e evidence i s
s t a l e or because of a l l e g e d f a i l e d memories of w i t n e s s e s i s w i t h o u t m e r i t .
A7

Cf. Polk v . I v e r s , 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977)(applying Westinqhouse
f a c t o r s and r e v e r s i n g d i s m i s s a l as an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n where p e r i o d of
i n a c t i v i t y was two and o n e - h a l f y e a r s and c o u r t f a i l e d t o n o t i f y a t t o r n e y s of new
t r i a l date).

21

for failure to prosecute because plaintiffs failed to take any
action to move their case along for nearly two years, which delay
occurred after a separate trial court previously had dismissed the
case

with prejudice for failure to prosecute, which decision was

reversed by this Court to allow plaintiffs to refile their action.
In the second action, neither plaintiff nor its counsel attended
the hearing on the order to show cause why the trial court should
not dismiss the case for the second time.

Boyd clearly has not

engaged in such flagrant disregard of the court's orders.

Meadow

Fresh Farms clearly has no application.
In

Country

Meadows

Convalescent

Center

v.

Department

of

Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the court affirmed the
dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiff's petition for judicial
review of the Department of Health's denial of an application for
construction

costs.

Plaintiff

took no

action to advance

district court action for a period of more than five years.

the
This

extraordinarily long period of inactivity readily distinguishes
Country Meadows from the present case.
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals
held that plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute his claims
and affirmed the dismissal of his claims with prejudice because
plaintiff

engaged

in

a

series

of

dilatory

actions

including

multiple motions for continuances and other motions after the case
had been pending for nearly seven years and the defendants had
filed a certificate of readiness for trial.

22

Rushton therefore is

not an example of inactivity; rather, it involved

affirmative

actions by a party that inexcusably and in bad-faith delayed trial
in the matter.
Boyd

is

guilty

In short, it was a case of egregious malfeasance.
of

no

malfeasance,

and

Rushton

therefore

is

inapplicable.
In Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), this Court
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims because there was a
fourteen-month

period

of

inactivity

coupled

with

plaintiff's

dilatory motion to continue on the day of trial because plaintiff
still had not retained a crucial medical expert and therefore could
not proceed with the trial.

Fishier, 538 P.2d at 1324.48

Fishier,

therefore, is readily distinguishable because of the plaintiff's
misconduct in addition to the period of inactivity.
In sum, the Rule 41(b) dismissals previously affirmed by Utah
courts each are distinguishable from the present case.

As shown

above, each of those cases involved either dilatory conduct or
misconduct or a period of inactivity far exceeding the twenty-one
months at issue here. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of
Boyd's claims should be reversed.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES TO MOVE THE CASE ALONG THAT WERE
LESS HARSH THAN DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE.

In this case, the trial court had at its disposal several
tools to encourage the parties to move the case forward and police

Fishier subsequently was questioned by this Court in Johnson v.
Firebrand. 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977), where the Court stated that, in denying the
request for continuance, the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff the
opportunity to put on his case without the expert. .Id. at 1369.
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its docket, all of which were less drastic than dismissal with
prejudice. Boyd respectfully submits that, in these circumstances,
it was an abuse of discretion not to employ one or more of these
procedures.
For example, Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
provides:
If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been
served and filed within 180 days of the filing date, the
clerk shall mail written notification to the parties
stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date
specified in the notification, the court shall dismiss
the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
No such notice was ever sent to the parties by the court clerk/ 9
Had this notice been sent by the court clerk, Boyd respectfully
submits that the notice would have spurred the parties to action as
is evidenced by the discovery

filed by Boyd after defendants'

motions to dismiss were filed.50

See Hartford Leasing Corp. v.

State, 888 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(sending plaintiff
required

notice to appoint counsel

Hartford

to action, as demonstrated

"would

likely have

by the plethora

spurred
of

legal

documents filed by [plaintiff's counsel] concurrent with his Notice
of Appearance and in response to the State's Motion to Dismiss.

It

would indeed be unjust to deprive Hartford of its day in court
given the State's failure to provide the required notice.")
Alternatively, the trial court could have entered other orders
short of dismissal with prejudice, such as ordering a scheduling

Record at 401, 112 (Addendum X ) .
Record at 443-579.
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conference as requested by Boyd, fixing a trial date and discovery
and dispositive motion deadlines, or dismissing without prejudice.
Use of any of these alternatives would have balanced the "need to
expedite

litigation

and

efficiently

utilize

.

.

.

judicial

resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in
court."

Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d

at 219.

By failing to

implement one of these procedures and dismissing this case with
prejudice in circumstances where there was no misconduct by Boyd,
but only inactivity for a relatively short period of time, the
trial court's decision was "unreasonable and arbitrary" resulting
in injustice to Boyd. Westinahouse, 544 P. 2d at 879. Accordingly,
this Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of Boyd's
claims.
EL;.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY DISMISSING
BOYD'S CLAIMS AGAINST HARMON CITY AND THE HARMONS WHERE
BOYD HAD FILED A SCHEDULING REQUEST BEFORE THE FILING OF
THE HARMON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS,

Boyd f i l e d a r e q u e s t f o r a s c h e d u l i n g c o n f e r e n c e p u r s u a n t

to

R u l e 1 6 , Utah R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , on F e b r u a r y 9 , 1 9 9 5 , b e f o r e
t h e Harmon d e f e n d a n t s moved f o r d i s m i s s a l .
Harmon d e f e n d a n t s
pleadings

filed

prosecuting

their

his

T h u s , by t h e t i m e

motion to d i s m i s s ,

claims

against

them.

Boyd had
Therefore,

the

filed
any

p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y had e n d e d . 5 1

Without e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s t a t e d a t o r a l argument, "And so
t h a t everyone u n d e r s t a n d s , I'm not going t o c o n s i d e r anything t h a t o c c u r r e d by
way of a c t i v i t y a f t e r t h e January of '95 motion [ t o d i s m i s s by K i r t o n and
Burbidge only] was f i l e d , for purposes of r e s o l v i n g t h i s m o t i o n . " Record a t 806.
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Boyd respectfully submits that even if the Court concludes
that his claims against the attorney defendants should have been
dismissed, Boyd took affirmative steps to prosecute his claims
against the Harmon defendants by filing his request for scheduling
conference before they moved to dismiss the case.

Accordingly, at

a minimum, this Court should reverse the dismissal of Boyd's claims
against the Harmon defendants.
L.

THE PARTIES HAD SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS TWELVE MONTHS
BEFORE THE TIME DEFENDANTS FILED THEIR MOTIONS TO
DISMISS.

In this case, Boyd engaged in settlement discussions with
several of the defendants during the period of alleged inactivity
and before the time defendants filed their motions to dismiss.52
In light of such settlement discussions before the filing of a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, Boyd submits that it
was improper for the trial court to dismiss Boyd's claims with

52

Mr. Jones stated on the record before the trial court that after his
meeting with Mr. Kay in 1994, he talked to Mr. Boyd regarding settlement. Record
at 804-805, 812-13. Thereafter, Mr. Boyd proposed a settlement regarding Kirton
and Burbidge to Mr. Kay. Mr. Kay never responded. Record at 400, 14. Mr. Jones
testified, "In February 1994, I contacted Mr. Boyd regarding a meeting which I
had with Mr. Kay at court regarding this case. Mr. Kay asked me to provide him
with a settlement offer from Mr. Boyd. I contacted Mr. Boyd and he authorized
me to make a proposal to Mr. Kay. I then called Mr. Kay regarding the settlement
terms proposed by Mr. Boyd. Mr. Kay never told me of his clients' acceptance or
rejection of Mr. Boyd's settlement offer." .Id. Accordingly, Boyd initiated
settlement discussions as recently as ten months before the defendants filed
their motions to dismiss.
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prejudice.53

In Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah

1977), this Court held:
Turning now to the issue as to whether or not a lapse of
16 months in prosecuting a claim for relief is sufficient
to support a dismissal with prejudice, this court has
been active in that area and has held that where all of
the litigants had power to obtain relief and failed to do
so, it is error to dismiss with prejudice. None of the
defendants requested a re-setting of either a pre-trial
conference or trial as was mandated by the court
previously when the pre-trial was suspended by reason of
settlement negotiations.
•

*

*

Applying the foregoing rules to the case at hand, it
is obvious that plaintiffs' lack of diligence in
prosecuting over 16 months was reasonably excusable in
light of the settlement efforts and had defendants been
anxious to proceed they need only have taken such
affirmative step themselves.
Also, no prejudice to
defendants' position is evident while serious injustice
may well exist as result of the dismissal.
Similarly, no material prejudice to defendants is evident here,
despite their claims to the contrary.

Since their motions to

dismiss were decided in 1993, defendants have filed no substantive
motions, served no written discovery, sent no notices of deposition
and requested no scheduling or pretrial conference with the trial
court.
his

Boyd's inactivity, on the other hand, was partially due to

efforts

to

settle

the

case

with

at

least

three

of

the

defendants. Therefore, dismissal was inappropriate under Utah Oil.

53

Much emphasis has been placed upon the differing accounts of the
conversation between Mr. Jones and Mr. Kay. Where affidavits conflict on a
motion to dismiss, Boyd submits that the trial court must look at the parties'
affidavits in a light most favorable to Boyd and resolve the factual disputes in
favor of the nonmoving party. Accordingly, the Court should find that settlement
negotiations did take place and the court should reverse the trial court's
dismissal under Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977).
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II,

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT,
In his amended complaint, Boyd alleged that, in the spring of

1986, the Harmon defendants and he entered into a binding written
agreement for the purchase of all of the common stock of Harmon
City.54

Boyd further alleged that certain of the defendants made

untrue statements of material

fact and omitted to state other

material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading
—

specifically that defendants failed to disclose to Boyd, as the

purchaser of the Harmon City stock, that Harmon City's shareholders
had been accused

of

an ERISA violation

$4,000,000 liability.55
fourth

cause

violation

of

of

a potential

Based on these factual allegations, the

action

Section

involving

in

the

61-1-1(2)

amended
of

the

complaint
Utah

asserted

Securities

(hereinafter the "Act") entitling Boyd to damages.56

I

a

Act
n

early 1993, upon separate motions by the defendants, the trial
court dismissed Boyd's fourth cause of action, concluding that
there is no private right of action for securities fraud under the
Act.57

The trial court's conclusion in that regard is contrary to

the plain language of the Act and the application of the statute by
Utah courts and constituted reversible error.

5A

270-72

Record a t 12,

116.

55

R e c o r d a t 12, 1 1 8 .

56

Record a t 16-17,

57

R e c o r d a t 2 2 3 - 2 8 (Addendum K ) ; 2 5 7 - 6 0 (Addendum L ) ; 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; (Addendum M);
(Addendum N ) ; 2 9 3 - 9 6 (Addendum O ) .

1145-47.
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A^

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT,

Section 61-1-1 of the Act provides:
It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
* * *

(2) make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not
misleading.
Section 61-1-20 confers upon the Division of Securities of the
Utah State Department of Commerce broad enforcement powers for
violations of the Act.

In addition to the enforcement authority of

the Division of Securities, Section 61-1-22(1)(a), in relevant
part, unequivocally and unambiguously confers a private right of
action for violations of Section 61-1-1(2):
A person who . . . offers, sells or purchases
a security in violation of Subsection 61-11(2) is liable to the person selling the
security to or buying the security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity.
In its order dismissing Boyd's claim under the Act, the trial
court correctly observed that Boyd's claim was based on Sections
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22, as set forth above.

However, in dismissing

the securities fraud claim, the trial court mistakenly concluded
that there is no private right of action for securities fraud under
the Act.
private

The trial court reasoned that (i) because there is no
right

of

action

solely

under

Section

61-1-1

(citing

Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co. . 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974)), and because
29

Sections

61-1-1(2)

and

61-1-22(1)(a)

both

involve

the

same

actionable conduct, there can be no private right of action under
Section 61-1-22; and (ii) Section 61-1-20 provides the exclusive
enforcement procedures under the Act, all of which are vested with
the Division of Securities.58

Neither of these rationales

is

consistent with the language of the statute or the cases applying
the statute.
In Milliner, the Court affirmed the dismissal of securities
fraud claims by the purchaser of securities against the accountants
and attorneys of the seller of the securities. The Court held that
the accountants owed no duty to the plaintiff, and

that plaintiff

had failed to allege culpable conduct on the part of the attorney
defendants.

Milliner, 529 P. 2d at 808. The Court then observed in

dicta that Section 61-1-1 "does not provide for a private right of
action for its violation."

Id.

The contents of the complaint at issue in Milliner are not
evident from the published opinion.

Nevertheless, the only way to

reconcile the Court's language in Milliner (quoted above) with the
unambiguous provisions of Section 6-1-22 is to assume that the
complaint relied upon Section 61-1-1 as the statutory authority for
the private right of action, rather than relying on a violation of
Section 61-1-1 as the predicate act giving rise to a private cause

Record at 223-28 (Addendum K); 257-60 (Addendum L); 261-62; (Addendum M);
270-72 (Addendum N); 293-96 (Addendum O ) .
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of action under Section 61-1-22. 59 Moreover, the Court in Milliner
did not discuss the effect of Section 61-1-22 or i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p
with Section 61-1-1.
In

any

case,

Milliner

cannot

be

read

to

support

the

proposition t h a t t h e r e i s no p r i v a t e r i g h t of action under the Act,
p a r t i c u l a r l y in l i g h t of the multiple decisions in which t h i s Court
and the Court of Appeals have acknowledged such a p r i v a t e r i g h t
e i t h e r expressly or i m p l i c i t l y .
P. 2d 958, 960 (Utah 1987)

See, e . g . , Ball v. Volken, 741

(affirming

trial

c o u r t ' s award on a

p r i v a t e action under the Act and remanding for determination of
a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s ) ; Russell v. M a r t e l l , 681 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Utah
1984) (affirming default judgment for p l a i n t i f f in p r i v a t e action
brought under the Act for misrepresentations in connection with
s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n s ) ; Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1246
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) ( i m p l i c i t l y acknowledging t h a t a person buying
a s e c u r i t y has a p r i v a t e cause of action for s e c u r i t i e s fraud under
the Act).

Since 1974, when M i l l i n e r was d e c i d e d , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e h a s , on s e v e r a l
o c c a s i o n s , amended S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 2 2 .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e o p e r a t i v e language
c o n f e r r i n g a p r i v a t e r i g h t of a c t i o n for m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of m a t e r i a l f a c t i n
connection with an o f f e r , purchase or s a l e of s e c u r i t i e s has been a p a r t of t h a t
s e c t i o n s i n c e t h e Utah L e g i s l a t u r e f i r s t adopted a modified v e r s i o n of t h e
Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act i n 1963. See Laws of Utah 1963, Chapter 145.
Any p o s s i b l e confusion t h a t may have e x i s t e d about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between
S e c t i o n s 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22 as of 1974, c e r t a i n l y would have been c l a r i f i e d
by t h e 1990 amendments t o s e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 2 2 .
Those amendments exchanged t h e
n a r r a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e t y p e s of conduct t h a t a r e a c t i o n a b l e under S e c t i o n
61-1-22 for a shorthand r e f e r e n c e t o persons who o f f e r or s e l l s e c u r i t i e s "in
v i o l a t i o n of Subsection 6 1 - 1 - 1 ( 2 ) . " 1990 Laws of Utah, c h a p t e r 133, s e c t i o n 15.
I t i s c l e a r from t h i s amendment t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e always has i n t e n d e d a
v i o l a t i o n of S e c t i o n 61-1-1(2) t o be t h e b a s i s for a p r i v a t e r i g h t of a c t i o n
under S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 2 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) .
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Nor does Section 61-1-20, as the trial court assumed, render
Section 61-1-22 a nullity.
director

of

the

Division

Rather, Section 61-1-20 allows the
of

Securities

administrative or judicial proceedings

M

to

institute

either

[w]henever it appears to

the director that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about
to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of [the
Act]."

Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-20.

Conspicuously absent from

Section 61-1-20 is any indication that the Legislature intended it
to be the exclusive remedy for violations of the Act.

As is

explained above, such a construction would be contrary to the plain
language of other sections of the statute as well as the judicial
application of the statute by Utah courts.
In sum, the trial court erroneously concluded that Boyd had no
claim under the Act.

Thus, that decision should be reversed.60

Although not mentioned by the trial court in its memorandum decisions
dismissing Boyd's securities fraud claim, defendants asserted in their memoranda
in support of their motions to dismiss the securities fraud claim that Boyd had
not actually purchased the stock of Harmon City, and therefore had no standing
under the Act. The Utah Court of Appeals recently has clarified the extent to
which a plaintiff must be a "purchaser" of securities to have standing under the
Act. A review of that authority demonstrates that Boyd had standing under the
Act because he alleged in his amended complaint that he had entered into a
binding executory contract for the purchase of the securities.
In Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245 (Utah ct. App. 1994), the court
remanded a securities fraud action in which the lower court had entered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff. The court held that there was insufficient evidence
to determine whether the plaintiff was a "purchaser" for purposes of the Act.
Id. at 1248. The court followed other jurisdictions that have adopted versions
of the Uniform Securities Act in concluding that "[pjotential purchasers or mere
offerees do not have a cause of action [under Section 61-1-22(1)(a)]." £d. at
1246. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that a party who has entered into a
binding executory contract for the purchase of securities may be deemed to be a
purchaser for purposes of standing under the Act. Id. at 1247-48 n.5.; see also
id. at 1249 (Bench J., dissenting) ("under the statute, there need be only a
contract to sell and not necessarily an actual sale").
In this case, Boyd clearly and sufficiently alleged the existence of an
enforceable contract for the purchase of the stock of Harmon City. Given such
allegations, for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Boyd had
(continued...)
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CONCLUSION
Dismissal for failure to prosecute with prejudice and on the
merits is a harsh and permanent result not favored by this Court.
Boyd does not dispute that a trial court may and should, in an
appropriate
sanction.

case, exercise

its

discretion

by

imposing

such a

Boyd respectfully submits, however, that dismissal with

prejudice for failure to prosecute should be reserved for cases of
misconduct, contempt for court orders or rules, or extraordinarily
long periods of inactivity —
case.

none of which are present in this

At a minimum, Boyd should be allowed to proceed against the

Harmon

defendants

because

Boyd

moved

the

trial

court

for

a

scheduling conference before those defendants filed their motion to
dismiss.

Finally, the trial court erred as a matter of law in

concluding that Boyd had failed to state a claim under the Utah
Securities Act.
In light of the foregoing, Boyd respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss Boyd's claims
with

prejudice

and

remand

to

the

trial

court

for

additional

proceedings.

60

( . . .continued)
established his standing to sue under the Act. Accordingly, there was no
alternate basis for the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss
Boyd's securities fraud claim, and summary affirmance of that dismissal by this
Court is inappropriate.
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DATED this 15th day of February, 1996.
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR
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_ _
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M. Jones
J. (Jlark Gibb
Attorneys for Samuel L. Boyd
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I hereby certify that on the 15th day of February, 1996, I
caused two copies of the foregoing to be mailed in the U.S. Mail,
first-class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T. Ostler
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants Harmon City, Inc.
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas L. Kay
SNELL & WILMER
Attorney for Defendants Kirton and Burbidge
111 East Broadway #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Glenn C. Hanni
STRONG & HANNI
Attorney for Defendant Matthew Hilton
600 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

TITLE H. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND
ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An
appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court
to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from
all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided
by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial
court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but
is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of
attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties
are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their
interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file
a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another
party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the
appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party,
or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal
shall be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise
directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the
appellate court, the party making the original application
shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the
respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal
shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed
from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken;
and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the
appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by
serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of
record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party
is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's
last known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the
time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a
civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of
the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and
also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of
appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of
appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docketing fee, and a
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate
court. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the
docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the
appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the
title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant
identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of
the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the
trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within

Rule 5

30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial
court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the
order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other
such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any
party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for
an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a
defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before
the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect.
Anew notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court
disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except
as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal
filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order
but before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of
appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of
appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice
of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by
paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by
paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of
the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10
days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from
an interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial
court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A
timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines
is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission
to appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may
direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the
requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented
to the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk
of the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the
petition, together with the fee required by statute. For a
petition presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall
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designation in any official publication of the statutes or
ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice
thereof.
(j) Libel and slander.
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary
in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic
facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is
sufficient to state generally that the same was published
or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is
controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter
must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or
spoken.
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for
libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of
the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and,
whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in
evidence the mitigating circumstances.
Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court
shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the
title of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or
other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall
include the names of all the parties, but other pleadings and
papers need only state the name of the first party on each side
with an indication that there are other parties. A party whose
name is not known shall be designated by any name and the
words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem,
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons
who claim any interest in the subject matter of the action."
Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall also
state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of
any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which
information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first
page. Every pleading shall state the name and address of the
party for whom it is filed; this information shall appear in the
lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of
claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the
contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable
to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or
occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated
in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a
pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the
same pleading or in another pleading, or in any motion. An
exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings
and other papers filed with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be typewritten, printed or
photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed paper of
letter size (8 Va." x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2
inches above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not
less than 1 inch, a right-hand margin of not less than one-half
inch, and a bottom margin of not less than one-half inch. All
typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be doublespaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or
printing shall appear on one side of the page only.
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under
all signature lines, and all signatures shall be made in
permanent black or blue ink.

(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties.
The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings and other
papers filed with the court. If they are not prepared in
conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but
may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers
for nonconforming papers. The clerk or the court may waive
the requirements of this rule for parties appearing pro se. For
good cause shown, the court may relieve any party of any
requirement of this rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original
pleading or paper filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the
court may, upon motion, with or without notice, authorize a
copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.)
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name who is duly licensed to
practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address also shall
be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer
within twenty days after the service of the summons and
complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by
statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading
stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer
thereto within twenty days after the service upon him. The
plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is
ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a
motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows,
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its
disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the
court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite
statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within
ten days after the service of the more definite statement.
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7)
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by
being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a
claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to
serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the
pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in
a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the
court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be
deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to
frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The
motion shall point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the
court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may
strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make
such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within
twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a
motion under this rule may join with it the other motions
herein provided for and then available to him. If a party
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this
rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter
make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.

V^x v i u

x J.V^V_/*-.J^

wa.*^

fh) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and
objections which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to
state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the
pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if
made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b)
in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a
responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made
pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such
motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When
the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign
corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the
plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the
court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking
with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No
security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or
agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff
fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the
service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the
defendant, enter an order dismissing the action,
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as
a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subjectmatter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not
state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the
claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to
render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is
not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a
counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter
of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought
by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount
or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the
opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either matured or was acquired by the
pleader after serving his pleading may, with the permission of
the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up
a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set
up the counterclaim by amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state
as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-
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Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences.
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its
discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct the attorneys
for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before
it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes
as:
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that
the case will not be protracted for lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more
thorough preparation;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the orderly
disposition of the case.
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. In any
action, in addition to any pretrial conferences that may be
scheduled, the court in its discretion may direct that a
scheduling or management conference be held. The court may
direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before
the court. Scheduling or management conferences may also be
held by way of telephone conferencing between the court and
counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions and
agreements reached at scheduling and management conferences may be formally made an order of the court. At the
conference, the court may consider the following matters:
(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional
parties or amendment of pleadings;
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery;
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions;
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance rulings from the court on admissibility of evidence;
(6) the identification of witnesses and documents, the
need for and schedule for filing and exchanging trial
briefs, and the dates for a final pretrial and scheduling
conference and for a trial;
(7) the advisability of referring matters to a lower court
that has appropriate jurisdiction to hear the case;
(8) the possibility of settlement;
(9) the need for adopting special procedures for managing particularly difficult or protracted actions that may
involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal
questions, or unusual proof problems;
(10) the form and substance of a pretrial order, if it is
determined that a formal pretrial order is necessary in
the particular case; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of
the case.
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any
action where a final pretrial conference has been ordered, it
shall be held as close to the time of trial as reasonable under
the circumstances. The conference shall be attended by at
least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of
the parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless
waived by the court, shall have available, either in person or
by telephone, the appropriate parties who have authority to
make binding decisions regarding settlement.
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey
a scheduling or pretrial order, if no appearance is made on
behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a
party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to
participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney
fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its
own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as

are just, and among others, any of the orders provided in Rule
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other
sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney
representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
PART IV.
PARTIES.
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a
party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides,
an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in
the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on
the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and
such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same
effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an
insane or incompetent person who is a party must appear
either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem
appointed in the particular case by the court in which the
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in
any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action or
proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor,
insane or incompetent person in the action or proceeding,
notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem
it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any
unknown party who might be a minor or an incompetent
person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad
litem appointed by a court must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of
the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or
if under that age, upon the application of a relative or
friend of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application
of the minor if the minor is of the age of fourteen years
and applies within 20 days after the service of the
summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend
of the minor, or of any other party to the action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state,
the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an
order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad
litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or
someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after
service of notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of such notice
may be made upon the defendant's general or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is
none, such notice, together with the summons in the
action, shall be served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years
of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service on
the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad
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(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports.
At the time of making an order to submit to an examination
under Subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall, upon motion
of the party to be examined, order the party seeking such
examination to furnish to the party to be examined a report of
any examination previously made or medical treatment previously given by any examiner employed directly or indirectly
by the party seeking the order for a physical or mental
examination, or at whose instance or request such medical
examination or treatment has previously been conducted. If
the party seeking the examination refuses to deliver such
report, the court on motion and notice may make an order
requiring delivery on such terms as are just; and if an
examiner fails or refuses to make such a report the court may
exclude the examiner's testimony if offered at the trial, or may
make such other order as is authorized under Rule 37.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.)
Rule 36. Request for admission.
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any
other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of
the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to
fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in
the request. The request for admission shall contain a notice
advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless
said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may
allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request
unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made
available for inspection and copying. The request may, without
leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after
service of the summons and complaint upon that party.
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be
separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within
thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter
or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the
matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the
court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to
serve answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days
after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If
objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The
answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail
the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit
or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of
the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of
which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering
party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or
readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit
or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an
admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for
trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or
set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
The party who has requested the admissions may move to
determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless
the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall
order that an answer be served. If the court determines that
an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule,
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an
amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these

orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made
at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial.
The provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion.
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this
rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject
to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose
of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for
any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other
proceeding.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery;
sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party,
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as
follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to
a party may be made to the court in which the action is
pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the
court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a
party shall be made to the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation
under Rule 30(bX6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the
discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. When taking a
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the
question may complete or adjourn the examination before
he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may
make such protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be
treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the
motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the
motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a
just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer
a question after being directed to do so by the court in the
district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure
may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending.
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, including an order made
under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the
following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the
order was made or any other designated facts shall be
taken to be established for the purposes of "tie action
in accordance with the claim of the party - staining
the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of
court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an
order under Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce
another for examination, such orders as are listed in
Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision,
unless the party failing to comply shows that he is
unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey
the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by
the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit
the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document
or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable
attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds
that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable
ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4)
there was other g<n>a reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or
serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request
for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(bX6) or
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the

officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request
for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of
the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (bX2) of this rule. In lieu
of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the
party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by
the failure, unless the court finds that the ^'Uire was substantially justified or that other circumstance^ n:%&e an award
of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective
order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is
required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for
hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused
by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
PART VI.
TRIALS.
Rule 38. Jury trial of right.
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared
by the constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to
the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any
issue triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee
and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and
not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a
pleading of the party.
(c) Same: Specification of issues. In his demand a party
may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he
shall be i-emed to have demanded trial by jury for all the
issues ible. If he has demanded trial by jury for only
some o. «ae issues, any other party, within 10 days after
service of the demand or such lesser time as the court may
order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all
of the issues of fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee,
to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as
required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by
jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may
not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court.
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the
register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so
demanded shall be by jury, unless
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation
made in open court and entered in the record, consent to
trial by the court sitting without a jury, or
(2^ The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds
that c right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues
does not exist, or
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(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any
or all issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter
of right.
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar
(1) without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party,
the court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present If required
by the adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such
postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness
present taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the
testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made
with respect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule
32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)].
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable
statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer
or of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
Prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of
any state an action based on or including the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall
not be dismissed at the plaintiff^ instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of
the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the

order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal
of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph
(1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a
responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff
who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an
action based upon or including the same claim against the
same defendant, the court may make such order for the
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until
the plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse
party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision
(a)(lXi) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed
such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such
provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court
to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy
was obtained.
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials.
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of
any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
Rule 43. Evidence.
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these
ru)es, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. AU
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court.
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts
not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on
affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court
may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may
specify or limit his powers and may direct him to report only
upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to
receive and report evidence only and may fix the time and
place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing
of the master's report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before
him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or
proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the
order. He may require the production before him of evidence
upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the
production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of
reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath and
may himself examine them and may call the parties to the
action and examine them upon oath. When a party so requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered
and excluded in the same manner and subject to the same
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence for a
court sitting without a jury.
(d) Proceedings.
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the clerk
shall forthwith furnish the master with a copy of the order
of reference. Upon receipt thereof unless the order of
reference otherwise provides, the master shall forthwith
set a time and place for the first meeting of the parties or
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after the date of
the order of reference and shall notify the parties or their
attorneys. It is the duty of the master to proceed with all
reasonable diligence. Either party, on notice to the parties
and master, may apply to the court for an order requiring
the master to speed the proceedings and to make his
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and place
appointed, the master may proceed ex parte or, in his
discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving
notice to the absent party of the adjournment.
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the attendance of witnesses before the master by the issuance and
service of subpoenas as provided in Rule 45. If without
adequate excuse a witness fails to appear or give evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be
subjected to the consequences, penalties, and remedies
provided in Rules 37 and 45.
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of accounting are in issue before the master, he may prescribe the
form in which the accounts shall be submitted and in any
proper case may require or receive in evidence a statement by a certified public accountant who is called as a
witness. Upon objection of a party to any of the items thus
submitted or upon a showing that the form of statement is
insufficient, the master may require a different form of
statement to be furnished, or the accounts or specific
items thereof to be proved by oral examination of the
accounting parties or upon written interrogatories or in
6uch other manner as he directs.
(e) Report.
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall prepare a
report upon the matters submitted to him by the order of
reference and, if required to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, he shall set them forth in the report.
He shall file the report with the clerk of the court and in
an action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise
directed by the order of reference, shall file with it a
transcript of the proceedings and of the evidence and the
original exhibits. The clerk shall forthwith mail to all
parties notice of the filing.

(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be tried
without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous. Within 10 days after
being served with notice of the filing of the report any
party may serve written objections thereto upon the other
parties. Application to the court for action upon the report
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion and upon
notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The court after hearing
may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it in
whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may
recommit it with instructions.
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury
the master shall not be directed to report the evidence.
His findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be read to
the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any
objections in point of law which may be made to the
report.
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a master's report is the same whether or not the parties have
consented to the reference; but, when the parties stipulate
that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be
considered.
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a master may
submit a draft thereof to counsel for all parties for the
purpose of receiving their suggestions.
(f) Objections to appointment of master. A party may
object to the appointment of any person as a master on the
same grounds as a party may challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objections
must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same
manner as a motion.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
PARTVH.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of
a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving
multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against
one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the
justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate
rights of the parties on each side as between or among
themselves.
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(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default
shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount,
that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) l b whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in
these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for
review is taken, costs of th- action, other than costs in
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the fina. determination of the cause.
Costs against the state of ^ tan, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs
must within five days after the entry of judgment serve
upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and
necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the
court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct >nd that
the disbursements have been necessarily incurr m the
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with :ne costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of
costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was
rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and
filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is
entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment.
The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs
have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank
left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment
docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
appear the clerk shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the
default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of
this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve
any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules t
be served on a party to the action or proceeding, except a
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event tha
it is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with
regard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting
party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as
follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by
computation be made certain, and the defendant has been
personally served otherwise than by publication or by
personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon
request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the

amount due and costs against the defendant, if he has
been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an
infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled
to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor.
If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the
truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of an ther matter, the court may conduct such
hearings or » aer such references as it deems necessary
and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court
may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The
provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a
party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of
Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency
thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the
state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as
to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
-vidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
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ARTICLE 9.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND JUVENILE PRACTICE.
RULE

4-901. Notice requirements for cases pending in both district
or circuit court and juvenile court.
4-902. Certification of district court cases to juvenile court.
4-903. Uniform custody evaluations.
4-904. Repealed.
4-905. Domestic pretrial conferences and orders.
4-906. Guardian ad litem program.
4-907. Mandatory divorce education.
4-908. [Reserved.]
4-909. Mandatory divorce mediation.
4-910. Sanctions for denial of child visitation.
4-911. Motion and order for payment of costs and fees.
4-912. Child support worksheets.
ARTICLE 1.
CALENDAR MANAGEMENT.
Rule 4-101. Calendaring court sessions.
Intent:
lb establish a procedure for calendaring court sessions and
cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) The clerk of court of record shall, prior to October 1 of
each year, schedule the time for holding court for each court
site within that courts jurisdiction.
(2) The clerk of court shall annually prepare a court calendar which shall include:
(A) The locations within that court's jurisdiction in
which court will be held.
(B) The dates when court will be held.
(3) The calendar shall be submitted to the Administrative
Office prior to October 1 of each year. Calendars shall run from
January 1 through December 31 of the following year.
(4) The calendar shall be posted in a conspicuous location at
the appropriate courthouse.
(Amended effective April 15, 1995.)
Rule 4-102. Law and motion calendar.
Intent:
Tb establish a uniform procedure of scheduling matters on
the law and motion calendar.
Tb establish uniform notice requirements and filing deadlines for law and motion matters.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil and criminal proceedings in
the District and Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Law and motion matters,
(A) In multi-judge districts, law and motion matters
arising in connection with a case which has been assigned
for all purposes to a particular judge shall be heard by the
assigned judge.
(B) If the assigned judge is unavailable, the case shall
not be assigned or transferred to any other judge for
handling without the approval of the presiding judge.
(2) Notice and filing requirements.
(A) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring

written notice shall be heard only after written notice
served no less than five days prior to the date of the
hearing, unless the court for good cause shown orders the
period of time for notice of hearing shortened.
(B) Affidavits in support of law and motion matters
must be filed with the motion or memorandum of points
and authorities supporting or opposing the motion. Other
documents filed in support of or in opposition to law and
motion matters, including returns of service on supplemental orders, orders to show cause and bench warrants,
must be filed in the clerk's office at least two working days
before the hearing on the matter, together with a copy of
the signed order showing the date and time of the required appearance.
(C) Proceedings based upon supporting documents
which are not filed in accordance with this rule may be
dismissed.
(3) Ex-parte matters, stipulated matters and supplemental proceedings.
(A) Ex-parte matters based upon stipulations may be
presented at any time to the assigned judge. Proceedings
on the law and motion calendar involving the taking of
evidence may be heard after those not requiring the
taking of evidence. Add-ons may be heard on the day set
for hearing, provided proper notice has been given and the
convenience of the court permits such hearing.
(B) Motions for supplemental proceedings may be set
on the weekly supplemental proceedings calendar or
before the judge assigned to the case on the assigned
judge's regular law and motion calendar.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Rule 4-103. Civil calendar management.
Intent:
lb establish a procedure which allows the trial courts to
manage civil case processing.
Tb reduce the time between case filing and disposition.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) If a default judgment has not been entered by the
plaintiff within 60 days of the availability of default, the clerk
shall mail written notification to the plaintiff stating that
absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in the
notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice
for lack of prosecution.
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been served
and filed within 180 days of the filing date, the clerk shall mail
written notification to the parties stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in the notification, the
court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of
prosecution.
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, move to vacate a dismissal entered under this rule.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; May 1, 1993; May 15,
1994.)
Rule 4-104. Request for trial setting.
Intent:
lb establish a procedure for the assignment of trial dates,
lb provide firm and timely trial dates in civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts.
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Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small
claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement
and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain, if known, the judgment debtor's address or last known address and social
security number.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff" or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court,
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to writing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; April 15, 1995.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment added the final sentence to the Intent
paragraph, deleted "and not of record" following "courts of record" in the Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivision (10).

The 1995 amendment rewrote Subdivision
(6) after "shall contain," which had read "the
address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the social security number of
the judgment debtor if known."
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CHAPTER 2
S U P R E M E COURT
Section
78-2-1.

Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and
associate chief justice — Selection and functions.
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
78-2-2.
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78-2-3.
Repealed.
78-2-4.
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
78-2-5.
Repealed.
78-2-6.
Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7.
Repealed.
78-2-7.5.
Service of sheriff to court.
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.

78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice
and associate chief justice — Selection and
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
initially to serve until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten
years and commences on the first Monday in J a n u a r y following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices. The t e r m of the office of chief justice is four
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court.
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30
days of a vacancy in t h a t office, the associate chief justice shall
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice h a s duties as provided by
law.
(6) There is created t h e office of associate chief justice. The
term of office of t h e associate chief justice is two years. The
associate chief justice may serve in t h a t office no more than
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice.
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate
chief justice as consistent with law.
1990
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971,1081

78-2-2. S u p r e m e Court j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Supreme Court h a s original jurisdiction to answer
Questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
Process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
^ d decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
, (3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
Jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over.

78-2-4

(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Sovereign Lands and Forestry;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
1995
78-2-3.
78-2-4.

Repealed.

1986

S u p r e m e C o u r t — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s pro tempore, a n d p r a c t i c e of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
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Chapter
2b Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification
3 Securities and Securities Transfer Agents [Repealed]
4 Take-Over Offers for Equity Securities [Repealed]
5 Corporate Take-Overs [Repealed]
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CHAPTER 1
UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
Section
61-1-1
61-1-2
61-1-3
61-1-4
61-1-5
61-1-6
61-1-7
61-1-8
61-1-9
61-1-10
61-1-11
61-1-12
61-1-13
61-1-14
61-1-14 5
61-1-16
61-1-17
61-1-18
61-1-18 1
61-1-18 2
61-1-18 3
61-1-18 4
61-1-18 5

61-1-18 6
61-1-18 7
61-1-19
61-1-20
61-1-21
61-1-21 1
61-1-21 5
61-1-22
61-1-23
61-1-24
61-1-25
61-1-26
61-1-27
61-1-28
61-1-29
61-1-30

Fraud unlawful
Investment adviser — Unlawful acts
Licensing of broker-dealers, agents,
and investment advisers
Licensing procedure
Posthcensmg provisions
Denial, suspension, revocation, cancellation, or withdrawal of license
Registration before sale
Registration by notification
Registration by coordination
Registration by qualification
Provisions applicable to registration
generally
Denial, suspension, and revocation of
registration
Definitions
Exemptions
Burden of proving exemption
FJJJJ?^ of sa)as hterature
False statements unlawful
No finding by division on merits —
Contrary representation unlawful
Division of Securities established —
Director — Appointment — Functions
Technical experts and specialists —
Employment — Contracts
Budget — Annual report
Information obtained by division —
Use for personal benefit prohibited
— Disclosure
Fees collected by division
Securities Advisory Board established
— Appointment — Duties — Qualifications — Terms — Vacancies —
Meetings — Conflicts of interest —
Compensation
Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings
Funding of securities investor education and training
Investigations authorized
Enforcement
Penalties for violations
Limitation of prosecutions
Legaf counsef — Prosecutions
Sales and purchases in violation —
Remedies — Limitation of actions
Review of orders
Rules, forms, and orders of division
Record of registrations
Scope of the act — Service of process
Construction of chapter
Citation of chapter
Savings clause
Prior law repealed — Savings clause

61-1-1. Fraud unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person, m connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly 0
indirectly to
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(2) make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in orxfer to make the statements made, m the
light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person
198J
61-1-2. Investment adviser — Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person who receives any
consideration from another person primarily for advising the other person as to the value of securities or
their purchase or sale, whether through the issuance
of analyses or reports or otherwise to
(a) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud the other person,
(b) engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon the other person, or
(c) divide or otherwise split any consideration
with any person not licensed under this chapter
as an investment advisor or investment adviser
representative
(2) (a) Except as may be permitted by rule of the
division, it is unlawful for any investment adviser to enter into, extend, or renew any investment advisory contract unless it provides in writmg that
d) the investment adviser shall not be
compensated on the basis of a share of capital gams upon or capital appreciation of the
funds or any portion of the funds of the client,
(n) no assignment of the contract may be
made by the investment adviser without the
consent of the other party to the contract;
and
(in) the investment adviser, if a partnership, shall notify the other party to the contract of any change in the membership of the
partnership within a reasonable time after
the change
(b) Subsection 61-l-2(2)(a)(i) does not prohibit
an investment advisory contract which provides
for compensation based upon the total value of a
fund averaged over a definite period, or as of definite dates or taken as of a definite date
(c) "Assignment," as used in Subsection
61-l-2(2)(a)(n), includes any direct or indirect
transfer or hypothecation of an investment advi-^
sory contract by the assignor or of a controlling
block of the assignor's outstanding voting secunties by a security holder of the assignor
^
(d) If the investment adviser is a partnership,
no assignment of an investment advisory contract is considered to result from the death or
withdrawal of a minority of the members of the
investment adviser having only a minority interest in the business of the investment adviser, or
from the admission to the investment adviser ot,
one or more members who, after admission, will
be only a minority of the members and will havei
only a minority interest in the business

3) It is unlawful for any investment adviser to
•e or have custody of any securities or funds of any
' t if:
(a) the division by rule prohibits custody; or
(b) in the absence of a rule, the investment

J
adviser fails to notify the division that he has or
"may have custody.
tj The division may by rule adopt exemptions
Subsections 61-l-2(2)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) where
exemptions are consistent with the public intergnd within the purposes fairly intended by the
Jicy and provisions of this chapter.
1993

f.1-3. Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, and
investment advisers.
) It is unlawful for any person to transact busiin this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless
person is licensed under this chapter.
!) (a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an agent unless the
agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not
" iffective during any period when he is not associa t e d with a particular broker-dealer licensed unler this chapter or a particular issuer,
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a conlection with a broker-dealer or issuer, or begins
'or terminates those activities which make him
tan agent, the agent as well as the broker-dealer
Vor issuer shall promptly notify the division,
t) It is unlawful for any person to transact busiin this state as an investment adviser or as an
iment adviser representative unless:
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or
(b) the person's only clients in this state are
^investment companies as defined in the Investm e n t Company Act of 1940, other investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, trust companies,
^savings and loan associations, insurance compazines, employee benefit plans with assets of not
tiless than $1,000,000, and governmental agencies
or instrumentalities, whether acting for themi$elves or as trustees with investment control, or
vother institutional investors as are designated by
So rule or order of the director; or
;e/ (c) the person has no place of business in this
state and during any period of 12 consecutive
imonths does not direct business communications
pin this state in any manner to more than five
clients, other t h a n those specified in Subsection
,<n (b), whether or not the person or any of those to
'i whom the communications are directed is then
i< present in this state.
[4). (a) It is unlawful for any investment adviser
} required to be licensed to employ an investment
[j adviser representative unless the investment adviser representative is licensed under this chapter,
ft •• (b) The license of an investment adviser representative is effective during the period when the
person is employed by an investment adviser liij, censed under this chapter.
&<' (c) When an investment adviser representat i v e begins or terminates employment with an
investment adviser, both the investment adviser
CL\.and the investment adviser representative shall
B Promptly notify the division.
1991
f*

*7i\"*" k* c e n s * n S procedure.
gft) (a) A broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser,
or investment adviser representative must obtain an initial or renewal license by filing with
the division or its designee an application to-

gether with a consent to service of process under
Section 61-1-26.
(b) The application shall contain whatever information the division by rule requires concerning such matters as:
(i) the applicant's form and place of organization;
(ii) the applicant's proposed method of doing business;
(iii) the qualifications and business history of the applicant; in the case of a brokerdealer or investment adviser, the qualifications and business history of any partner,
officer, or director, any person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly
controlling the broker-dealer or investment
adviser;
(iv) any injunction or administrative order or conviction of a misdemeanor involving
a security or any aspect of the securities
business and any conviction of a felony; and
(v) the applicant's financial condition and
history.
(c) The division may, by rule or order, require
an applicant for an initial license to publish an
announcement of the application in one or more
specified newspapers published in this state.
(d) Licenses of broker-dealers, agents, investment advisers, and investment adviser representatives shall expire on December 31 of each year.
(e) (i) If no denial order is in effect and no proceeding is pending under Section 61-1-6, a
license becomes effective at noon of the 30th
day after an application is filed.
(ii) The division may by rule or order specify an earlier effective date and may by order
defer the effective date until noon of the 30th
day after the filing of any amendment.
(iii) Licensing of a broker-dealer automatically constitutes licensing of only one partner, officer, director, or a person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions as a licensed agent of the brokerdealer.
(iv) Licensing of an investment adviser
automatically constitutes licensing of only
one partner, officer, director, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions.
(2) (a) Every applicant for an initial or renewal
license shall pay a reasonable filing fee as determined under Section 61-1-18.4.
(b) If the license or renewal is not granted or
the application is withdrawn, the division shall
retain the fee.
(3) A licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser
may file an application for licensing of a successor for
the unexpired portion of the year. There shall be no
filing fee.
(4) The division may by rule require a minimum
capital for licensed broker-dealers and establish minimum financial requirements for investment advisers, which may include different requirements for
those investment advisers who maintain custody of or
have discretionary authority over client funds or securities and those investment advisers who do not.
(5) (a) The division may by rule require licensed
broker-dealers and investment advisers who
have custody of or discretionary authority over
client funds or securities to post surety bonds and

may by rule determine the conditions and the
amounts of the bonds.
(b) Any appropriate deposit of cash or securities may be accepted in lieu of any required bond.
(c) No bond may be required of any licensee
whose net capital, or in the case of an investment
adviser whose minimum financial requirements,
which may be defined by rule, exceeds $30,000.
(d) Every bond shall provide for suit on the
bond by any person who has a cause of action
under Section 61-1-22 and, if the division by rule
or order requires, by any person who has a cause
of action not arising under this chapter.
(e) Every bond shall provide that no suit may
be maintained to enforce any liability on the
bond unless brought before the expiration of four
years after the act or transaction constituting the
violation or the expiration of two years after the
discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting
the violation, whichever expires first.
1991

61-1-5. Postlicensing provisions.
(1) (a) Every licensed broker-dealer and investment adviser shall make and keep such accounts,
correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and
other records as the division by rule prescribes.
(b) All required records shall be preserved for
three years unless the division by rule prescribes
otherwise for particular types of records.
(2) (a) Every licensed broker-dealer shall, within
24 hours after demand, furnish to any customer
or principal for whom the broker-dealer has executed any order for the purchase or sale of any
securities, either for immediate or future delivery, a written statement showing the time when,
the place where, and the price at which the securities were bought and sold.
(b) With respect to investment advisers, the
division may require that certain information be
furnished or disseminated as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors and advisory clients.
(c) To the extent determined by the director,
information furnished to clients or prospective
clients of an investment adviser pursuant to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the rules
thereunder may be used in whole or partial satisfaction of this requirement.
(3) Every licensed broker-dealer and investment
adviser shall file financial reports as the division by
rule prescribes.
(4) If the information contained in any document
filed with the division is or becomes inaccurate or
incomplete in any material respect, the licensee shall
promptly file a correcting amendment unless notification of the correction has been given under Section
61-1-3.
(5) (a) All the records referred to in Subsection (1)
are subject at any time or from time to time to
reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations by representatives of the division, within or
without this state, as the division deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
(b) For the purpose of avoiding unnecessary
duplication of examination, the division may cooperate with the securities administrators of
other states, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and national securities exchanges or national securities associations registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
1991

61-1-6. Denial, suspension, revocation, cancellation, or withdrawal of license.
(1) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the director, by means of adjudicative proceedings conducted in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, may
issue an order denying, suspending, or revoking any
license, barring or censuring any licensee or any officer, director, partner, or person occupying a similar
status or performing similar functions for a licensee
from employment with a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser, or restricting or limiting a licensee
as to any function or activity of the business for
which a license is required in this state, and may
impose a fine if the director finds that it is in the
public interest and if he finds any of the following
with respect to the applicant or licensee or, in the
case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any
partner, officer, or director, or any person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, or any
person directly or indirectly controlling the brokerdealer or investment adviser, that the person:
(a) has filed an application for a license that,
as of its effective date or as of any date after
filing in the case of an order denying effectiveness, was incomplete in any material respect or
contained any statement that was, in light of the
circumstances under which it was made, false or
misleading with respect to any material fact;
(b) has willfully violated or willfully failed to
comply with any provision of this chapter or a
predecessor act or any rule or order under this
chapter or a predecessor act;
(c) was convicted, within the past ten years, of
any misdemeanor involving a security or any aspect of the securities business, or any felony;
(d) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by
any court of competent jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice involving any aspect of the securities business;
(e) is the subject of an order of the director or
any predecessor denying, suspending, or revoking license as a broker-dealer, agent, investment
adviser, or investment adviser representative;
(f) is the subject of:
(i) an adjudication or determination,
within the past five years by a securities or
commodities agency or administrator of another state, Canadian province or territory,
or a court of competent jurisdiction that the
person has willfully violated the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
Commodity Exchange Act, or the securities
or commodities law of any other state; or
(ii) an order entered within the past five
years by the securities administrator of any
state or Canadian province or territory or by
the Securities and Exchange Commission
denying or revoking license as a brokerdealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser representative or the substantial equivalent of those terms or is the subject of an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending or expelling
the person from a national securities exchange or national securities association registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, or is the subject of a United States post
office fraud order; except that

(in) the division may not commence
agency action to revoke or suspend any license under Subsection (f) more than one
year from the date of the order relied on, and
the director may not enter an order under
Subsection (f) on the basis of an order under
another state's law unless that order was
based on facts that would currently constitute a ground for an agency action under this
section,
(g) has engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business,
(h) is insolvent, either in the sense that liabilities exceed assets or in the sense that obligations
cannot be met as they mature, except that the
director may not enter an order against a brokerdealer or investment adviser under this subsection without a finding of insolvency as to the broker-dealer or investment adviser,
(1) is not qualified on the basis of the lack of
training, experience, and knowledge of the securities business, except as otherwise provided in
Subsection (3),
(j) has failed reasonably to supervise his
agents or employees if the person is a brokerdealer, or his investment adviser representatives
or employees if the person is an investment adviser, or
(k) has failed to pay the proper filing fee
within 30 days after being notified by the division of a deficiency
(2) The division may enter a denial order under
Subsection (l)(j) or (k), but shall vacate the order
when the deficiency has been corrected
(3) The division may not institute a suspension or
revocation proceeding on the basis of a fact or transaction known to it when the license became effective
unless the proceeding is instituted within the next
120 days
(4) The following provisions govern the application
of Subsection 61-l-6(l)(i)
(a) The director may not enter an order
against a broker-dealer on the basis of the lack of
qualification of any person other than
(l) the broker-dealer himself if he is an individual, or
(n) an agent of the broker-dealer
(b) The director may not enter an order
against an investment adviser on the basis of the
lack of qualification of any person other than
d) the investment adviser himself if he is
an individual, or
(n) an investment adviser representative
(c) The director may not enter an order solely
on the basis of lack of experience if the applicant
or licensee is qualified by training or knowledge
(d) The director shall consider that an agent
who will work under the supervision of a licensed
broker-dealer need not have the same qualifications as a broker-dealer and that an investment
adviser representative who will work under the
supervision of a licensed investment adviser need
not have the same qualifications as an investment adviser
(e) d) The director shall consider that an investment adviser is not necessarily qualified
solely on the basis of experience as a brokerdealer or agent
(n) When the director finds that an applicant for a license as a broker-dealer is not
qualified as an investment adviser, the director may condition the applicant's license

as a broker-dealer upon the applicants not
transacting business in this state as an investment adviser
(f) (l) The division may by rule provide for examinations, which may be written or oral or
both, to be taken by any class of or all applicants
(n) The division may by rule or order
waive the examination requirement as to a
person or class of persons if the division determines that the examination is not necessary for the protection of investors
(5) If the director finds that any licensee or applicant for a license is no longer in existence, has ceased
to do business as a broker-dealer, agent, investment
adviser, or investment adviser representative, or is
subject to an adjudication of mental incompetence or
to the control of a committee, conservator, or guardian, or cannot be located after reasonable search, the
division may summarily cancel or deny the license or
application according to the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act
(6) (a) Withdrawal from license as a broker-dealer,
agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser
representative becomes effective 30 days after receipt of an application to withdraw or within a
shorter period of time as determined by the director, unless
(l) a revocation or suspension proceeding
is pending when the application is filed,
(n) a proceeding to revoke or suspend or to
impose conditions upon the withdrawal is instituted within 30 days after the application
is filed, or
(in) additional information is requested
by the division regarding the withdrawal application
(b) (I) If a proceeding described in Subsection
(5)(a) is pending or instituted, the director
shall designate by order when and under
what conditions the withdrawal becomes effective
(n) If additional information is requested,
withdrawal is effective 30 days after the additional information is filed
(c) (l) If no proceeding is pending or instituted,
and withdrawal automatically becomes effective, the director ma> initiate a revocation or suspension proceeding under Section
61-1-6 within one year after withdrawal became effective
(n) The director shall enter any order under Subsection (1Kb) as of the last date on
which the license was effective
1991
61-1-7. Registration before sale.
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any
security in this state unless it is registered under this
chapter or the security or transaction is exempted
under Section 61-1-14
1983
61-1-8. Registration by notification.
(1) The following securities may be registered by
notification, whether or not they are also eligible for
registration by coordination under Section 61-1-9
(a) any security whose issuer and any predecessors have been in continuous operation for at
least five years if there has been no default during the current fiscal year or within the three
preceding fiscal years in the payment of principal, interest, or dividends on any security of the

issuer, or any predecessor with a fixed maturity
or a fixed interest or dividend provision, and the
issuer and any predecessors during the past three
fiscal years have had average net earnings, de
termined in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles
(1) which are applicable to all securities
without a fixed maturity or a fixed interest
or dividend provision outstanding at the date
the registration statement is filed and equal
to at least 5% of the amount of such outstanding securities, as measured by the maximum offering price or the market price on a
day, selected by the registrant, within 30
days before the date of filing the registration
statement, whichever is higher, or book
value on a day, selected by the registrant,
within 90 days of the date of filing the registration statement to the extent that there is
neither a readily determinable market price
nor a cash offering price, or
(n) which, if the issuer and any predecessors have not had any security of the type
specified in Subsection (l)(a)(i) outstanding
for three full fiscal years, equal to at least
5% of the amount, as measured in Subsection
(l)(a)(i), of all securities which will be outstanding if all the securities being offered or
proposed to be offered, whether or not they
are proposed to be registered or offered in
this state, are issued,
(b) any security, other than a certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining
title or lease or in payments out of production
under such a title or lease, registered for
nonissuer distribution if any security of the same
class has ever been registered under this chapter
or a predecessor act, or the security being registered was originally issued pursuant to an exemption under this chapter or a predecessor act
(2) A registration statement under this section
shall contain the following information and be accompanied by the following documents in addition to the
information specified in Subsection 61-1-11(3) and
the consent to service of process required by Section
61-1-26
(a) a statement demonstrating eligibility for
registration by notification,
(b) with respect to the issuer and any significant subsidiary
(I) its name, address, and form of organization,
(n) the state or foreign jurisdiction and
the date of its organization, and
(m) the general character and location of
its business,
(c) with respect to any person on whose behalf
any part of the offering is to be made in a
nonissuer distribution
(2) his name and address,
(II) the amount of securities of the issuer
held by him as of the date of the filing of the
registration statement, and
(III) a statement of his reasons for making
the offering,
(d) a description of the security being registered,
(e) the information and documents specified in
clauses (h), (1), and 0) of Subsection 61-1-10(2),
and

(f) in the case of any registration under Subsection 61-l-8(l)(b) which does not also satisfy
the conditions of Subsection 61-l-8(l)(a)
(I) a balance sheet of the issuer as of a
date within four months prior to the filing of
the registration statement, and
(II) a summary of earnings for each of the
two fiscal years preceding the date of the balance sheet and for any period between the
close of the last fiscal year and the date of
the balance sheet, or for the period of the
issuer's and any predecessor's existence if
less than two years
(3) If no stop order is in effect and no proceeding is
pending under Section 61-1-12, a registration statement under this section automatically becomes effective at 3 p m Mountain Standard Time of the second
full working day after the filing of the registration
statement or the last amendment, or at such earlier
time as the division determines
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61-1-9. Registration by coordination.
(1) Any secunty for which a registration statement
or a notification under Regulation A or any successor
to Regulation A has been filed under the Securities
Act of 1933 in connection with the same offering may
be registered by coordination
(2) A registration statement under this section
shall contain the following information and be accompanied by the following documents in addition to the
information specified in Subsection 61-1-11(3) and
the consent to service of process required by Section
61-1-26
(a) One copy of the disclosure statement together with all its amendments filed under the
Securities Act of 1933,
(b) If the division by rule or otherwise requires, a copy of the articles of incorporation and
bylaws or their substantial equivalents currently
in effect, a copy of any agreements with or among
underwriters, a copy of any indenture or other
instrument governing the issuance of the security to be registered and a specimen or copy of the
security,
(c) If the division requests, any other information, or copies of any other documents, filed under the Securities Act of 1933, and
(d) An undertaking to forward all future
amendments to the disclosure
statement
promptly and in any event not later than the first
working day after the day they are forwarded to
or filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, whichever first occurs
(3) A registration statement under this section automatically becomes effective at the moment the disclosure statement becomes effective if all the following conditions are satisfied
(a) no stop order is in effect and no proceeding
is pending under Section 61-1-12,
(b) the disclosure statement has been on file
with the division for at least ten working days,
ancf
(c) a statement of the maximum and minimum
proposed offering prices and the maximum underwriting discounts and commissions has been
on file for two full working days or such shorter
period as the division permits by rule or otherwise and the offering is made within those limitations
(4) (&) The registrant shall promptly notify the division by telephone or telegram of the date and
time when the disclosure statement became ef-

fective and the content of the price amendment,
if any, and shall promptly file a posteffective
amendment containing the information and documents in the price amendment.
(b) "Price amendment" means the final federal
amendment which includes a statement of the
offering price, underwriting and selling discounts
or commissions, amount of proceeds, conversion
rates, call prices, and other matters dependent
upon the offering price.
(5) (a) Upon failure to receive the required notification and posteffective amendment with respect
to the price amendment, the division may enter a
stop order, without notice or hearing, retroactively denying effectiveness to the registration
statement or suspending its effectiveness until
compliance with Subsection (4), if it promptly notifies the registrant by telephone or telegram and
promptly confirms by letter or telegram when it
notifies by telephone of the issuance of the order.
(b) If the registrant proves compliance with
the requirements of Subsection (4) as to notice
and posteffective amendment, the stop order is
void as of the time of its entry.
(6) The division may by rule or otherwise waive
either or both of the conditions specified in Subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c).
(7) If the disclosure statement becomes effective
before all the conditions in Subsections (3)(b) and
(3)(c) are satisfied and they are not waived, the disclosure statement automatically becomes effective as
soon as all the conditions are satisfied.
(8) If the registrant advises the division of the date
when the disclosure statement is expected to become
effective, the division shall promptly advise the registrant by telephone or telegram, at the registrant's
expense, whether all the conditions are satisfied and
whether it then contemplates the institution of proceedings under Section 61-1-12, but this advice by the
division does not preclude the institution of such a
proceeding at any time.
(9) The division may by rule or order permit registration by coordination of any security for which a
notification or similar document has been filed under
the Securities Act of 1933 in connection with the
same offering.
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61-1-10. Registration by qualification.
(1) Application may be made to register any security by qualification.
(2) A registration statement under this section
shall contain the following information and be accompanied by the following documents in addition to the
information specified in Subsection 61-1-11(3) and
the consent to service of process required by Section
61-1-26:
(a) with respect to the issuer and any significant subsidiary:
(i) its name, address, and form of organization;
(ii) the state or foreign jurisdiction and
date of its organization;
(iii) the general character and location of
its business;
(iv) a description of its physical properties
and equipment; and
(v) a statement of the general competitive
conditions in the industry or business in
which it is or will be engaged;
(b) with respect to every director and officer of
the issuer or person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions:

(i) his name, address, and principal occupation for the past five years;
(ii) the amount of securities of the issuer
held by him as of a specified date within 30
days of the filing of the registration statement;
(iii) the amount of the securities covered
by the registration statement to which he
has indicated his intention to subscribe; and
(iv) a description of any material interest
in any material transaction with the issuer
or any significant subsidiary affected within
the past three years or proposed to be affected;
(c) with respect to persons covered by Subsection (b), the remuneration paid during the past
12 months and estimated to be paid during the
next 12 months, directly or indirectly, by the issuer, together with all predecessors, parents,
subsidiaries, and affiliates, to all those persons in
the aggregate;
(d) with respect to any person owning of
record, or beneficially if known, 10% or more of
the outstanding shares of any class of equity security of the issuer, the information specified in
Subsection (b) other than the person's occupation;
(e) with respect to every promoter if the issuer
was organized within the past three years, the
information specified in Subsection (b), any
amount paid to the promoter within that period
or intended to be paid to the promoter, and the
consideration for any such payment;
(f) with respect to any person on whose behalf
any part of the offering is to be made in a
nonissuer distribution:
(i) the person's name and address;
(ii) the amount of securities of the issuer
held by the person as of the date of filing of
the registration statement;
(iii) a description of any material interest
in any material transaction with the issuer
or any significant subsidiary effected within
the past three years or proposed to be effected; and
(iv) a statement of the person's reasons for
making the offering;
(g) the capitalization and long-term debt, on
both a current and pro forma basis, of the issuer
and any significant subsidiary, including a description of each security outstanding or being
registered or otherwise offered, and a statement
of the amount and kind of consideration, whether
in the form of cash, physical assets, services,
patents, goodwill, or anything else, for which the
issuer or any subsidiary has issued any of its securities within the past two years or is obligated
to issue any of its securities;
(h) (i) the kind and amount of securities to be
offered;
(ii) the proposed offering price or the
method by which it is to be computed;
(iii) any variation therefrom at which any
proportion of the offering is to be made to
any person or class of persons other than the
underwriters, with a specification of any
such person or class;
(iv) the basis upon which the offering is to
be made if otherwise than for cash;
(v) the estimated aggregate underwriting
and selling discounts or commissions and
finders' fees, including separately cash, secu-

rities, contracts, or anything else of value to
accrue to the underwriters or finders in connection with the offering, or, if the selling
discounts or commissions are variable, the
basis of determining them and their maximum and minimum amounts;
(vi) the estimated amounts of other selling
expenses, including legal, engineering, and
accounting charges;
(vii) the name and address of every underwriter and every recipient of a finder's fee;
(viii) a copy of any underwriting or selling-group agreement under which the distribution is to be made, or the proposed form of
any such agreement whose terms have not
yet been determined; and
(ix) a description of the plan of distribution of any securities which are to be offered
otherwise than through an underwriter;
(i) (i) the estimated cash proceeds to be received by the issuer from the offering;
(ii) the purposes for which the proceeds
are to be used by the issuer;
(iii) the amount to be used for each purpose;
(iv) the order or priority in which the proceeds will be used for the purposes stated;
(v) the amounts of any funds to be raised
from other sources to achieve the purposes
stated; the sources of any such funds; and
(vi) if any part of the proceeds is to be used
to acquire any property, including goodwill,
otherwise than in the ordinary course of
business, the names and addresses of the
vendors, the purchase price, the names of
any persons who have received commissions
in connection with the acquisition, and the
amounts of any such commissions and any
other expense in connection with the acquisition, including the cost of borrowing money
to finance the acquisition;
(j) a description of any stock options or other
security options outstanding, or to be created in
connection with the offering, together with the
amount of any such option held or to be held by
every person required to be named in clause (b),
(d), (e), (0, or (h) and by any person who holds or
will hold 10% or more in the aggregate of any
such options;
(k) (i) the dates of, parties to, and general effect concisely stated of, every management
or other material contract made or to be
made otherwise than in the ordinary course
of business if it is to be performed in whole or
in part at or after the filing of the registration statement or was made within the past
two years, together with a copy of every such
contract; and
(ii) a description of any pending litigation
or proceeding to which the issuer is a party
and which materially affects its business or
assets, including any such litigation or proceeding known to be contemplated by governmental authorities;
(1) a copy of any prospectus, pamphlet, circular, form letter, advertisement, or other sales literature intended as of the effective date to be
used in connection with the offering;
(m) (i) a specimen copy of the security being
registered;
(ii) a copy of the issuer's articles of incorporation, and bylaws, if any, or their sub-

stantial equivalents, as currently in effect;
and
(iii) a copy of any indenture or other instrument covering the security to be registered;
(n) a signed or conformed copy of an opinion of
counsel as to the legality of the security being
registered, with an English translation if it is in
a foreign language, which shall state whether
the security when sold will be legally issued,
fully paid, and nonassessable, and if a debt security, a binding obligation of the issuer;
(o) the written consent of any accountant, engineer, appraiser, or other person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him,
if that person is named as having prepared or
certified a report or valuation, other than a public and official document or statement, which is
used in connection with the registration statement;
(p) (i) a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date
within four months prior to the filing of the
registration statement;
(ii) a profit and loss statement and analysis of retained earnings for each of the three
fiscal years preceding the date of the balance
sheet and for any period between the close of
the last fiscal year and the date of the balance sheet, or for the period of the issuer's
and any predecessors' existence if less t h a n
three years; and
(iii) if any part of the proceeds of the offering is to be applied to the purchase of any
business, the same financial statements
which would be required if that business
were the registrant; and
(q) such additional information or verification
of any statement as the division requires by rule
or order.
(3) A registration statement under this section becomes effective when the division so orders.
(4) As a condition of registration under this section, a prospectus containing the information, but not
containing copies of contracts or agreements specified
in Subsections (2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (0, (g), (h), (i), (j),
(k), and (p) shall be sent or given to each person to
whom an offer is made before or concurrently with:
(a) the first written offer made to the person,
otherwise than by means of a public advertisement, by or for the account of the issuer or any
other person on whose behalf the offering is being made, or by any underwriter or broker-dealer
who is offering part of an unsold allotment or
subscription taken by the person as a participant
in the distribution;
(b) the confirmation of any sale made by or for
the account of any such person;
(c) payment pursuant to any such sale; or
(d) delivery of the security pursuant to any
such sale, whichever occurs
first.
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61-1-11.

Provisions applicable to registration
generally.
( D A registration statement may be filed by the
issuer, any other person on whose behalf the offering
is to be made, or a licensed broker-dealer.
(2) Every person filing a registration statement
shall pay a filing fee as determined under Section
61-1-18.4.
(3) Every registration statement shall specify:
(a) the amount of securities to be offered in
this state;

(b) the states in which a registration statement or similar document in connection with the
offering has been or is to be filed, and
(c) any adverse order, judgment, or decree entered in connection with the offering by the regu
latory authorities in each state or by any court or
the Securities and Exchange Commission
(4) Any document filed under this chapter or a pre
decessor act within five years preceding the fifing of a
registration statement may be incorporated by reference in the registration statement to the extent that
the document is currently accurate
(5) The division may permit the omission of any
item of information or document from any registration statement
(6) In the case of a nonissuer distribution, information may not be required under Section 61-1-10 or
Subsection 61-1-11(9) unless it is known to the person
filing the registration statement or to the persons on
whose behalf the distribution is to be made, or can be
furnished by them without unreasonable effort or expense
(7) (a) The division may require as a condition of
registration by qualification or coordination
(l) that any security issued within the
past three years or to be issued to a promoter
for a consideration substantially different
from the public offering price, or to any person for a consideration other than cash, be
deposited in escrow, and
(n) that the proceeds from the sale of the
registered security be impounded until the
issuer receives a specified amount from the
sale of the security either in this state or
elsewhere
(b) The division may determine the conditions
of any escrow or impounding required by this
subsection, but it may not reject a depository
solely because of location in another state
(8) (a) Every registration statement is effective for
one year from its effective date
(b) All outstanding securities of the same class
as a registered security are considered to be registered for the purpose of any nonissuer transaction
(I) so long as the registration statement is
effective, and
(n) between the 30th day after the entry of
any stop order suspending or revoking the
effectiveness of the registration statement
under Section 61-1-12, if the registration
statement did not relate in whole or in part
to a nonissuer distribution and one year
from the effective date of the registration
statement
(c) A registration statement may not be withdrawn for one year from its effective date if any
securities of the same class are outstanding
(d) A registration statement may be withdrawn otherwise only in the discretion of the division
(9) So long as a registration statement is effective
and the offering is not completely sold, the division
may require the person who filed the registration
statement to file reports, not more often than quarterly, to keep reasonably current the information contained in the registration statement and to disclose
the progress of the offering
(10) (a) A registration statement may be amended
after its effective date so as to increase the securities specified to be offered and sold, if the public
offering price and underwriters' discounts and

commissions are not changed from the respective
amounts of which the division was informed
(b) The amendment becomes effective when
the division so orders
(c) Everv person filing an amendment shall
pay a registration fee as determined under Section 61-1-18 4 with respect to the additional securities proposed to be offered
(d) The amendment relates back to the date of
the sale of the additional security being regis
tered provided that within six months of the
date of the sale the amendment is filed and the
additional registration fee is paid
(11) (a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (b), an issuer may only employ or engage an
agent to effect or attempt to effect transactions in
its securities who is licensed under this chapter
and associated with a licensed broker-dealer
(b) A partner, officer, or director of an issuer,
or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, ma> act as an agent of
the issuer to effect or attempt to effect transactions in its securities, provided the person is licensed under this chapter and receives no commission or other remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect the
transactions
(12) (a) Any security that is offered or sold under
Section 4(5) of the Securities Act of 1933 or that
is a "mortgage related security" as defined in
Section 3(a)(41) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 shall not be exempt under Subsection
61-l-14(l)(a) to the same extent as any obligation
issued by or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or an agency or instrumentality of the United States Accordingly, any
such security shall comply with the applicable
registration and qualification requirements set
forth in this chapter
(b) This subsection specifically overrides the
preemption of state law contained in Section
106(c) of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Public Law Number
98-440
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61-1-12. Denial, suspension, and revocation of
registration.
(1) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the director, by means of adjudicative proceedings conducted in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act,
may issue a stop order that denies effectiveness to, or
suspends or revokes the effectiveness of, any securities registration statement and may impose a fine if
he finds that the order is in the public interest and
that
(a) the registration statement, as of its effective date or as of any earlier date in the case of
an order denying effectiveness, or any amendment under Subsection 61-1-11(10) as of its effective date, or any report under Subsection 61-111(9), is incomplete in any material respect, or
contains any statement that was, in the light of
the circumstances under which it was made, false
or misleading with respect to any material fact,
(b) any provision of this chapter, or any rule,
order, or condition lawfully imposed under this
chapter, has been willfully violated, in connection with the offering, by
d) the person filing the registration statement,

(ii) the issuer, any partner, officer, or director of the issuer, any person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by the issuer, but
only if the person filing the registration
statement is directly or indirectly controlled
by or acting for the issuer; or
(in) any underwriter;
(c) the security registered or sought to be registered is the subject of an administrative stop
order or similar order, or a permanent or temporary injunction of any court of competent jurisdiction entered under any other federal or state
act applicable to the offering; except that the division may not commence agency action against
an effective registration statement under this
subsection more than one year from the date of
the order or injunction relied on, and it may not
enter an order under this subsection on the basis
of an order or injunction entered under the securities act of any other state unless that order or
injunction was based on facts that would currently constitute a ground for a stop order under
this section;
(d) the issuer's enterprise or method of business includes or would include activities that are
illegal where performed;
(e) the offering has worked or tended to work a
fraud upon purchasers or would so operate;
(f) the offering has been or would be made
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and
sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or participation, or
unreasonable amounts or kinds of options;
(g) when a security is sought to be registered
by notification, it is not eligible for such registration;
(h) when a security is sought to be registered
by coordination, there has been a failure to comply with the undertaking required by Subsection
61-l-9(2)(d); or
(i) the applicant or registrant has failed to pay
the proper filing fee.
(2) The director may enter an order under this section but may vacate the order if he finds that the
conditions that prompted its entry have changed or
that it is otherwise in the public interest to do so.
(3) The director may not issue a stop order against
an effective registration statement on the basis of a
fact or transaction known to the division when the
registration statement became effective unless the
proceeding is instituted within the next 120 days.
(4) No person may be considered to have violated
Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any order or
sale effected after the entry of an order under this
section if that person proves by a preponderance of
ths evidence that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of the order.
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6M-13. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that, directly or
indirectly, through one or more intermediaries,
controls or is controlled by, or is under common
control with a person specified.
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or
issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who represents an issuer,

who receives no commission or other remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities
in this state, and who:
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted by Subsection 61-l-14(l)(a), (b), (c),
(i), or (j);
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-1-14(2); or
(c) effects transactions with existing employees, partners, officers, or directors of the
issuer. A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or issuer, or a person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, is an agent only if he otherwise comes
within this definition.
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own account. "Broker-dealer" does not include:
(a) an agent;
(b) an issuer;
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust
company;
(d) a person who has no place of business
in this state if:
(i) the person effects transactions in
this state exclusively with or through:
(A) the issuers of the securities
involved in the transactions;
(B) other broker-dealers; or
(C) banks, savings institutions,
trust companies, insurance companies, investment companies as defined in the Investment Company
Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional buyers,
whether acting for themselves or as
trustees; or
(ii) during any period of 12 consecutive months the person does not direct
more than 15 offers to sell or buy into
this state in any manner to persons
other than those specified in Subsection
(3)(d)(i), whether or not the offeror or
any of the offerees is then present in this
state;
(e) a general partner who organizes and
effects transactions in securities of three or
fewer limited partnerships, of which the person is the general partner, in any period of
12 consecutive months;
(f) a person whose participation in transactions in securities is confined to those
transactions made by or through a brokerdealer licensed in this state;
(g) a person who is a real estate broker
licensed in this state and who effects transactions in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel mortgage
or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire
mortgage, deed or trust, or agreement, together with all the bonds or other evidences
of indebtedness secured thereby, is offered
and sold as a unit;
(h) a person effecting transactions in commodity contracts or commodity options; or
(i) other persons as the division, by rule or
order, may designate, consistent with the

public interest and protection of investors, as
not within the intent of this subsection
(4) "Bu>" or "purchase" means every contract
for purchase of, contract to buy, or acquisition of
a security or interest in a security for value
(5) "Commodity" means, except as otherwise
specified by the division by rule
(a) any agricultural, grain, or livestock
product or byproduct, except real property or
any timber, agricultural, or livestock product grown or raised on real property and offered or sold by the owner or lessee of the
real property,
(b) any metal or mineral, including a precious metal, except a numismatic com whose
fair market value is at least 15% greater
than the value of the metal it contains,
(c) any gem or gemstone, whether characterized as precious, semi-precious, or otherwise,
(d) any fuel, whether liquid, gaseous, or
otherwise,
(e) any foreign currency, and
(f) all other goods, articles, products, or
items of any kind, except any work of art
offered or sold by art dealers, at public auction or offered or sold through a private sale
by the owner of the work
(6) "Commodity contract" means any account,
agreement, or contract for the purchase or sale,
primarily for speculation or investment purposes
and not for use or consumption by the offeree or
purchaser, of one or more commodities, whether
for immediate or subsequent delivery or whether
delivery is intended by the parties, and whether
characterized as a cash contract, deferred shipment or deferred delivery contract, forward contract, futures contract, installment or margin
contract, leverage contract, or otherwise
(a) Any commodity contract offered or sold
shall, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be offered or sold for
speculation or investment purposes
(b) (I) A commodity contract shall not include any contract or agreement which
requires, and under which the purchaser
receives, within 28 calendar days from
the payment in good funds any portion
of the purchase price, physical delivery
of the total amount of each commodity to
be purchased under the contract or
agreement
(n) The purchaser is not considered to
have received physical delivery of the
total amount of each commodity to be
purchased under the contract or agreement when the commodity or commodities are held as collateral for a loan or
are subject to a lien of any person when
the loan or hen arises in connection with
the purchase of each commodity or commodities
(7) (a) "Commodity option" means anv account, agreement, or contract giving a party
to the option the right but not the obligation
to purchase or sell one or more commodities
or one or more commodity contracts, or both
whether characterized as an option, privilege, indemnity, bid, offer, put, call, advance
guaranty, decline guaranty, or otherwise
(b) It does not include an option traded on
a national securities exchange registered

with the United btates becunneb cum JUA
change Commission or on a board of trade
designated as a contract market by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Securities charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter
(9) "Division" means the Division of Securities
established by Section 61-1-18
(10) "Executive director" means the executive
director of the Department of Commerce
(11) "Fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" are not
limited to their common-law meanings
(12) "Guaranteed" means guaranteed as to
payment of principal or interest as to debt securities, or dividends as to equity securities
(13) (a) "Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or
through publications or writings, as to the
value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing m, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as a part
of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities
(b) "Investment adviser" does not include
(l) a bank, savings institution, or
trust company;
(n) a lawyer, accountant, engineer, or
teacher whose performance of these services is solely incidental to the practice
of his profession,
(m) a broker-dealer or its agent
whose performance of these services is
solely incidental to the conduct of his
business as a broker-dealer and who receives no special compensation for them,
dv) a publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news column, news letter, news
magazine, or business or financial publication or service, of general, regular,
and paid circulation, whether communicated in hard copy form, or by electronic
means, or otherwise, that does not consist of the rendering of advice on the basis of the specific investment situation of
each client,
(v) a person whose advice, analyses,
or reports relate only to securities exempted by Subsection 61-l-14(l)(a),
(vi) an investment advisor representative, or
(vn) such other persons not within the
intent of this subsection as the division
may by rule or order designate
(14) "Investment
adviser
representative"
means any partner, officer, director of, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, or other individual employed by or
associated with an investment adviser, except
clerical or ministerial personnel, who
(a) makes any recommendations or otherwise renders advice regarding securities directly to advisory clients,
(b) manages accounts or portfolios of clients,
(c) determines which recommendation or
advice regarding securities should be given
if that person is a member of the investment
adviser's investment committee that determines general investment advice to be given
to clients or, if the investment adviser has no

investment committee, the person determines general client advice, but if there are
more than five such persons, only the supervisors of these persons are considered to be
investment adviser representatives;
(d) solicits, offers, or negotiates for the
sale of or sells investment advisory services;
or
(e) immediately supervises employees who
perform any of the foregoing.
(15) (a) "Issuer" means any person who issues
or proposes to issue any security or has outstanding a security that it has issued.
(b) With respect to a preorganization certificate or subscription, "issuer" means the
promoter or the promoters of the person to be
organized.
(c) With respect to:
(i) interests in trusts, including but
not limited to collateral trust certificates, voting trust certificates, and certificates of deposit for securities; or
(ii) shares in an investment company
without a board of directors, "issuer"
means the person or persons performing
the acts and assuming duties of a depositor or manager under the provisions of
the trust or other agreement or instrument under which the security is issued.
(d) With respect to an equipment trust
certificate, a conditional sales contract, or
similar securities serving the same purpose,
"issuer" means the person by whom the
equipment or property is to be used.
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, general or limited, "issuer" means the
partnership itself and not the general partner or partners.
(f) With respect to certificates of interest
or participation in oil, gas, or mining titles
or leases or in payment out of production under the titles or leases, "issuer" means the
owner of the title or lease or right of production, whether whole or fractional, who creates fractional interests therein for the purpose of sale.
(16) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer.
(17) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock
company, a joint venture, a trust where the interests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an unincorporated organization, a government, or a political subdivision of a government.
(18) "Precious metal" means the following,
whether in coin, bullion, or other form:
(a) silver;
(b) gold;
(c) platinum;
(d) palladium;
(e) copper; and
(f) such other substances as the division
may specify by rule.
(19) "Promoter" means any person who, acting
alone or in concert with one or more persons,
takes initiative in founding or organizing the
business or enterprise of a person.
(20) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract
for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a
security or interest in a security for value.
(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation

of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security for value.
(c) The following are examples of the definitions m Subsections (a) and (b):
(i) any security given or delivered
with or as a bonus on account of any
purchase of a security or any other
thing, is part of the subject of the purchase, and has been offered and sold for
value;
(ii) a purported gift of assessable
stock is an offer or sale as is each assessment levied on the stock;
(iii) an offer or sale of a security that
is convertible into, or entitles its holder
to acquire or subscribe to another security of the same or another issuer is an
offer or sale of that security, and also an
offer of the other security, whether the
right to convert or acquire is exercisable
immediately or in the future;
(iv) any conversion or exchange of one
security for another shall constitute an
offer or sale of the security received in a
conversion or exchange, and the offer to
buy or the purchase of the security converted or exchanged;
(v) securities distributed as a dividend wherein the person receiving the
dividend surrenders the right, or the alternative right, to receive a cash or property dividend is an offer or sale;
(vi) a dividend of a security of another
issuer is an offer or sale; or
(vii) the issuance of a security under a
merger, consolidation, reorganization,
recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall constitute the
offer or sale of the security issued as
well as the offer to buy or the purchase
of any security surrendered in connection therewith, unless the sole purpose
of the transaction is to change the issuer's domicile.
(d) The terms defined in Subsections
(20)(a) and (b) do not include:
(i) a good faith gift;
(ii) a transfer by death;
(iii) a transfer by termination of a
trust or of a beneficial interest in a
trust;
(iv) a security dividend not within
Subsection (20)(c)(v) or (vi);
(v) a securities split or reverse split;
or
(vi) any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in which a security is issued in exchange for one or
more outstanding securities, claims, or
property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash.
(21) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchange Act of 1934," "Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company Act of 1940" mean the federal statutes of
those names as amended before or after the effective date of this chapter.
(22) "Security" means any:
(a) note;
(b) stock;
(c) treasury stock;
(d) bond;

(e) debenture,
(f) evidence of indebtedness,
(g) certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement,
(h) collateral-trust certificate,
(1) preorganization certificate or subscription,
(j) transferable share,
(k) investment contract,
(1) burial certificate or burial contract
(m) voting-trust certificate,
(n) certificate of deposit for a security,
(o) certificate of interest or participation
in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in
payments out of production under such a title or lease,
(p) commodity contract or commodity option, or
(q) in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing
"Security" does not include any insurance or
endowment policy or annuity contract under
which an insurance company promises to
pay money in a lump sum or periodically for
life or some other specified period
(23) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
(24) "Working days" means 8 a m to 5 p m ,
Monday through Friday, exclusive of legal holidays hsted m Section 63-13-2
(25) A term not defined in Section 61-1-13
shall have the meaning as established by division rule The meaning of a term neither defined
in this section nor by rule of the division shall be
the meaning commonly accepted in the business
community
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61-1-14. Exemptions.
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sec
tions 61-1-7 and 61-1-15
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, issued or guaranteed by the United States,
any state, any political subdivision of a state, or
any agency or corporate or other instrumentality
of one or more of the foregoing, or any certificate
of deposit for any of the foregoing,
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Can
ada, any Canadian province, any political subdi
vision of any Canadian province, any agency or
corporate or other instrumentality of one or more
of the foregoing, or any other foreign government
with which the United States currently maintains diplomatic relations, if the security is rec
ognized as a valid obligation by the issuer or
guarantor,
(c) any security issued by and representing an
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any
bank organized under the laws of the United
States, or any bank, savings institution, or trust
company supervised under the laws of any state,
(d) any security issued by and representing an
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any
federal savings and loan association, or any
building and loan or similar association organized under the laws of any state and authorized
to do business in this state,

(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any
federal credit union or any credit union, industrial loan association, or similar association organized and supervised under the laws of this state,
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any
railroad, other common carrier, public utility or
holding company which is subject to the jurisdiction of the interstate commerce commission, a
registered holding company under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary of such a company within the meaning of
that act, or any security regulated in respect of
its rates or in its issuance by a governmental
authority of the United States, any state, Canada, or any Canadian province,
(g) any security listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System, the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock
exchange or medium approved by the division,
except that the director may at any time suspend
or revoke this exemption for any particular stock
exchange, medium, security, or securities under
Subsection 61-1-14(4), any other security of the
same issuer which is of senior or substantially
equal rank to any security so listed and approved
by the director, any security called for by subscription rights or warrants so listed or approved,
or any warrant or right to purchase or subscribe
to any of the foregoing,
(h) d) any security issued by any person organized and operated not for private profit but
exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, charitable, fraternal, social, athletic,
or reformatory purposes, or as a chamber of
commerce or trade or professional association, and
(n) any security issued by a corporation
organized under Title 3, Chapter 1, and any
security issued by a corporation to which the
provisions of that chapter are made applicable by compliance with the requirements of
Section 3-1-21,
d) a promissory note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance that evidences an obligation
to pay cash within nine months after the date of
issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or a renewal
of such an obligation that is likewise limited, or a
guarantee of such an obligation or of a renewal
d) issued in denominations of at least
$50,000, and
(n) either
(A) receives a rating in one of the
three highest rating categories from a
nationally recognized statistical rating
organization, or
(B) the issuer satisfies requirements
established by rule or order of the division,
(j) any investment contract issued in connection with an employees' stock purchase, savings,
pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit p\an,
(k) a security issued by an issuer registered as
an open-end management investment company
or unit investment trust under Section 8 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, if
(0 (A) the issuer is advised by an investment adviser that is a depository institution exempt from registration under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or
that is currently registered as an investment adviser, and has been registered,

or is affiliated with an adviser that has
been registered, as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 for at least three years next preceding an offer or sale of a security
claimed to be exempt under this subsection; and
(B) the adviser has acted, or is affiliated with an investment adviser that
has acted as investment adviser to one
or more registered investment companies or unit investment trusts for at
least three years next preceding an offer
or sale of a security claimed to be exempt under this subsection; or
(ii) the issuer has a sponsor that has at all
times throughout the three years before an
offer or sale of a security claimed to be exempt under this subsection sponsored one or
more registered investment companies or
unit investment trusts the aggregate total
assets of which have exceeded $100,000,000;
(iii) in addition to Subsection (i) or (ii), the
division has received prior to any sale exempted herein:
(A) a notice of intention to sell which
has been executed by the issuer which
sets forth the name and address of the
issuer and the title of the securities to be
offered in this state; and
(B) a filing fee as determined under
Section 61-1-18.4;
(iv) in the event any offer or sale of a security of an open-end management investment
company is to be made more than 12 months
after the date on which the notice and fee
under Subsection (iii) is received by the director, another notice and payment of the applicable fee shall be required.
(v) For the purpose of this subsection, an
investment adviser is affiliated with another
investment adviser if it controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with
the other investment adviser;
(1) any security as to which the director, by
rule or order, finds that registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
(2) The following transactions are exempted from
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected
through a broker-dealer or not;
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding security, if as provided by rule of the division:
(i) information about the issuer of the security as required by the division is currently listed in a securities manual recognized by the division, and the listing is based
upon such information as required by rule of
the division; or
(ii) the security has a fixed maturity or a
fixed interest or dividend provision and
there has been no default during the current
fiscal year or within the three preceding fiscal years, or during the existence of the issuer and any predecessors if less than three
years, in the payment of principal, interest,
or dividends on the security;
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or
through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to
an unsolicited order or offer to buy;

(d) any transaction between the issuer or other
person on whose behalf the offering is made and
an underwriter, or among underwriters;
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence
of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, deed of trust, or agreement, together with
all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness
secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit;
(f) any transaction by an executor, administrator, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator;
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide
pledgee without any purpose of evading this
chapter;
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company, insurance company, investment company as defined in the Investment
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing
trust, or other financial institution or institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the
purchaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary
capacity;
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or subscription if:
(i) no commission or other remuneration
is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber;
(ii) the number of subscribers acquiring
any legal or beneficial interest therein does
not exceed ten; and
(iii) there is no general advertising or solicitation in connection with the offer or sale;
(j) any transaction pursuant to an offer by an
issuer of its securities to its existing securities
holders, if:
(i) no commission or other remuneration,
other than a standby commission is paid or
given directly or indirectly for soliciting any
security holders in this state and the transaction constitutes either:
(A) the conversion of convertible securities;
(B) the exercise of nontransferable
rights or warrants;
(C) the exercise of transferable rights
or warrants if the rights or warrants are
exercisable not more than 90 days after
their issuance; or
(D) the purchase of securities under a
preemptive right; and
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection
(2)(j) is not available for an offer or sale of
securities to existing securities holders who
have acquired their securities from the issuer in a transaction in violation of Section
61-1-7;
(k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for
which registration statements have been filed
under both this chapter and the Securities Act of
1933 if no stop order or refusal order is in effect
and no public proceeding or examination looking
toward such an order is pending;'
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if
the person distributing the dividend is the issuer
of the securities distributed;
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or
through a registered broker-dealer where the
broker-dealer or issuer files with the division,
and the broker-dealer maintains in his records,
and makes reasonably available upon request to

any person expressing an interest in a proposed
transaction in the security with the brokerdealer information prescribed by the division under its rules;
(n) any transactions not involving a public offering;
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or
"time period units" as those terms are defined in
the Condominium Ownership Act, whether or
not to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions of the Condominium Ownership Act, or if
the units are located in another state, the condominium act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act, the Utah Timeshare and
Camp Resort Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code are complied with;
(p) any transaction or series of transactions involving a merger, consolidation, reorganization,
recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets,
if the consideration for which, in whole or in part,
is the issuance of securities of a person or persons, and if:
(i) the transaction or series of transactions
is incident to a vote of the securities holders
of each person involved or by written consent
or resolution of some or all of the securities
holders of each person involved;
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is
given under a provision in:
(A) the applicable corporate statute or
other controlling statute;
(B) the controlling articles of incorporation, trust indenture, deed of trust, or
partnership agreement; or
(C) the controlling agreement among
securities holders;
(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a)
or (c) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 or Section 20 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed;
(B) one person involved in the transaction is an insurance company which is
exempt from filing under Section
12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and has filed proxy or informational materials with the appropriate
regulatory agency or official of its domiciliary state; or
(C) all persons involved in the transaction are exempt from filing under Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and file with the division
such proxy or informational material as
the division requires by rule;
(iv) the proxy or informational material is
filed with the division and distributed to all
securities holders entitled to vote in the
transaction or series of transactions at least
ten working days prior to any necessary vote
by the securities holders or action on any
necessary consent or resolution; and
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or
revoke the exemption within ten working
days after filing of the proxy or informational materials;
(q) any transaction pursuant to an offer to sell
securities of an issuer if:
(i) the transaction is part of an issue in
which there are not more than 15 purchasers
in this state, other than those designated in

Subsection (2)(h), during any 12 consecutive
months;
(ii) no general solicitation or general advertising is used in connection with the offer
to sell or sale of the securities;
(iii) no commission or other similar compensation is given, directly or indirectly, to a
person other than a broker-dealer or agent
licensed under this chapter, for soliciting a
prospective purchaser in this state;
(iv) the seller reasonably believes that all
the purchasers in this state are purchasing
for investment;
(v) the transaction is part of an aggregate
offering that does not exceed $500,000, or a
greater amount as prescribed by a division
rule, during any 12 consecutive months; and
(vi) the director, as to a security or transaction, or a type of security or transaction,
may withdraw or further condition this exemption or waive one or more of the conditions in Subsection (q);
(r) any transaction involving a commodity contract or commodity option; and
(s) any transaction as to which the division
finds that registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
(3) Every person filing an exemption notice or application shall pay a filing fee as determined under
Section 61-1-18.4.
(4) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the director, by means of an adjudicative proceeding conducted in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, may
deny or revoke any exemption specified in Subsection
(l)(g), (h), or (j) or in Subsection (2) with respect to:
(a) a specific security, transaction, or series of
transactions; or
(b) any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or any entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or
issuer generally and may impose a fine if he finds
that the order is in the public interest and that:
(i) the application for or notice of exemption filed with the division is incomplete in
any material respect or contains any statement which was, in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or
misleading with respect to any material fact;
(ii) any provision of this chapter, or any
rule, order, or condition lawfully imposed
under this chapter has been willfully violated in connection with the offering or exemption by:
(A) the person filing any application
for or notice of exemption;
(B) the issuer, any partner, officer, or
director of the issuer, any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, or any person directly or
indirectly controlling or controlled by
the issuer, but only if the person filing
the application for or notice of exemption is directly or indirectly controlled
by or acting for the issuer; or
(C) any underwriter;
(iii) the security for which the exemption
is sought is the subject of an administrative
stop order or similar order, or a permanent
or temporary injunction or any court of competent jurisdiction entered under any other
federal or state act applicable to the offering

or exemption; the division may not institute
a proceeding against an effective exemption
under this subsection more than one year
from the date of the order or injunction relied on, and it may not enter an order under
this subsection on the basis of an order or
injunction entered under any other state act
unless that order or injunction was based on
facts that would currently constitute a
ground for a stop order under this section;
(iv) the issuer's enterprise or method of
business includes or would include activities
that are illegal where performed;
(v) the offering has worked, has tended to
work, or would operate to work a fraud upon
purchasers;
(vi) the offering has been or was made
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters'
and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other
compensation, or promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of
options;
(vii) an exemption is sought for a security
or transaction which is not eligible for the
exemption; or
(viii) the proper filing fee, if required, has
not been paid.
(5) (a) No order under Subsection (4) may operate
retroactively.
(b) No person may be considered to have violated Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any
offer or sale effected after the entry of an order
under this subsection if he sustains the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the order.
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61-1-14.5. Burden of proving exemption.
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of proving
an exemption under Section 61-1-14 or an exception
from a definition under Section 61-1-13 is upon the
person claiming the exemption or exception.
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61-1-15. Filing of sales literature.
The division may by rule or order require the filing
of any prospectus, pamphlet, circular, form letter, advertisement, or other sales literature or advertising
communication addressed or intended for distribution
to prospective investors, unless the security or transaction is exempted by Section 61-1-14.
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61-1-16. False statements unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person to make or cause to be
made, in any document filed with the division or in
any proceeding under this chapter, any statement
which is, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, false or misleading in
any material respect.
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61-1-17.

No finding by division on merits —

Contrary representation unlawful.
(1) Neither the fact that an application for registration or a registration statement has been filed nor
the fact that a person or security is effectively registered constitutes a finding by the division that any
document filed under this chapter is true, complete,
and not misleading. Neither any such fact nor the
fact that an exemption or exception is available for a
security or a transaction means that the division has
passed in any way upon the merits or qualifications
of, or recommended or given approval to, any person,
security, or transaction.

(2) It is unlawful to make, or cause to be made, to
any prospective purchaser, customer, or client any
representation inconsistent with Subsection (1). 1983
61-1-18. Division of Securities established — Director — Appointment — Functions.
(1) (a) There is established within the Department
of Commerce a Division of Securities.
(b) The division shall be under the direction
and control of a director, appointed by the executive director with the governor's approval.
(c) The director shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of this chapter.
(d) The director shall hold office at the pleasure of the governor.
(2) The director, with the approval of the executive
director, may employ such staff as necessary to discharge the duties of the division at salaries to be fixed
by the director according to standards established by
the Department of Human Resource Management.
1991

61-1-18.1. Technical experts and specialists —
Employment — Contracts.
The director may employ or contract with technical
experts and specialists including but not limited to
certified public accountants, appraisers, engineers,
and tax accountants to conduct or participate in any
examination, audit, investigation or proceeding. 1983
61-1-18.2. Budget — Annual report.
The director shall annually prepare and submit to
the executive director:
(1) a budget for the expenses of the division for
the administration and enforcement of this chapter for the next fiscal year; and
(2) a report outlining the division's work for
the preceding fiscal year.
1983

61-1-18.3. Information obtained by division —
Use for personal benefit prohibited —
Disclosure.
It is unlawful for any of the division's employees or
any member of the Securities Advisory Board to use
for personal benefit any non-public information
which is filed with or obtained by the division. No
provision of this chapter authorizes the division or
any of its officers or employees to disclose any such
information except among themselves or when necessary or appropriate in a proceeding or investigation
under this chapter. No provision of this chapter either creates or derogates from any privilege which
exists at common law or otherwise when documentary or other evidence is sought under subpoena directed to the division or any of its employees.
1983

61-1-18.4. Fees collected by division.
The Division of Securities shall establish, charge,
and collect fees pursuant to Section 63-38-3.2, except
when it can be demonstrated that the fee amount
should be based on factors other than cost, for the
following:
(1) the fair and reasonable cost of any examination, audit, or investigation authorized or required by this chapter or other state law;
(2) certificate of serving and mailing process
served upon the division in any action or proceeding commenced or prosecuted in this state
against any person who has appointed the division its agent as provided in Subsection
61-1-26(7); and
(3) copies and authentication of all papers,
publications, data, and other records available to

the public or issued under the division's authority.
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61-1-18.5.

Securities Advisory Board established — Appointment — Duties —
Qualifications — Terms — Vacancies
— Meetings — Conflicts of interest —
Compensation.
(1) There is hereby established a Securities Advisory Board. Members of the board shall be appointed
by the governor with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The board shall have the following duties:
(a) formulate and make recommendations to
the director regarding policy and budgetary matters;
(b) submit recommendations regarding registration requirements and division rules;
(c) formulate and make recommendations to
the director regarding the establishment of reasonable fees; and
(d) generally act in an advisory capacity to the
director with respect to the exercise of his duties,
powers, and responsibilities.
(2) The Securities Advisory Board shall be comprised of five members, two from the securities brokerage community who have at least five years prior
experience in securities matters, one from the securities section of the Utah Bar Association, one officer or
director of a corporation not subject to the reporting
requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and one from the public at
large who has no active participation in the securities
business. The term of the public member first appointed shall expire July 1, 1987, the term of the
broker and one attorney first appointed shall expire
July 1,1986, and the term of the other broker and the
officer or director first appointed shall expire July 1,
1985. The terms of the board members thereafter
shall run three years with no member serving more
than two consecutive terms.
(3) Any vacancy in the membership of the board
occurring other than by expiration of the term shall
be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but for the unexpired term only. All members
shall serve until their respective successors are appointed and qualified.
(4) The board shall meet at least quarterly on a
regular date to be fixed by the board and at such
other times at the call of the director or any two members of the board. Four members shall constitute a
quorum for the transaction of business. Actions of the
board shall require a vote of a majority of those
present.
(5) Each member of the board shall, by sworn and
written statement filed with the Department of Commerce and the lieutenant governor, disclose any position of employment or ownership interest that the
member has with respect to any entity or business
subject to the jurisdiction of the division. This statement shall be filed upon appointment and must be
appropriately amended whenever significant changes
occur in matters covered by the statement.
(6) The members of the board shall receive no salary but shall be paid a per diem allowance, as provided by law, for each day actually spent in the performance of their duties, and travel expenses as established by the Division of Finance.
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61-1-18.6.

P r o c e d u r e s — Adjudicative proceedings.
The Division of Securities shall comply with the
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter
46b, in its adjudicative proceedings.
1987

61-1-18.7.

Funding of securities investor education and training.
(1) There is created a special revenue fund known
as the Securities Investor Education and Training
Fund to provide revenue for educating the public and
the securities industry as provided in this section.
(2) All money received by the state by reason of
civil penalties ordered and administrative fines collected pursuant to this chapter shall be deposited in
the Securities Investor Education and Training Fund,
and subject to the requirements of Title 51, Chapter
5.
(3) The special revenue fund may include any fines
collected by the division after July 1, 1989, pursuant
to voluntary settlements or administrative orders.
(4) (a) The fund shall earn interest.
(b) All interest earned on fund monies shall be
deposited into the fund.
(5) Notwithstanding Title 63, Chapter 38, Budgetary Procedures Act, the director may use special revenue fund monies, upon concurrence of the Securities
Advisory Board and the executive director of the Department of Commerce, in a manner consistent with
the duties of the division under this chapter and only
for any or all of the following and the expense of providing them:
(a) education and training of Utah residents in
matters concerning securities laws and investment decisions, by publications or presentations;
(b) education of registrants and licensees under this chapter, by:
(i) publication of this chapter and rules
and policy statements and opinion letters of
the division; and
(ii) sponsorship of seminars or meetings to
educate registrants and licensees as to the
requirements of this chapter; and
(c) investigation and litigation.
(6) If the balance in the fund exceeds $100,000 at
the close of any fiscal year, the excess shall be transferred to the General Fund.
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61-1-19. Investigations authorized.
(1) (a) The division in its discretion may make any
public or private investigations within or without this state as it considers necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of this
chapter or any rule or order hereunder.
(b) To aid in the enforcement of this chapter or
in the prescribing of rules and forms hereunder,
the division may require or permit any person to
file a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated.
(c) The division may publish information concerning any violation of this chapter or the violation of any rule or order hereunder.
(2) For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this chapter, the division or any employee
designated by it may:
(a) administer oaths and affirmations;
(b) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance;
(c) take evidence; and
(d) require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, agreements,
or other documents or records relevant or material to the investigation.
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61-1-20. E n f o r c e m e n t .
Whenever it appears to the director that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in
any act or practice constituting a violation of this
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, in
addition to any specific powers granted in this chap
ter
(1) (a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the division
and show cause why an order should not be
issued directing the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or
doing any act in furtherance of the activity,
(b) the order to show cause shall state the
reasons for the order and the date of the
hearing,
(c) the director shall promptly serve a
copy of the order to show cause upon each
person named in the order,
(d) the director shall hold a hearing on the
order to show cause no sooner than ten business days after the order is issued,
(e) after a hearing, the director may issue
an order to cease and desist from engaging in
any act or practice constituting a violation of
this chapter or any rule or order under this
chapter The order shall be accompanied by
written findings of fact and conclusions of
law,
(f) the director may impose a fine, and
(g) the director may bar or suspend that
person from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in this
state
(2) (a) The director may bring an action in the
appropriate district court of this state or the
appropriate court of another state to enjoin
the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order
under this chapter,
(b) upon a proper showing in an action
brought under this section, the court may
(i) issue a permanent or temporary,
prohibitory or mandatory injunction,
(n) issue a restraining order or writ of
mandamus,
(in) enter a declaratory judgment,
(IV) appoint a receiver or conservator
for the defendant or the defendant's assets,
(v) order disgorgement,
(vi) order rescission,
(vn) impose a fine of not more than
$500 for each violation of the act, and
(vni) enter any other relief the court
considers just, and
(c) the court may not require the division
to post a bond in an action brought under
this subsection
1994
61-1-21. Penalties for violations.
(1) A person who willfully violates any provision of
this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or
who willfully violates any rule or order under this
chapter, or who willfully violates Section 61-1-16
knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material respect, shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1
shall upon conviction be

(a) fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years or both if, at the time
the crime was committed the property, money
or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be ob
tamed was worth $10,000 or less,
(b) fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned
not more than 10 years or both if, at the time the
crime was committed, the property, money, or
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth more than $10,000
(3) No person mav be imprisoned for the violation
of any rule or order if he proves that he had no knowl
edge of the rule or order
1992
61-1-21.1. Limitation of p r o s e c u t i o n s .
(1) No indictment or information may be returned
or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than
five years after the alleged violation
(2) As to causes of action arising from violations of
this chapter, the limitation of prosecutions provided
in this section supersedes the limitation of actions
provided in Section 76-1-302 and Title 78, Chapter
12, Articles 1 and 2
1992
61-1-21.5. Legal c o u n s e l — P r o s e c u t i o n s .
(1) The attorney general shall advise and represent the division and its staff in all civil matters,
administrative or judicial, requiring legal counsel or
services in the exercise or defense of the division's
power or the performance of its duties
(2) With the concurrence of the attorney general,
the staff of the division may represent the division in
hearings conducted during the course of adjudicative
proceedings of the division
(3) In the prosecution of all criminal actions under
this chapter, the attorney general, county attorney,
or district attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction,
shall provide all legal services for the division and its
staff The division may refer such evidence as is
available concerning violations of this chapter to the
attorney general or the appropriate county attorney
or district attorney for criminal prosecution
1993
61-1-22.

Sales a n d p u r c h a s e s in violation —
R e m e d i e s — L i m i t a t i o n of a c t i o n s .
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security m
violation of Subsection 61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7,
Subsection 61-1-17(2), any rule or order under
Section 61-1-15, which requires the affirmative
approval of sales literature before it is used, any
condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or
61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security
in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to
the person selling the security to or buying the
security from him, who may sue either at law or
in equity to recover the consideration paid for the
security, together with interest at 12% per year
from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income
received on the security, upon the tender of the
security or for damages if he no longer owns the
security
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest
at 12% per year from the date of disposition
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection
(1) may award an amount equal to three times the
consideration paid for the security, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, less any amounts,
all as specified in Subsection (1) upon a showing that
the violation was reckless or intentional
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SAMUEL L. BOYD, an
individual,

: MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
:

CASE NO. 920901436

vs.
s
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, et al.,

I
:

Defendants.
7
This matter comes before the Court upon defendants Motion to
Dismiss, pursuant to Rules 12(e), 9(b) and (12(b)(6), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the four claims filed by the plaintiff in the
above-mentioned case.

The specific defendants involved in this

motion and decision are Brinton Burbidge, and Kirton, McConkie &
Bushnell (collectively and hereafter "Kirton"). A hearing was held
on January 15, 1993, and the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, the Memoranda submitted
by counsel, and the pertinent law, rules as stated herein.

The

Kirton defendants' Motion is denied as to the plaintiff's First,
Second and Third Claims for Relief, and is granted as to the Fourth
Claim for Relief.
The

plaintiff

alleges

that

the

Kirton

defendants,

attorneys, represented certain co-defendants in this case.

as

The
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plaintiff claims that during the formation of a contract between
the parties: (1) the Kirton defendants breached their contractual
obligations

to the plaintiff

by

failing to disclose various

liabilities on the securities of the transaction; (2) that the
defendants made promises on behalf of its client that the plaintiff
relied on and hence suffered a detriment; (3) that the defendants
committed fraud by making false statements to the plaintiff to
induce the plaintiff to enter the contract; and

(4) that the

plaintiff has a claim against the defendants based on Utah's
Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 62-1-22.
Rule 12(e), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
part that:
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he
may move for a more definite statement. . . .
However, motions for a more definite statement are not favored
by the court.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that a motion under

Rule 12(e) is properly made only when the complaint is indefinite,
ambiguous, or vague in either factual allegation or legal theory to
such an extent that the moving party cannot reasonably be required
to frame his responsive pleading.

Liquor Control Commission v.

Atlas. 243 P.2d 441 (1952).
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It is the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff's Complaint
against the Kirton defendants is sufficiently clear and definite to
enable defendant to frame a response.
Rule 9(b) provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
with particularity.
This Court finds that the plaintiff has pled fraud with
sufficient specificity with regard to the alleged conduct and
individual Kirton defendants to withstand the provisions of Rule
9(b).
Rule 12(b)(6), provides that a pleading may be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
is appropriate only "when it appears to be a certainty that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be provided in support of its claim."
First National Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (1988).

Arrow v. Zions

In considering a motion

to dismiss a complaint, a court is to survey its allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and grant dismissal "only if
the plaintiff could not in any event establish a right to recover."
Barr v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207 (1965).
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In this case, the plaintiff's Fourth Claim for Relief is based
on the Kirton defendants alleged violations of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22.
However, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled that Section 61-1-1
does not provide for a private right of action.
Fox and Co. , 529 P.2d 806 (1974).

Millner v. Elmer

Further, the language in the

first sentence of Section 61-1-22 is identical to the provisions of
Section 61-1-1.

Additionally, Section 61-1-20, which authorizes

the enforcement of the Act, refers exclusively to the Division of
Securities, established within the Department of Commerce, and
provides various remedies and procedures for the Division.
Based on this, the Court finds that the plaintiff's Fourth
Claim falls within the narrow provisions of Rule 12(b)(6), as
relief cannot be granted to the plaintiff under the State's Uniform
Securities Act

in the factual context of this case, as the

plaintiff in bringing suit as a private party rather than as an
agent of the state government.
With regards to the plaintiff's First, Second and Third
Claims, the Court finds that these claims present issues of fact
that require that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to present
its case. Where there is any doubt about whether a claim should be
dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue must be
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resolved in favor of the party seeking an opportunity to present
its proof.

Olson v. Park. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah App. 1991).

The Kirton defendants argue that the plaintiff has not alleged
facts

that

demonstrate

the

existence

of

a

contract

between

themselves and the plaintiff, promissory estoppel, or of fraud.
However, the Court disagrees and finds that if the facts, as
presented in the plaintiff's Complaint, could be proved at trial,
those facts would be sufficient to support the claims as pleaded.
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the plaintiff's First, Second and TljjL^d Claims for Relief
is denied.
Dated this

^<Tday of Februai

LESLIE A
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

0 0022 7

PAGE SIX

BOYD V. HARMON CITY

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this<^*>

day of

February, 1993:

4f^W.
Q&UA, faf.
A [)V ^TT (/^ • . A rQ-r)^J) J^r)Crja3l
UT^/MO£/

Samuel L. Boyd
901 Main Street, Suite 5010
Dallas, Texas 75202
Arthur H. Nielsen
Attorney for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T, Ostler
Attorney for Defendant Harmon City,
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

31* £> • efalc Strict
^//*
"^^1

Ij^Tiln ^tJ^II)
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Thomas L. Kay
Attorney for Defendants Brinton Burbidge
and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael Gottfredson
Attorney for Defendant Gottfredson
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878
Victoria K. Kidman
Attorney for Defendant Hilton
9 Exchange Place, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SAMUEL L. BOYD, an
individual,

:

SUPPLEMENT TO
FEBRUARY, 1993
MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 920901436

Plaintiff,
vs.
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, et al.,

:

Defendants•
This matter came before the Court on defendants' Motions to
Dismiss, pursuant to Rules 12(e), 9(b) and (12(b)(6), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Burbidge,

and

The specific defendants involved are Brinton

Kirton, McConkie

& Bushnell

(collectively

and

hereafter "Kirton"), and Terry and Doreen Harmon (hereafter the
"Harmon defendants").
On July 31, 1992, the Harmon defendants made a Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, claiming that the plaintiff
did not have standing to assert a claim under the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.
On August 11, 1992, the Kirton defendants made a Rule 12(e)
Motion for a More Definite Statement, a Rule 9(b) Motion for a more
particular statement concerning plaintiff's fraud claim, and
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incorporated the Harmon defendants' 12 (b) (6) motion concerning the
plaintiff's claim under the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

The

plaintiff's Fourth Claim for Relief goes to the claimed securities
law violation.
A hearing was held on January 15, 1993, and the matter was
taken under advisement.

The Court reviewed the pleadings, the

Memoranda submitted by counsel, and the pertinent law, and ruled on
February 23, 1993 in a Memorandum Decision, that the defendants'
Motions to Dismiss would be denied as to the plaintiff's first,
second and third claims for relief, but would be granted as to the
plaintiff's fourth claim for relief, as the plaintiff did not have
a cause of action under the state's Uniform Securities Act.
On March 15, 1993, the Court received a letter from the Kirton
defendants

requesting

that

the Ruling

that

had

been

issued

dismissing the plaintiff's fourth cause of action be clarified as
to whether it included the Harmon defendants, as well as the Kirton
defendants, as Terry and Doreen Harmon had also moved for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court now supplements its Memorandum

Decision of February 23, 1993 to clarify that the ruling of
February 23, 1993 applies to both Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell

0 00258
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(the "Kirton" defendants), as well as to JTer^ry and Doreen Harmon
(the "Harmon" defendants).
Dated this

/ /day of April/ 199;

LESLIE A: LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this,

.day of

April, 1993:

Samuel L. Boyd
Pro se
901 Main Street, Suite 5010
Dallas, Texas 75202
Arthur H. Nielsen
Attorney for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T. Ostler
Attorney for Defendant Harmon City,
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas L, Kay
Attorney for Defendants Brinton Burbidge
and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael Gottfredson
Attorney for Defendant Gottfredson
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878
Victoria K. Kidman
Attorney for Defendant Hilton
9 Exchange Place, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

000260

TabM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SAMUEL L. BOYD, an individual,

COURT'S RULING

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

920901436

vs.
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule
4-501, Code

of Judicial Administration,

in connection

with

defendant, Nielsen & Senior's, Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings, the Court having reviewed the Motion, Memorandum
in support and no Memorandum in opposition having been filed,
and the Court being fully advised and finding good cause, rules
as stated herein.
The Motion is granted and the Fourth Claim for Relief as to
this defendant is dismissed.

Mr. Nielsen is to prepare an

Order consisted with, this Ruling.
Dated this n/J) da\r of April, 1993
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of
this

the

foregoing

Court's

Ruling,

to

the

following,

.day of April, 1993:

Jeffrey M. Jones
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 S. State, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T. Ostler
Attorney for Defendants Harmon City
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas L. Kay
Attorney for Defendants Burbidge, and
Kirton, McConkie & Poelman
111 East 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael Gottfredson, Esq.
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, Maryland 20878
Victoria K. Kidman
Attorney for Defendant Hilton
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Arthur H. Nielsen
John K. Mangum
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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MAY 1 0 1993
Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
John K. Mangum (2072)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Telefax:
(801) 532-1913

By.

£.

Uv.C u

-wltfK

Attorneys for Defendant
Nielsen & Senior

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

vs.

ORDER DISMISSING WITH
PREJUDICE THE FOURTH CLAIM
FOR RELIEF OF PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT AS ALLEGED
AGAINST NIELSEN & SENIOR

HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation; et al.,

Civil No. 920901436CV

SAMUEL L. BOYD, an individual,
Plaintiff,

Defendants.

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Having reviewed the motion of Defendant Nielsen & Senior
for partial

judgment on the pleadings, dated March 10, 1993,

seeking a dismissal with prejudice of the fourth claim for relief
of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, together with the memorandum
filed in support thereof, and the prior papers filed in this action
on both sides of said issue, no memorandum in opposition having
been filed by Plaintiff after and specifically in response to
Nielsen & Senior's motion, and the Court being fully advised in
the premises, having ruled on the same issue presented hereby in a
20253.NI211 64

•V *. c <: i ti

memorandum decision in this action dated February 23, 1993 and in
a supplement thereto dated April 14, 1993, and finding good cause
to grant Nielsen & Senior's motion pursuant to the Court's ruling
on said motion dated April 20, 1993, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the fourth claim for relief of
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, pertaining to claimed violations
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, be and hereby is dismissed,
with prejudice, insofar as the same is alleged against Defendant
Nielsen & Senior, on the ground that said cause of action, under
the factual circumstances alleged in this case, does not state
and cannot be amended to state a viable claim for relief.

20253. NI211.64
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this ^2i?

day of April, 1993, I served

the foregoing proposed ORDER DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE THE FOURTH
CLAIM

FOR RELIEF

OF

PLAINTIFF'S

AMENDED

COMPLAINT

AS

ALLEGED

AGAINST NIELSEN & SENIOR by mailing a true and correct copy of
the same, first class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esa.
DURHAM & EVANS
Attorneys for Plaintiff Samuel L. Boyd
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T. Ostler, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Defendants Harmon City,
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas L. Kay, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER
Attorneys for Defendants Brinton Burbidge
and Kirton, McConkie & Poelman
900 Broadway Centre
111 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael Gottfredson, Esq.
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, Maryland 20878
Victoria K. Kidman, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant Hilton
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Blake T. Ostler (A4642)
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorney for Defendants Harmon City, Inc.,
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

MAY 2 7 1993

ltkn.%iij wtsrk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON,
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON,
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah
corporation, MICHAEL
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSON &
SENIOR, a Utah corporation, TERRY
HARMON, and MRS. TERRY
HARMON,

ORDER DISMISSING FOURTH
CLAIM AS TO DEFENDANTS
HARMON CITY, INC., TERRY
HARMON AND MRS. TERRY
HARMON

Civil No. 92-0901436-CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
This matter came on for hearing on the 15th day of January, 1993 before
the above entitled court. The Court having heard the arguments and read the memoranda
on file in this matter and for good cause, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs Fourth
Claim is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Defendants Harmon City, Inc.,
Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon.
DATED this *A

' d a y of May, 1993.

lonora
District Court J
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the ' o^-i-day of May, 1993 I caused to be mailed
a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing ORDER to the following by mailing
said copy through the United States mail, postage prepaid:
Samuel L. Boyd, Pro Se
5010 NationsBank Plaza
901 Main Street
Lock Box 100
Dallas, TX 75202
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Thomas L. Kay
SNELL & WILMER
Attorneys for Defendants Brinton Burbidge and
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
60 East South Temple, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael Gottfredson
Attorney for Defendant Gottfredson
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878
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Victoria K. Kidman
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant Hilton
9 Exchange Place, 9th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BOYD, SAMUEL L
PLAINTIFF
VS
HARMON CITY, INC
HILTON, MATTHEW
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

CASE NUMBER 92090143 6 CV
DATE 04/06/95
HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK EHM

DEFENDANT
HEARING

P. ATTY. JONES, JEFFREY M.
D. ATTY. OSTLER, BLAKE T

THIS CASE IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, THOMAS KAY APPEARING
FOR BRINTON BURBIDGE & KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN, JEFFERY JONES
APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFF, ARTHUR NIELSEN AND JOHN MANGUM
APPEARING FOR NIELSEN AND SENIOR, AND CATHERINE LARSON
APPEARING FOR THE DEFENDANT MATTHEW HILTON.
THE MOTION IS ARGUED TO THE COURT BY COUNSEL AND SUBMITTED.
THE COURT NOW BEING FULLY ADVISED, GRANTS THE MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WITH PREJUDICE.
MR. KAY IS TO PREPARE FINDINGS AND AN ORDER.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BOYD, SAMUEL L
PLAINTIFF
VS
HARMON CITY, INC
HILTON, MATTHEW

CASE NUMBER 92090143 6 CV
DATE 06/01/95
HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK EHM

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS.
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED.
2. PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND ORDER ARE DENIED. THE FINDINGS AND ORDER ARE
SIGNED AS SUBMITTED ON THE ABOVE DATE.
MR. KAY IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER.
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Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the J 3*

day of ^QbjAU.

iffiO,

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
BLAKE T OSTLER
Atty for Defendant
1800 EAGLE GATE PLAZA
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

THOMAS KAY
Atty for Defendant
111 E BROADWAY, STE 900
BROADWAY CENTRE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Atty for Defendant
1100 EAGLE GATE TOWER
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

GLENN C. HANNI
Atty for Defendant
600 BOSTON BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

JEFFREY M. JONES
Atty for Plaintiff
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SUITE 850
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84144

MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON
15524 QUAIL RUN DRIVE
NORTH POTOMAC MD 20878

District Court Clerk

By:

f^O/Majuuyyi
Deputy Clerk
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"©JPSTWCT COURT
THOMAS L. KAY (A1778)
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889)
AMY E. WEISSMAN (A7012)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
I l l East Broadway, Suite 900
Broadway Centre
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 237-1900

m

1 1995

^puiyctes

Attorneys for Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
VS.

]
•
]>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON,
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON,
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah
corporation, MICHAEL
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON,
and MRS. TERRY HARMON,
Defendants.

]
]
]
]
]
;
)
;
)
]

Civil No. 92-0901436-CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

On April 6, 1995, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, pursuant to
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, came on for hearing before the Honorable
Leslie A. Lewis. The Court, having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the

1

(I i* (> V 1 >•

pleadings, and the arguments of counsel, hereby renders the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about July 10, 1992, Samuel L. Boyd ("Boyd" or "Plaintiff") filed his

Amended Complaint against Defendants.
2.

The events underlying the causes of action asserted in the Amended Complaint

occurred during 1986.
3.

On or about July 31, 1992, Defendants Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and

Doreen Harmon ("Harmon Defendants") filed a Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Claim of
Plaintiffs Complaint, along with a Memorandum in Support of the Motion.
4.

On August 11, 1992, Defendants Brinton Burbidge ("Burbidge") and Kirton,

McConkie & Bushnell ("Kirton") filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Request
for Oral Argument, along with a Memorandum in Support of their Motion.
5.

On or about August 17, 1992, Defendant Nielsen & Senior ("Nielsen & Senior")

filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. Defendant Matthew Hilton ("Hilton") filed an
Answer on or about August 18, 1992.
6.

On or about September 4, 1992, Boyd filed his Opposition to the Harmon

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
7.

On or about September 14, 1992, Boyd filed his Opposition to Burbidge and

Kirton's Motion to Dismiss.
8.

On or about September 15, 1992, the Harmon Defendants filed a Reply

Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss.

2
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9.

On September 22, 1992, Burbidge and Kirton filed a Reply Memorandum in

Support of their Motion to Dismiss Complaint.
10.

On January 15, 1993, the Court held a hearing on Burbidge and Kirton's Motion

to Dismiss and took the matter under advisement.
11.

On February 23, 1993, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision by which it

denied Burbidge and Kirton's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Claims for
Relief, and granted the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief.
12.

On March 10, 1993, Nielsen & Senior filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the

Pleadings and a Memorandum in Support of that Motion. Nielsen & Senior's Motion was not
opposed by Plaintiff.
13.

On March 12, 1993, Burbidge and Kirton filed an Answer to Amended

Complaint.
14.

On April 14, 1993, the Court issued a Supplement to its Memorandum Decision,

clarifying that the Memorandum Decision dismissed Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief not only
against Kirton and Burbidge, but also against the Harmon Defendants.
15.

On April 20, 1993, the Court granted Nielsen & Senior's Motion for Partial

Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissed Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief against Nielsen &
Senior.
16.

On or about April 21, 1993, the Harmon Defendants filed their Answer to

Amended Complaint.
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17.

On or about May 19, 1993, Nielsen & Senior filed an Amended Answer to

Amended Complaint, pursuant to a Stipulation For Leave to File Amended Answer filed
concurrently therewith.
18.

Plaintiff took no action in this lawsuit other than defending against the various

motions to dismiss. With regard to Burbidge, Kirton, and the Harmon Defendants, Plaintiff has
done nothing for more than two years since defending against the Motion to Dismiss at the
January 15, 1993 hearing before this Court.
19.

During February 1994, Thomas L. Kay, counsel for Burbidge and Kirton,

encountered Jeffrey M. Jones, counsel for Plaintiff, at court. During that chance encounter, Mr.
Kay suggested to Mr. Jones that he either "do something" to move this lawsuit along or else
dismiss the claims against Burbidge and Kirton. Mr. Jones responded that he would look into
it. No other discussion occurred: no monetary or other settlement terms were exchanged, and
no negotiations took place. Despite this conversation, neither Mr. Jones nor any other attorney
in his firm did anything to move the lawsuit along or to dismiss the claims against Burbidge and
Kirton.
20.

Nielsen and Senior and its counsel have not engaged in any settlement discussions

with Plaintiff for more than two years.
21.

No settlement discussions have taken place between Plaintiff and the Harmon

Defendants.
22.

No settlement discussions have taken place between Plaintiff and Hilton.

4
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23.

On January 26, 1995, Burbidge and Kirton filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to Prosecute. Shortly thereafter, Hilton, Nielsen & Senior, and the Harmon Defendants filed
similar motions.
24.

Plaintiff did not initiate any discovery until after the Motions to Dismiss for

Failure to Prosecute were pending before the Court. Initiating discovery at this late date was
Plaintiffs first affirmative conduct in more than two years, and the only action taken other than
filing the Amended Complaint.
25.

There has been no real activity in the case for over two years.

26.

Plaintiff has had over three years to pursue his claim and has chosen not to do so.

He has had a forum for the resolution of his disputes and has chosen not to use it.
27.

The onus was not on Defendants to undertake expensive discovery or other action

when Plaintiff had taken no action to further his lawsuit.
28.

Other than the filing of the Complaint, all action taken in this lawsuit has been

initiated by Defendants. Plaintiff has filed no dispositive motions. In fact, it is Defendants'
activity that has generated the majority of the work in this case, and all of the activity for the
last several years.
29.

Plaintiff offered no sufficiently reasonable or viable excuse for his lack of

diligence, and the Court can find none.
30.

The pendency of this lawsuit has required the presence and activity of six

attorneys, has necessitated an expenditure of their time and energy, and has resulted in
considerable expense and concomitant prejudice to Defendants, their clients.

5
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31.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the attorney-Defendants must

maintain professional liability coverage and insurance and, in so doing, must undertake
significant reporting to maintain that insurance.
32.

The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that all Defendants must pay

attorneys to defend them and incur costs in connection with the defense and opinions regarding
ongoing liability and loss contingency.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has considered the following five criteria in evaluating Defendants'

Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute: (a) the conduct of the parties; (b) the opportunity
each party has had to move the case along; (c) what each party has done to move the case
forward; (d) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side;
and (e) whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul
W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)).
2.

Each of the five factors weighs in favor of Defendants.

3.

No sufficiently reasonable or viable excuse exists for Plaintiff's lack of diligence.

4.

Because Plaintiff had three years to pursue his claim, but chose not to do so, he

is not unfairly prejudiced by dismissal of this action. In light of the Court's findings of fact,
no injustice will result from dismissal.
5.

The four Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute were brought pursuant to

Rule 41(b), which provides:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
6
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dismissal of an action or of any claim against him . . . . Unless
the court in its order of dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
U.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

Dismissal therefore operates as an adjudication on the merits, unless

otherwise provided.
6.

Pursuant to Rule 41(b), this lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits

as against Burbidge, Kirton, Hilton, Nielsen & Senior, and the Harmon Defendants.

HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the I /-^" day of April, 1995,1 served a true and accurate copy
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE upon the following named persons by depositing said document
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. ^
J. Mark Gibb
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Blake T. Ostler, Esq. '
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Harmon Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. /
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Matthew Hilton
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. •/
John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael Gottfredson, Esq.
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878
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tF i f D 0\STRia COURT
Third Judici*lD.stnct

THOMAS L. KAY (A1778)
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
I l l East Broadway, Suite 900
Broadway Centre
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 237-1900
Attorneys for Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
•
]>
)
)

HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
)
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON,
]
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON,
]
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah
]
corporation, MICHAEL
]
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR ]
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON, ;)
and MRS. TERRY HARMON,
]
)
Defendants.
]

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

Civil No. 92-0901436-CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, came on for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on
April 6, 1995. Plaintiff was represented by Jeffrey M. Jones and J. Mark Gibb. Defendant
Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon were represented by Blake T.
Ostler. Defendant Matthew Hilton was represented by Catherine M. Larson.

Defendants
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Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell were represented by Thomas L. Kay.
Defendant Nielsen & Senior was represented by Arthur H. Nielsen and John K. Mangum.
Prior to the hearing, the Court had reviewed the memoranda of counsel, cases cited by
the parties and the pleadings on file. After hearing the arguments of counsel and after making
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute are
granted and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this

/£fajTof April, \995.
BY THE COKRT:

HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the | y

day of April, 1995,1 served a true and accurate copy

of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
FADLURE TO PROSECUTE upon the following named persons by depositing said document
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
J. Mark Gibb
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Blake T. Ostler, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Harmon Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Matthew Hilton
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael Gottfredson, Esq.
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878
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RIED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

THOMAS L. KAY (A1778)
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889)

JUN 1 &J995

SNELL&WILMERLLP.

I l l East Broadway, Suite 900
Broadway Centre
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 237-1900
Attorneys for Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Poelman

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
>
]

ORDER

]

HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON,
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON,
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah
corporation, MICHAEL
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON.
and MRS. TERRY HARMON,
Defendants.

]
;
;
;
,
;)
;
)
]

Civil No. 92-0901436-CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Plaintiff, Samuel L. Boyd, filed Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration on April
27, 1995. The Objection and the Motion were fully briefed by the parties, and were submitted
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to the Court for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(d) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
The Court, having considered the parties' submissions, and good cause appearing
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

2.

Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Judgment is denied.
DATED this

' {•} day of June, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

^HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS'
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT " "
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /<^fJi day of June, 1995,1 served a true and accurate copy
of the foregoing ORDER upon the following named persons by depositing said document in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Blake T. Ostler, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Harmon Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Matthew Hilton
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael Gottfredson, Esq.
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878
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Paul M. Durham (0939)
Jeffrey M. Jones (1741)
J. Mark Gibb (5702)
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P . C .
Key B a n k T o w e r , S u i t e 8 5 0
50 S o u t h M a i n S t r e e t
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84144
F8LEJ3tt&YMCr8SU8T
Telephone:
(801) 538-2424
Third jHrt'cta! D.&tnct

Attorneys for Plaintiff

HAY 0 1 1995
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DIST^iaffcirtfcjQWRT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,

HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON,
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON,
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah
corporation, MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON,
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah
corporation, TERRY HARMON and
MRS. TERRY HARMON,

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL L.
BOYD IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Civil No. 920901436CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
COUNTY OF DALLAS
STATE OF TEXAS

)
:ss
)

SAMUEL L. BOYD, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, I have personal

knowledge of the facts set forth herein and would so testify if
called upon to do so.
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2.

I am an attorney and have reviewed the proposed Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the defendants in this
action and find several portions to be in error.
3.

The delay in pursuing this case was due to my counsel's

attention to the case in which I was sued by my previous counsel of
record in the present case, Mr. Isom.
4.

Isom

and

I

thereafter

attempt to settle our fee dispute.
settlement could not be reached.

exchanged

several

letters

to

Unfortunately a compromise and
Isom thereafter filed a Motion

for Withdrawal of Counsel in this action.
5.

On September 9, 1992, I filed an action in the Dallas

County Court, State of Texas, Samuel L. Boyd v. David K. Isom and
the Law Offices of David K. Isom, Cause No. 92-7710, ("the

Texas

Action") seeking among other things, a declaratory judgment that I
only pay Isom for reasonable attorneys' fees actually incurred, as
well as out-of-pocket expenses in representing me in this action.
6.
Isom

Subsequent to my filing of the Texas Action in Texas,

filed a related

"Isom Action").
was

tried

before

action

in Utah on September

2 2 , 1992

(the

The Texas Action was stayed and the Isom Action
Judge

Frank

G.

Noel

who

decision in favor of Isom on June 16, 1993.

issued

a

memorandum

My attorneys filed my

notice of appeal in the Isom action on December 9, 1993.
7.

In February

1994, Mr. Jones, my attorney contacted

me

regarding a meeting which he had with Mr. Kay at court regarding
this

case.

I

asked

Mr.

Jones

settlement terms proposed by me.

to

inform

Mr.

Kay

regarding

Mr. Kay apparently never told Mr.
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Jones of his clients acceptance or rejection of my

settlement

offer.
8.

On June 2, 1994, my counsel filed my appellant's brief in

the Isom Action.

On or about July 26f 1994, while the matter was

in the process of being submitted to the Utah Supreme Court, Mr.
Isom and I settled the Isom Action.
9.
dismiss.

Defendants in this action have only filed a motion to
Further, these motions to dismiss were not filed with

respect to all claims in this action, but were only with respect to
the fourth cause of action for securities fraud with the exception
of Burbidge and Kirton's motion which was filed on all causes of
action.
10.

Accordingly,

it

is my

understanding

that

defendants

Harmon City, Inc., Matthew Hilton, Michael Gottfredson, Nielsen &
Senior, Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon have taken no action
with respect to Plaintiff's First, Second and Third Causes of
Action other than to answer the Amended Complaint.
11.

I am not aware of any evidence of defendants' expense or

prejudice that is currently before the Court nor was it at the time
of the Court's ruling granting defendants' motion to dismiss.
12.

I am not aware of any evidence of defendants' maintenance

of professional liability coverage and insurance that is currently
before the Court nor was it at the time of the Court's ruling
granting defendants' motion to dismiss.
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13.

Upon information and belief, not all defendants have paid

other outside attorneys to defend them, but instead have defended
themselves.
14.

Defendants,

to

my

knowledge,

have

not

previously

requested a scheduling conference in this action.
15.
issued

I have not been made aware of any Orders to Show Cause

or

hearings

held

in

this

case

regarding

a

lack

of

prosecution until April 6, 1995.
16.

Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2 does not appear to

differentiate between the defendants regarding their conduct and
opportunity to move the case along.
17.

Only Kirton and Burbidge, to the extent of my knowledge,

filed a Motion to Dismiss all causes of action in this case.
18.

I also understand that Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon,

and Mrs. Terry Harmon's motion to dismiss was only with respect to
the Fourth Cause of Action.

Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and

Mrs. Terry Harmon have done nothing with respect to defending or
bringing motions regarding the First, Second, and Third Causes of
Action until their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was
filed.
19.

I am not aware that Defendant Nielsen & Senior has done

anything other than file an Answer to the Complaint and request a
partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to the Fourth Cause
of Action.

Nielsen & Senior has done nothing with respect to

defending or bringing motions regarding the First, Second, and
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Third Causes of Action until its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute was filed.
20.

I understand that Defendant Hilton has done nothing but

answer the Complaint until his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute was filed.
21.

Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2 does not consider the

very significant expense incurred by me in negotiating the purchase
of Harmon City, Inc., which is the basis for my claims in this
lawsuit.
22.

During the time in which I was negotiating for the sale

of Harmon City, Inc. with the various defendants I incurred great
expense and attorney fees.

The expenses incurred by me were for

bank consultants, attorneys, travel, housing and related expenses,
which expenses I recall totalled approximately $50,000.00.
further

incurred

$100,000.00

in

attorney

seeking

time

recovery

and

expenses

for my

losses

well

I have

exceeding

in the

failed

purchase of Harmon City, Inc.
23.

Because of these expenses and the lack of prejudice shown

by defendants, it is my strong opinion and belief that dismissal of
my claims with prejudice will result in severe and substantial
injustice to me.
Citicorp

was

I wanted to purchase Harmon City, Inc. and

willing

to

finance

the

acquisition

subject

to

clarifying a material, non-disclosure relating to the Company's
mishandling of their employees and pension/ERISA money.
24.

If given the opportunity, my attorneys have committed to

diligently pursue discovery and my claims.
5

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
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DATED this

day of April, 1995

Samuel L
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this

day of April,

1995

My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this ~"gfc** day of
April, 1995, to the following:
iSt*—
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq,
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T. Ostler, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorney for Defendant
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas L. Kay, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER
Attorney for Defendant
111 East Broadway #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Michael Gottfredson, Esq.
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878
Glenn C. Hanni
STRONG & HANNI
Attorney for Defendant
600 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Blake T. Ostler (A4642)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Harmon City, Inc.
Terry Harmon & Mrs. Terry Harmon
60 East South Temple, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,

HARMONS DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

vs.
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON,
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON,
McCONKIE BUSHNELL, a Utah
corporation, MICHAEL
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSON & SENIOR,
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON
and MRS. TERRY HARMON

Civil No. 9209021436CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
Defendants Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon (the "Harmons
Defendants") hereby respond Plaintiffs First Request for Admissions as follows:
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GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

The Harmons Defendants object to each and every request insofar and to

the extent that such requests seek work product and/or disclosure of attorney-client
privileged, or otherwise privileged, information.
2.

The Harmons Defendants object to each and every Request on the grounds

that the Court should first determine the Harmons' Defendants Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute.
3.

The Harmons Defendants object to each and every request insofar and to

the extent that it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action and not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
4.

In accordance with these objections and exceptions, and without waiving any

of them, the Harmons Defendants respond to the Plaintiffs Request to Admit as follows:
RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO ADMIT
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that during the period between January 1, 1986, through
September 31, 1986, T.R. Harmon was the chief executive office (sic) and president of
Harmon City Incorporation.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that during that same period you were a trustee of the ProfitSharing Plan as well as the Benefit Trust.
RESPONSE: Denied.
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REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that as the chief executive officer of Harmon City and as a
Trustee of the Profit-Sharing Plan and the Benefit Trust, you were notified by an officer of
the U.S. Department of Labor that an audit of the records of the Trust and the ProfitSharing Plan was to be initiated.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that as Trustee of the Trust and Profit-Sharing Plan you
received a letter July 24, 1986, from the U.S. Department of Labor that there may be
personal liability for violation of U.S. Department of Labor rules and regulations.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that that same letter informed you that a formal investigation
was to be initiated or instituted by the U.S. Department of Labor of the transactions of the
Trustees and the Trust with entities or individuals the Trustees were associated or involved
with.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that the U.S. Department of Labor investigation established
that violations of its rules and regulations had, in fact, occurred.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to Request No. 6 on the grounds that
it is too vague to form a coherent request. Without waiving the foregoing objection, the
Harmons Defendants admit that the U.S. Department of Labor concluded that violations of
ERISA had occurred and brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
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Utah. However, the Harmons Defendants deny that any final determination was made to
establish such alleged violations.
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that you and other Trustees were held personally liable for
the misuse or mismanagement of the Trust and Profit-Sharing Plan funds and required to
reimburse said funds or a substantial portion thereof.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that you received a letter dated June 2, 1986, from Nini
corporation offering to purchase 100 percent of the shares of Harmon City.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that on June 24, 1986, a meeting was held at which time
certain basic terms were agreed upon between Boyd as agent of Nini Corporation and the
Shareholders to purchase 100 percent of the Harmon City shares.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants admit that a meeting was held but deny that
any binding or final agreement was reached.
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that Matthew Hilton, Esq., attorney at law, was present at
said meeting representing the Harmons and Martins and Greens, the Shareholders of
Harmon City.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that pursuant to the instructions of the Shareholders, Mr.
Hilton, attorney at law, prepared an agreement setting forth all of the terms of the Purchase
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Agreement between Nini Corporation, the plaintiff, and the Shareholders whereby Nini
Corporation would purchase 100 percent of the outstanding stock of Harmon City.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that the Agreement was signed by Nini Corporation on July
8, 1986, and by the Shareholders of Harmon City on July 7, 1986.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request on the ground that the
subject Agreement speaks for itself and deny the Request to the extent the subject
Agreement is inconsistent with it.
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that though the closing date was set in the Purchase
Agreement as August 30,1986, that date was later extended to September 10,1986, with the
agreement of the Plaintiff and the Shareholders of Harmon City.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants admit that a closing date was set for 30 August
1986 and was later extended on several occasions and deny the remainder of the Request
because it is untrue.
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that the Purchase Agreement set the value per share of
Harmon City at $20.00 per share.
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that the total purchase price of 100 percent of Harmon City
shares was agreement (sic) to be $20,000,000.

-5-
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RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to Request No. 15 on the grounds that
it is too vague to allow them to form a coherent response and therefore deny the same.
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that the $20,000,000 figure was subject to reduction as set
forth in paragraph 2 of the Purchase Agreement.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this request because the subject
Agreement speaks for itself and deny this Request to the extent the subject Agreement is
inconsistent with it.
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that the Seller agreed that so long as negotiations with the
Plaintiff were continuing, the Plaintiff had the exclusive and sole right to negotiate with the
Shareholders of Harmon City, individually or as a group for the purchase of the shares of
Harmon City.
RESPONSE: Denied. The subject Agreement speaks for itself and the Plaintiffs
recharacterization of the Agreement in this Request is not consistent with the intent and
meaning of the Agreement.
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that the Shareholders of Harmon City without notice to the
Plaintiff negotiated a sale of Harmon City shares among themselves as of August 28, 1986,
resulting in the Harmon Family Agreement.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. To the extent the Harmons Defendants
understand this Request, they deny that they negotiated a sale of Harmon City stock as of
28 August 1986.
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REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement incudes two
Shareholders who were not identified nor made a party to the original Purchase Agreement,
to wit, Laurie Harmon and Sid Harmon.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request because the subject
Agreement speaks for itself and deny this Request to the extent the agreement is inconsistent
with this Request.
REQUEST NO. 20 : Admit that The (sic) August 28,1986 Agreement does not include
one Shareholder that signed the Purchase Agreement dated July 7, 8, 1986, between the
Plaintiff and Seller, to wit, Jerry R. Harmon Trust.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 19.
REQUEST NO. 21: Admit that The (sic) August 28,1986 Agreement was negotiated
and prepared after the Shareholders entered into the Purchase Agreement with the Plaintiff.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that T.R. Harmon or his attorney had informed the
Shareholders of Harmon City at the time The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement was signed
that the Plaintiffs offer to purchase Harmon City shares had not been rejected and in fact
the Plaintiff had been granted additional time in which to verify the financial information
obtained concerning the financial condition of Harmon City.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request because it requests
attorney-client privileged information.

-7-
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REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that the Shareholders of Harmon City anticipated the failure
of The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement because they did not intend to execute the final
sales agreement between themselves and Plaintiff because they had entered into an
agreement providing for the specific distribution of Harmon City shares to pay or otherwise
resolve the existing financial problems with certain shareholders and certain banks, as well
as the Profit-Sharing Plan and the Benefit Trust.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. Without waiving the foregoing objection,
the Harmons Defendants deny this request because it is untrue.
REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that after The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement was in fact
instituted and the conditions enforced, all the debts and liabilities were paid or extinguished
or forgiven and that F. Ray Green and his wife and children were to be paid $784,574.00 for
their remaining shares of Harmon City.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15.
REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that T.R. Harmon and his wife and children benefitted from
the August 28,1986 Agreement in that several debt liabilities of T.R. Harmon were also paid,
extinguished or forgiven because he was jointly liable with F. Ray Green for the payment,
refunding and restitution of funds to the Profit-Sharing Plan and Benefit Trust.
RESPONSE: Denied.

00 0 i 3 ;

REQUEST NO. 26: Admit that The (sic) August 28,1986 Agreement provides that T.R.
Harmon Limited would purchase from F. Ray Green 56,041 shares of Harmon City stock for
$14.00 per share.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request on the ground that the
subject Agreement speaks for itself.
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that T. R. Harmon Limited is either (1) owned by Terry R.
Harmon or (2) owned by Terry R. Harmon and his wife and children or (3) controlled by
Terry R. Harmon.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15.
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that T.R. Harmon did not inform the Shareholders of
Harmon City of the potential liability of Harmon City, its officers and shareholders for the
ERISA violations.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15.
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that the Plaintiff became aware of said potential liability
sometime on the day of September 9, 1986.
RESPONSE: Denied. The Plaintiff was notified of the possible Department of Labor
claims much earlier.
REQUEST NO. 30: Admit that the representatives of the Plaintiff asked for more
information regarding the ERISA violations on September 10, 1986, at the time of the
scheduled closing.
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RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15.
REQUEST NO. 31: Admit that on September 10, T.R. Harmon representing himself,
the other Shareholders, and Harmon City was present at the time set for the closing with the
Plaintiff under the terms of the Purchase Agreement.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 32: Admit that on September 10, 1986, Boyd was present with an
officer or agent of City Corp., Plaintiffs financing bank.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15.
REQUEST NO. 33: Admit that the representative of City Corp. informed all present
that the loan to the Plaintiff for $20 million had in fact been approved.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15.
REQUEST NO. 34: Admit that City Corp. had all documents in hand and was prepared
to distribute the money as the parties to the Purchase Agreement, the Shareholders of
Harmon City agreed and directed.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request because it calls for the
state of mind of another and information exclusively within the possession of Plaintiffs agent.
REQUEST NO. 35: Admit that the City Corp. agent had just been informed of the
potential liability because of the investigation being conducted by the U.S. Department of
Labor concerning the Trust and the Profit-Sharing Plan.
RESPONSE: See response to Requests No. 6 and 34.

-10-
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REQUEST NO. 36:

Admit that both the Plaintiff and City Corp. through their

representing agents requested a continuance for a review of the circumstances regarding the
U.S. Department of Labor claim of the Department of Labor could be checked out (sic).
RESPONSE: See response to Requests No. 15 and 34.
REQUEST NO. 37: Admit that T.R. Harmon refused on behalf of himself and all other
Shareholders to grant an extension of the time requested by the Plaintiff and City Corp.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 38: Admit that T.R. Harmon within 24 hours after refusing the request
for continuance by the Plaintiff and its financing bank, notified all Shareholders and Zions
Bank that the terms of the August 28, 1986 Agreement were to be in effect.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 39:

Admit that pursuant to the terms of the August 28, 1986

Agreement, T.R. Harmon obtained control of Harmon City, Inc. by becoming the major
shareholder, and had an ownership or control of greater than 50 percent of the shares.
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request on the grounds that it
speaks for itself. In addition, and without waiving the foregoing objection, the Harmons
Defendants deny this request.
REQUEST NO. 40: Admit that all Harmon City shares owned by or in the possession
of T.R. Harmon are represented by certificates issued in the name of either T.R. Harmon
Limited or T.R. Harmon personally.
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RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST NO. 41: Admit that all the terms and conditions set forth in The (sic)
August 28, 1986 Agreement have been met and no party is in default.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 16. Without waiving the foregoing objection,
the Harmons Defendants deny this Request because it is not true.
DATED this

day of March, 1995.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Blake T. Ostler
Attorneys for Defendants Harmon City, Inc.,
Terry Harmon & Mrs. Terry Harmon
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the |/^Klday of March, 1995,1 caused to be delivered
by the method indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing HARMONS
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION to the following:

-*k

FEDERAL EXPRESS
U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
FAX TRANSMISSION

Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

7 ^

FEDERAL EXPRESS
U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
FAX TRANSMISSION

Thomas L. Kay
SNELL & WILMER
111 East Broadway, #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

FEDERAL EXPRESS
U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
FAX TRANSMISSION

Michael Gottfredson
15524 Quail Run Drive
North Potomac, MD 20878

^

FEDERAL EXPRESS
U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
FAX TRANSMISSION

Glenn C. Hanni
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

X-

FEDERAL EXPRESS
U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
FAX TRANSMISSION

Paul M. Durham
DURHAM EVANS JONES & PINEGAR
50 South Main Street, #850
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
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r
1

2
3
4
5
6

DANIEL W. TEEHAN
• ^ .: .
Regional Solicitor
' =
Patricia S. Weiner, Attorney
Office of the Solicitor
' '
United States Department of Labor
71 Stevenson Street, Suite 1020
P. 0. BOX 3495
San Francisco, California 94119-3495
Telephone: (415) 995-54 61

10

Local Counsel:
Brent D- Ward
United States Attorney for
-the District of Utah
U. S, Courthouse Building
Room 4 66
350 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 524-5682

11

Attorneys for Plaintiff

7
8
9

i-rtr:
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

13

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

15

Ann McLaughlin,
Secretary of Labor, United States
Department of Labor,

16
17

Plaintiff,

20
21
22

CIVIL ACTION
FILE No,
;

?;? C - 7 5 L" Vt/

PARTIAL CONSENT
JUDGMENT

18
19

i;

::jfe>

v._-;w7 *._

12

14

<v.-

/

Terry Harmon, an individual,
F. Ray Green, an individual,
Harmon City, Inc.f a Utah
corporation, and Midwest Realty
and Finance, Inc.r a Utah
corporation,
Defendants*

23
24

This action was filed by the Secretary of Labor

25

alleging that the defendants failed to discharge their

26

responsibilities as fiduciaries of the Harmon City, Inc.

27

Profit Sharing Plan ("the Plan") in violation of Title I of

28

000670
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),

2

29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., and seeking to enjoin further

3

violations of the Act and to obtain other equitable relief.

4

The defendants waive service of the Complaint and admit

5

that the Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant, to

6

ERISA §502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. §H32(e)(2), and that venue lies

7

in the District of Utah, Central Division, pursuant to ERISA

8

§502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(2).

9

The defendants, without admitting or denying the

10

violations of ERISA alleged in the Complaint, consent to this

1 1

Partial Judgment.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24 j!
25
26
27

All parties having agreed to the entry of this Order,
and it appearing that the Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and subject matter of this action and that the Court
is empowered to provide the following, equitable relief, it is
ORDERED:
1.

Judgment be entered as set forth below.

2.

Plaintiff shall have judgment against defendants in

the amount of $4 million, payment of which amount shall be
made as follows:
a.

On or before /h&((cr 1^ 1938, defendants shall

pay to the Plan cash in the amount of $500,000;
b.

On or before y&t^m/ff.Sl988, defendant Harmon

City, Inc. (hereinafter Harmon's) shall draft and give the
Plan a promissory note in the amount of $500,000.

said note

will be paid based on a thirty year amortization schedule
with a ten year call and shall bear interest on the unpaid

28
2
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ft

n f; 7 1

JUN

6 '90 16:27

1
2

FROM ANHE

PAGE.004

balance at the prime rate published by First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A. salt Lake City, Utah as of $Cg\tMw6r

j 1988.

3

Payments on said note are to be made on the 15th of each

4

month.

5

note within 3 0 days of the date when such payment is due

6

shall result in all remaining monies due pursuant to this

7

note becoming immediately due and payable.

8

be secured at the option of plaintiff, by either (a) deeds of

9

trust on the following properties:

Any failure to make a payment due pursuant to this

10

The Cable TV Property

11

cafe Silvestre

12

Hartwell House

Said note shall

13

or (b) first trust deed(s) on properties wherein the MAI

14

appraised value of the equity is at least $600,000 (c) or a

15

combination of the above.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 I

24
25
26

The defendants shall provide

plaintiff with the appraisals referred to in sub-paragraphs
(b) above within 30 days of the signing of this Order, and
plaintiff shall indicate her selection of securities within
ten -lays thereof.

Defendants shall then tender the selected

deed or deeds of trust to the Plan forthwith.
c.

On or before

88, the Plan shall transfer

to defendant Harmon City, Inc. all right title and ownership
interest in the below identified pieces of real property,
which real property defendant takes subject to all
encumbrances, liens and indebtedness of any kind-

The

property to be transferred is:

27
28
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Alsop Building
3086-3092 West 3500 South
West Valley c i t y , Utah
Brinker Building
1140 East 3 6th S t r e e t
Ogden, Utah
Cable TV Building
3575 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah
Cafe Silvestre
3525 South 2200 West
West Valley City, Utah
Medident Building
70 South 9 00 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Sandy Commercial
530 West 9460 South
sandy, Utah
Sana/ Commercial
560 West 9460 South
Sandy, Utah
Harman Drive Apartments
4637 & 4653 West Harman Drive
West Valley, Utah
Hartwell House
56 West Hartwell Ave
Salt Lake City, Utah

23
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1

Irving Street Apartments

2

74 4 & 7 46 North Irving Street

3

Salt Lake City, Utah

4

Olvmpus Apartments

5

2035 South 300 East

6

Salt Lake City, Utah

7

Redondo Apartments

8

326 East Redondo Avenue

9

Salt Lake City, Utah

10

Riverton Apartments

11

12659 & 12679 South 1630 West

12

Riverton, Utah

13 | Riviera West Apartments
14!!

i

1 5 |j

872 west 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

16 !l West Valley Apartments
17

4123 West 3275 South and 4147 West 3280 South

18

West Valley City, Utah

19

Chattel No. iv. Lot

20

9425 South 2500 West

21

South Jordan, Utah

2 2 ii

Pleasant Valley (4S Lots regaining)

23

3100 South 6400 West

24

West Valley City, Utah

25

Roxborough I, Lot 3 5

26

2 8 55 Roxborough Park

27

West Valley City, Utah

m

28
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Spring Meadow (13 lots remaining)
200 West
Kamas, Utah
Westcove P,U.D«
4460 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah
The trustee(s) of the Plan or their designates is/are
ordered/directed to execute all documents necessary to
transfer title to the above identified real properties from
the Plan to defendant Harmon City, Inc(d)

The defendants shall transfer to the Plan

stoc): in Harmon City, inc. worth $3 million dollars*

The

parties shall have said corporation appraised in order to
determine the exact number of shares which must be
transferred.

Credit to the extent of $129,000 shall be given

against such transfer for the forfeiture to the Plan of the
entirety of the vested account balance of participant
defendant Ray Green,

The actual amount of said account

balance shall be reallocated equitably among the accounts of
all other Plan participants.
It is anticipated that the stock appraisal
referred to in the preceding paragraph will be completed and
the stock transferred within 120 days, and that a final
consent judgment will be entered at that time setting forth
the specifics of that transfer-

The appraisal will be

conducted in the manner set forth below.

6
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The parties shall jointly engage, as neutral
appraisers, Bruce Brown and Greg Gilbert to conduct two full
and complete independent appraisals of Harmon City, Inc.

In

the event that either appraiser is unable or unwilling to be
so engaged, another appraiser will be chosen by the parties
jointly.

Upon receipt of the two appraisals, if the

appraised values as determined by each of the appraisers are
within $750,000 of each other, then the enterprise value of
the corporation will be determined by taking the median of
the two appraised values (i.e., splitting the difference
between the two appraised values) , and accepting that median
as the enterprise value of the corporation.

Thus, if the

appraised values as determined by the appraisers are
$12,500,000 and $13,000,000, then the $500,000 difference
between these two values would be divided in half ($250,000)
and that amount added to the lesser of the appraised values
to determine the appraised value (in this example
$12,750,000).
In the event the appraised values as determined by the
two appraisers differs by more than $750,000, a determination
would be made as to whether the difference between the two
exceeds 30%.

That determination would be made by determining

the median between the two appraised values, calculating 30%
of that figure, and then determining whether the amount by
which the two appraisals differ exceeds that figure.

By way

of example, if the appraised values are $13,000,000 and
$15,000,000, the median between these two figures would be

J'JU
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1

determined ($14,000,000).

2

would be calculated ($4,200,000).

3

determined whether the difference between the two appraised

4

values (herein $2,000,000) was less than 30% of the median of

5

the two values (herein $4,200,000).

6

Then 30% of that median figure
It would then be

In the event the difference between the two appraised

7

values, utilizing the above-described method is determined to

8

be less than 30%, the two appraisers would be instructed to

9

meet, either telephonically or in person, and attempt to

10

reach a single, mutually agreeable appraised value at or

1 1

between the two appraised values independently determined.

12

If the appraisers are unable of their own accord to reach

13

such a mutually agreeable appraised value after a reasonable

14

amount of discussion and exchange between them they would be

15

authorized to jointly select a third appraiser, to meet with

16

them and attempt to mediate their differences.

17

the responsibility of the third jointly-selected appraiser to

18

determine which of the two appraised values he found to be

19

most reasonable and factually supportable.

20

then be the value utilized as the enterprise value for

21

settlement purposes herein.

22

It shall be

That value would

However, the mediator need not select one of the two

23

appraiser's values, but may select a different figure between

24

those of the two appraisers. The mediator is, however,

25

precluded from selecting either a higher or a lower value.

26
27

The appraisers will be instructed that a single, joint
report including a single mutually agreed upon appraised

28
8
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value is to be issued as a result of the consultations
between the two appraisers (and the mediator, if necessary) .
In the event the difference between the two appraised
values, is determined to be greater than 30%, utilizing the
above-described method, the two appraisers would be requested
to meet (either telephonically or in person), and attempt to
determine whether there was a reasonable and factual basis
for either or both of their appraised values to be adjusted
so that they would be within 30% of each other.

If the two

appraisers were able to agree on values within 3 0% of each
other, then the procedure described in the preceding
paragraph, respecting the use of a mediator, would be
instituted in an attempt to reach a single, mutually agreed
upon value.

In the event such agreement, on value less than

3 0%, could not be reached, then two new appraisers would be
selected jointly by the parties and the valuation procedure
set forth above herein reinstituted.
The two appraisers shall be engaged mutually and issued
a mutually agreed upon joint letter of instruction to insure
their neutrality.

Each would be provided with all the

information either of them determined to be necessary to the
completion of their appraisals; however, neither shall be
informed of the results of any prior appraisals which have
been conducted with respect the corporation-

The appraisals

shall be reflective of all facts determined by the appraisers
to affect the value of the corporate defendant herein,
including any and all terms of the settlement in this action,
9
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1

such as the transfer of property, the note to be given the

2

Plan, the $500,000 cash payment, the stock transfer, on the

3

put, and the restrictions on corporate management set forth

4

in paragraph 11 herein.

5

to determine an enterprise value for the stock; as a result

6

of the terms of the put encompassed in the settlement it will

7

not be necessary to determine a minority stock value.

8

determined to be appropriate by either of the appraisers,

9

other accepted valuation methodologies may be used.

10

The appraisers shall be instructed

If

Payment of all costs of the above-described appraisal

1 1

process would be borne equally by the defendants herein and

12

the Plan,

13

The stock to be transferred to the Plan will be from

14

authorized shares, but not necessarily already issued shares*

15

In the event that shares are transferred to the Plan, whether

16

or not previously issued, the per share price will be

17

adjusted to reflect any dilution which the transfer of such

18

shares would have on a previously determined share price.

19 !|

other words, if a per share value is determined based on the

20

number of shares currently outstanding, the per share price

21

will have to be adjusted to reflect the dilution caused by

22

the transfer of additional shares to the Plan,

23

3.

In

Defendant Harmon City, Inc. shall within 30 days of

24

the entry of this Order nominate and submit to plaintiff the

25

name of a federally or state chartered bank or of a person

26

who is registered as an investment advisor under the

27

Investment Advisors Act of 1940 or of an insurance company

28
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qualified to manage, acquire, or dispose of any assets of the
Plan under the laws of more than one State, to serve as the
Plan trustee and the Plan Administrator.

Said nomination

shall be submitted to the Area Director, San Francisco Area
Office, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, 71
Stevenson Street, PO Box 3455, Suite 915, San Francisco, CA
94119-3455•

Unless plaintiff gives its written consent

otherwise, should the- nominee be a bank, such bank shall be
one with which none of the defendants has any ownership or
other significant financial interest, banking or investment
relationship•

Should any defendant have any ownership,

significant interest in, or banking or investment
relationship with the nominee Bank, such interest shall be
fully disclosed in the written nomination.
Upon receipt of defendants1 nomination and any
information provided plaintiff pursuant to the preceding
paragraph, the plaintiff shall approve or disapprove the
nomination, Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Should the plaintiff disapprove defendants1 nomination,
the defendant shall, within 3 0 days, nominate a second
candidate whose appointment shall be subject to the same
approval procedure.

In the event the defendants are unable

to locate any person(s) or entity(s) willing and capable of
serving as the Plan Trustee and the Plan Administrator, and
which are acceptable to plaintiff, plaintiff shall within 90
daysf unilaterally nominate a Plan trustee and a Plan
Administrator.

The person(s) or entity(ies) chosen to serve

u
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1

as Plan Trustee and Plan Administrator shall submit to the

2

Court and the parties a written acknowledgement of their

3

fiduciary status and of the binding nature of the terms of

4

this decree.

5

Upon approval by the plaintiff of defendants'

6

nomination for Plan Trustee and Plan Administrator,

7

defendants shall execute and/or cause other authorized Plan

8

officials to execute and provide the nominee(s) with all

9

documents necessary to allow the chosen entity, as Plan

10

Trustee and Plan Administrator, to take full discretionary

1 1

authority and control over all the assets owned by the Plan.

12

The Plan trustee shall have full discretion to engage any

13 i!

additional service providers including investment managers,

14

to effectively and efficiently manage the assets of the Plan.

15

It is anticipated that defendant Harmon's may continue to

16

provide participant accounting services to the Plan at no

17

expense to the Plan and may continue to make eligibility

18

deterainations, benefit determinations, and discrimination

19

calculations.

20

and with reasonable notice to the Plan Administrator, cease

21

to provide such services.

22

may, at its option and with reasonable notice to defendant

23

Harmons, select another service provider to provide

24

participant accounting services for the Plan.

25
26
27

However, defendant Harmon's may, at its option

Further, the Plan Administrator

The nominated Plan trustee shall be responsible for the
appointment of a Plan representative to become a member of
the Board of Directors of Harmon City, Inc., as set forth in

28
12

0 0 0 6 8.1

JW

G '90 16:32

FROM ftNHE

PAGE.014

1

paragraph 8(2) below.

2

any representative that would otherwise be elected by the

3
4

Plan in a stockholders election4*

This Plan representative is in lieu of

It is hereby ordered that an independent Plan

5

Trustee

6

retained for a period of ten years from the date of this

7

Judgment and shall not during that time period be removed

8

except with the written consent of the plaintiff or by

9

further Order of this Court.

10
11
12

of the type described in paragraph 3 above shall be

If the independent Plan trustee resigns, said trustee
shall notify plaintiff in writing by directing a letter to
the l rea Director, San Francisco Area Office, Pension and

13

Welfare Benefits Administration, 71 Stevenson Street, PO Box

14

3455, Suite 915, San Francisco, CA 94119-3455-

15

will then notify Harmon City, Inc. of the resignation- As

16

soon as possible thereafter, but in any event not later than

17

3 0 days from the date Harmon City, Inc. learns of the Plan

18 |

trustee's resignation or inability to act, it shall nominate

19 |

another candidate whose appointment shall be subject to the

20 J

approval procedure set forth herein in paragraph 3.

2 1 !j

Plaintiff

The

procedure in paragraph 3 shall also be followed if plaintiff

22 j

consents in writing to the removal of said trustee.

23

end of the ten year period referred to herein, the Plan

24

sponsor may designate a Plan trustee pursuant to the Plan.

25

Unless otherwise agreed to by Plaintiff, the Plan fiduciary

26

shall be required to report to the Plaintiff, on a yearly

27

At the

basis, within sixty days after the end of the Plan year,

28
13
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1

describing those actions taken on behalf of the Plan by the

2

independent fiduciary and a brief statement of the reasons

3

therefor.

4

5.

The defendants, their officers, agents and

5

employees are permanently enjoined from violating the

6

provisions of Sections 404(a)(1) and 406(a) and (b) of ERISA,

7

29 U.S-C. section 1001 et seer.

8

6.

The defendants Midwest, Green, Harmon and Harmon

9

City, Inc. are enjoined from acting in any fiduciary capacity

10

with respect to any employee benefit plan for a period of ten

1 1

years from the date of this Order.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

7.

Defendant Harmon's shall abide by all of the

conditions set forth in paragraph 8 below or obtain prior
approval from the appointed Plan Representative on the Board
of Directors of the Corporation before entering into a
transaction which would contravene one of these conditions.
Approval of the Plan representative shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
Defendant Harmon's shall be relieved from

20

compliance with conditions 1 through 8 of paragraph 8 herein

21

when the v.iue of the stock held by the Plan as a result of

22

the instant settlement has a value of less than $750,000.

23

Further, when the value of the stock held by the Plan is

24

reduced to $750,000, the corporation shall have the right to

25

call such stock.

26

corporation would have to pay to the Plan the value of the

27

stock at its "most recent appraised value" as defined in

In the event of the use of such a call the

28
1 A

A

A

r

r*
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Payment for any stock so purchased by

the corporation would be made in equal periodic payments (not
less frequently than annually) , with interest at the prime
rate published by First Security Bank of Utah, N*A. Salt Lake
City, Utah as of the date of the call, over a period
beginning not later than thirty days after exercise of the
call and not exceeding five years.

The Plan will retain the

stock as security until full payment is made*
3.

(1.)

The corporation shall not enter into any

transaction or any combination of transactions in any one
fiscal year which would result in the sale, liquidation or
spin-off of corporate assets (other than inventory) in excess
of twenty five (2 5%) of corporate assets at the time of
settlement, or that in any five year period during the time
when this restriction is in effect, would result in more than
fifty (50) percent of such assets being sold, liquidated or
spunoff.
(2 0

A position on the Board of Directors shall

be offered to the Plan representative designated by the Plan
Trustee.
(3-)

The corporation shall only engage in

business activities which are prudent in the normal operation
of a merchandizing chain and/or grocery super store chain.
Such normal activities may include, but not be limited to,
acquisition of land and construction or remodeling of
buildings for future expansion, and promotion of new and/or
additional products for retail sale within a store or stores,

is

00068 4
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1

which merchandise may or may not normally be associated with

2

grocery sales.

3

(4.)

Defendant Harmon's shall not acquire or

4

lease any assets for purposes of obtaining additional stores

5

until the following financial ratios are met as reflected on

6

the yearly audited financial statement:

7

Financial Ratio & Percentages

8

SOLVENCY

9

Debt/Net worth

5:1

current Assets/
Current Liabilities

.80-1 based on book
inventory having turned
22 times on book cost of sales

10
11
12
13
14 !
15
16

Efficiency
Sales/
Total Assets

4:1

Profitability
Pre-Tax Income/
Total Assets

5.0%

17
18
19

Pre-Tax income
Net Worth

T f">3r

10^

Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the

20

acquisition of additional stores when such acquisition would

21

have no effect on defendant Harmon's debt/equity ratios if

22

the following conditions are met:

23

a) Said acquisition is approved by defendant Harmon's

24

Board of Directors at a meeting at which the Plan

25

representative is present;

26
27

b)

An analysis is made and signed off on by the Plan's

independent auditors, and presented to the Board of

28
16
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Directors, confirming that said acquisition will not affect
defendant Harmon's debt/equity ratio;
c)

Defendant Harmon1s management has prepared and

presented to defendant Harmon!s Board of Directors1 a well
documented business plan including five year projections,
showing that said acquisition will be advantageous to
Harmon's and said Plan is approved by the Board; and
d)

During the time period preceding the appointment of

a Plan representative to defendant Harmon's Board of
Directors f , the information set forth in (b) and (c) above
which is required to be presented at the Board of Directors1
meeting referred to in subparagraph (a) above will be
provided to the Plan's attorney for his review*
(5.)

Executive Compensation shall be limited as set

forth below, subject to the best judgment of Harmon's senior
management:
a.

Store managers be limited to a base salary of

$40,000 per annum each plus the CPI plus 5% increase
limitations.

In addition, store managers may be entitled to

a bonus equal to no more than 4% of the store's pre-tax net
operating income after all charges.
b.

Departmental managers shall have a $35,000 per

annum base salary as adjusted by the CPI plus 5% increase
limitation and each may be entitled to a bonus equivalent to
no more than 2% of the store's pre-tax net operating income
after all charges.

17

(\ it n a £ a
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There are nine executive officers who are

compensated by base salaries and periodic bonuses.

The total

base compensation for this group shall be $365,000 per annum,
an average of $40,555 per person*

This aggregate amount

shall be allowed to increase by the above-described CPI plus
5% factors.

individuals included in the group will be

additionally compensated by periodic bonuses as follows:
i*

The President and General

Manager (one at present) of
the corporation may continue
to receive an $8,400 per
quarter bonus together with
an annual bonus of $12,000,
said amounts also subject to
the annual CPI plus 5%
increases,
ii.

Vice Presidents (2 at

present) may receive
quarterly bonuses in amounts
equal to no more than 2% of
the company net operating
income after all charges•
iii.

Other general officers,

Secretary/Treasurer,
Assistant Vice Presidents,
and Controller may each
receive quarterly bonuses
18

000667
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1

equal to no more than the greater

2

of 1% of the company pre-tax net

3

operating income after all charges

4

or the highest store manager for

5

the quarter.

6

d-

PAGE.020

In the event the company elects to change

7

its existing policies, the totals of the above-described

8

compensation amounts vill be aggregated and management

9

may have the option of allocating said totals among the

10
11

various participants in the management group at its discretion.
e-

In the event it becomes necessary to increase

12

the Executive and Management staff of the company as a

13

result of the addition of new stores or added work requirements,

14

employment may be extended and compensation paid at the

15

then prevailing rates standard in the grocery industry

16

as applicable to chains of a comparable size to Harmons,

17

f.

Wherein the term H CPI" is utilized herein

18

it is intended that the "5LS CPI-U/ U.S. City Average,

19

All Items Index*' be the CPI to be utilized in determining

20

the amount of such compensation.

21

(6.)

The corporation shall not accept or

22

enter into co-ventures or accept outside equity if such

23

action would result in a loss of control of the corporation

24

by the current owners*

25

(7.)

The Harmon family shall not lend any

26

additional money to the corporation during the period when

27

the terms of this agreement are in effect.

2§
:
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The Plan shall have a right of first refusal

to purchase shares, at the same price as others acquiring
newly issued shares at that point in time, of the corporate
stock each time that the corporation proposes to issue
additional shares from its authorized but unissued shares, as
well as each time that the corporation proposes to authorize
and issue shares in addition to those currently authorized.
This right to purchase shall, however, be limited to only
that number of shares required to maintain the Plan's
proportionate equity position in the corporation that exists
on the

date the new issue is to take place.
Any additional stock which may in the future be

issued, sold or otherwise transferred by the corporation
would be transferred only upon receipt by the corporation of
cash or other assets equal to or greater than the value of
said stock at the most recent appraised value as defined in
paragraph 9 below.
The corporation shall have the right of first refusal
on any stock held by the Plan or current or former Plan
participants or their heirs or assigns and which such parties
wish to offer for sale.
Except as provided below, any shares purchased pursuant
to this paragraph (8) , by the corporation, shall be purchased
at the "most recent appraised value11 as defined in paragraph
9 below.

In the event that the seller of the stock

determines that it is in his interest, or, in the case of the
Trustee, in the interest of the Plan, to sell the stock in
20
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his possession and he has received a bona fide offer from a
party unrelated to the corporation or any defendant herein
which he wishes to accept, then the corporation may exercise
a right of first refusal at such offering price9, (a)

The stock placed in the Plan pursuant to the

settlement agreement with the Department shall be subject to
a "put" option as follows:

Following any distributions of

such stock by the Plan to an employee, which distribution
shall be in accordance with the Plan document, such employee
may "put" such stock to the company at the most recent
appraised value within sixty days following the date of
distribution of such stock; if such stock is not "put" to the
company within such sixty day period, such employee may "put"
such stock to the company at the most recent appraised value
during another sixty day period beginning at the start of the
next plan year of the Plan.

If the last day of a sixty-day

period referred to in the previous sentence falls on a
weekend or public holiday, the period shall extend until the
next normal business day.
The "most recent appraised value" as used in this
decree shall mean the most recent appraised value pursuant to
annual appraisals or appraisal updates to be made by an
independent appraiser selected jointly by the company and the
Plan trustee, as of the end of each fiscal year of the
company-

In the event that the company and trustee cannot

agree on an appraiser, either the trustee or the company may
move the court to appoint or select an appraiser.

The

00 060ft
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1

company may, in its sole discretion, pay the purchase price

2

for any stock "put" to it under the terms of this paragraph

3

in substantially equal periodic payments (not less frequently

4

than annually) over a period beginning not later than thirty

5

days after the exercise of such put option but not exceeding

6

five years*

7 il

prime rate as published by First Security Bank of Utah on the

8

date the put is made.

9

party putting it to the corporation until the full purchase

10

Interest on any unpaid balance shall be at the

The stock shall be retained by the

price is paid,

1 1

(b)

Further, as to individuals whose total

12

distribution from the Plan would be $3,500 or less, the Plan

13

shall pay such individuals wholly in cash and shall not

14

distribute to such individuals any of the stock received as a

15 I

result of this settlement.

16

agreed that the Plan may, at the end of each calendar year,

17

"put" to the corporation the amount of stock which, in the

18
19

absence of this agreement, would have been distributed to

1

20

In recognition thereof it is

those individuals whose total distribution was $3,500 or
li

less.

The ability to put this stock to the corporation is

21

separate and apart from any other "put" agreed to herein.

22

The company may, in its sole discretion, pay the purchase

23

price for any stock "put" to it under the terms of this

24 |l

paragraph in substantially equal periodic payments (not less

25

frequently than annually) over a period beginning not later

26

than thirty days after the exercise of such put option but

27

not exceeding five years.

Interest on any unpaid balance

28
22

n
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1

shall be at the prime rate as published by First Security

2

Bank of Utah, N.A., Salt Lake City, Utah on the date the put

3

is made.

4

full purchase price is paid.

5

The stock shall be retained by the Plan until the

(c) . (i)

Further, during the ten year period

6 i|

immediately following the signing of this agreement, the Plan

7

shall have a "put" up to $300,000 per year, which amount

8

shall be cumulated for each of the ten years.

9

whether the Plan can exercise its "put", on the last day of

To determine

10

each calendar year, the Corporation will provide the Plan

1 1

trustee with a statement showing the number of shares and the

12

value of the shares which have been put to the Corporation by

13

Plan participants during the preceding 364 days of that year,

14

as well as the cumulative value of all shares put to the

15

corporation by Plan participants during each of the years

16 S

l!
17

subsequent to the signing of this agreement.
(ii)

In the event that the value of the shares put

18

to the corporation by the Plan participants is less than

19 I

$300,000 multiplied by the number of years which have then

20

elapsed since the signing of this agreement, the Plan would,

21

subject to the provisions of paragraph (iii) below, have the

22

option to "put" as many shares of stock to the Company at the

23

most recent appraised value as would bring the total value of

24

stock "put" to the Company to an amount equal to $300,000 for

25 I

each year subsequent to the signing of this agreement.

26
27

For example, if at the end of the third year subsequent
to the signing of this agrement, the total value of all stock

28
n
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1

"put" to the corporation by Plan participants in the three

2

years subsequent to the signing of this agreement is less

3

than $900,000 (3 times $300,000) then the Plan would have the

4

option to "put" to the corporation so much stock as would

5

bring the total value of

6

Plan participants and the Plan itself to a total of $900,000.

7

In the event the total value of stock "put" to the

8

corporation by Plan participants exceeded $900,000, the Plan

9

would be precluded from exercising any "put".

10

stock "put" to the company both by

The corporation may, in its sole discretion, pay the

11

purchase price for any stock "put" to it by the Plan under

12

the terms of this paragraph in substantially equal periodic

13

payments (not less frequently than annually) over a period

14

beginning not later than thirty days after the exercise of

15

such put option, but not exceeding five years.

16

any unpaid balance shall be at the prime rate as published by

17
18
19

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.r Salt Lake City, Utah on
the date the put is made.

The Plan shall retain the stock

until the full purchase price is paid.

20
21

Interest on

(iii)

Further, the put described in subparagraph

(i) shall only be exercisable in a year where the audited

22

financial statements of the previous fiscal year reflect that

23

the pre-tax net income of the Company exceeds 2 1/2% of gross

24

sales.

25
26

In such years, said "put" is exercisable to -the extent
of $30,000 for each l/10th percent by which the pre-tax net

27
28
24
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1

income of the Company exceeds 2 1/2% of gross sales, up to a

2

limit of $300,000.

3
4

Partial Consent Judgment or of the Final Judgment herein,

5

shall cause all sums due the Plan from the Corporate

6

defendant herein including but not limited to those due

7

pursuant to the $500,000 note referred to in paragraph 2

8

herein to become immediately due and payable.

10.

9

11.

Any material breach of any of the terms of this

Each party agrees to bear its own fees and other

10

expenses incurred by such party in connection with any stage

1 1

of this proceeding.

12

DATED: (jif,UiJ$J,

"7

13
14

//
//

17 i

//

18 !j

21
!|
1

22 l

26
27

Copies mailed to counsel 8-30-88cn:
Daniel W. Teehan, Esq.
Brent D. Ward, U.S. Attorney
Charles W. Hanna, Esq.
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq.
Jeffrey N. Clayton, Esq.

//

20

25

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

//

19 i

24

, 1988

//

15

23

' •

__^

i

//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//

28
25
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The undersigned apply for
and consent to the entry of the
preceding Order
<*L,sy

DATED:

& ^-

1988

GEORGE R. SALEM
Solicitor of Labor
DANIEL W. TEEHAN
Regional Solicitor
±#\
PATRICIA s/^vfelNER
Attorney

\XJLLL^LAJ

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DATED:

/

1988

<£*f
Charles v?. Hanna
Brown, Smith/ and Hanna
Attorneys for ?• Ray Green

Ray Gg^en

3/4/&L

Dated:

2Gu> j- y^4j^ ,< *^<^
:^^LS^JI^
$Ldvfest R e S i t y and Finance, I n c .

Dated: 0^.

1

t.

/?

/?<t8T

Harraba City/ Inc. Prof it' Shari]
Plan

'itmiaA.AA.ty

R6bert M-~ M o r r i s , T r u s t e e
Dated: 8 lci~££
\

i
!

/tkA^J*^S^\J

'TERRYJ/HARMON
i n d v y L p u a i l y and on b e h a l f
of^^aiymon C i t y , I n c . / f o r i t s e l f
and a s P l a n A d m i n i s t r a t o r
Dated:

< iV<z*L

'Attorney for Terry Harmon arffd
Harmor City/ Inc.

Trustee
Dated:

/

/^RRY^ARMON ^r^ b e n a i t
( HARK

CITY/

I N C

or

Plan

AdmLnistcator

ft/*
/
J E F F R E Y CuAY70N 1
Attornsv

<.„f,d /9 /^r

,r

/

o o o (? o 5

j

!
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:v<a?;:-:;T C O U R T
DISTRICT OF UTAH

DANIEL W. TEEHAN
Regional Solicitor
Office of the Solicitor
United states Department of Labor
71 Stevenson Street, Suite 1020
P*0. Box 3495
San Francisco, California 94119-3495

/
/
H A R K - : / . /IMHER,

BY

/.
„
D£nJf v CLERK

Local Ccmsel:
Dee V. Benson
6 United States Attorney for
the District of Utah
7 IKS, Courthouse Building
Room 466
8 350 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
9 (801) 524-5682
i o i! Attorneys for Plaintiff
5

0£

n

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

12

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Labor,
United States Department of Labor
1 4 8 (formerly Ann McLaughlin)

^

13

Plaintiff,

15
16
17
18
19
20

CIVIL ACTION
FILE No. 88-C-734W

v.
Terry Harmon, an individual,
F. Ray Green, an individual,
Harmon City, Inc., a Utah
corporation, and Midwest Realty
and Finance, Inc., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT

21
This action was filed by the Secretary of Labor alleging
22
that the defendants failed to discharge their responsibilities as
23
fiduciaries of the Harmon City, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan

("the

24
Plan") in violation of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income
25
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.c. §1001 et seg. , and seeking
26
to enjoin

further violations

of the Act

and

to

obtain

other

27
equitable relief.
28
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A Partial Consent Judgment was issued by the United States
District Court for the Central District of Utah, the Honorable

3I David K, Winder, presiding on the 29th day of August, 1988.
48

Since the entry of the aforesaid Partial consent Judgment,

51 the following have occurred:
6

1.

A plan trustee and a plan administrator have been

7 I appointed;
3J

2. Harmon City, Inc. has transferred Five Hundred Thousand

9| Dollars ($500,000) in cash to the Plan;
10

3,

Harmon City, Inc. has given to the Plan a provisory

111 note in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000);
12|

4*

The aforementioned note has been secured;

13 I

5.

The Plan has transferred properties to Harmon City,

141 Inc., as set forth in pages three

(3) through six

(6) of the

i

151 Partial Consent Judgment;
16

6.

Pursuant

to

paragraph

2d

of

the

Partial

Consent

17| Judgment, two appraisers were designated and rendered appraisals
IS { of the fair market value of Harmon city, inc.

Bruce Brown of

19 J Brown-Wright and Associates issued an appraisal report indicating
201 the total valuation of the corporation to be Twenty-two Million
211 Eight Hundred and Ninety Thousand Dollars

($22,890,000).

221; Gilbert

an

of

23 I indicating

Corporate

Valuations

issued

appraisal

the total value of the corporation

to be

24 h Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($19,500,000).

Greg
report

Nineteen

Pursuant to

25 | the above-noted paragraph of the Partial Consent Judgment, the two
26[j appraisers consulted and determined that the appraised value of

28,1

2
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1

Harmon City, Inc. as of July 31 r 1988 is Twenty-one Million Two

2

Hundred

3

experts' evaluation, it is determined that the appraised value of

4

Harmon City, Inc. as of July 31, 1988 is $21,200,000.

Thousand

7.

5

Dollars

Harmon

City,

($21,200,000).

Inc.

has

Based

transferred

on

to

the

above

the

Plan

6

$3,000,000 of stock minus the $129,000 adjustment set forth in

7

paragraph 2(d) of page 6 of the Partial Consent Judgment, all in

8

accord with the terms of the Partial Consent Judgment, a copy of

9

which is attached hereto and incorporated herein.

10

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

11

this Final Judgment be entered by this Court, each party to bear

12

its own fees and expenses.

13

Dated this

14

Copies neiled, 6-21-89jm
Daniel W. Teehan, Esq.
Dee Benson, USA
Charles W. Hanna, Esq.
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq.
Jeffrey N. Clayton, Esq.

15
16
17
18

//

19

//

20

//

21

//

22

//

23

//

24

//

25

//

26

//

7sU day of May 1989

/

/

^

DAVID K." tfltfDER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

27
28

0C%C\^
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is Judgrpent is hereby consented to:

1

64M**-

2
3
4

t-H(ah.Uol

O' w^'V

& >X4?^*-

Charles' W. Hanna
Brown, Smith, and Hanna
Attorneys for F. Ray Green
Dated:

F. Ray G/6en

Midwest aeal"Cy and Finance,
Inc.
Dated: /T2t*
20,/fS1?

Harmon city, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan

Dated:

J ^ U

^

/^JV?

5
6

R o b e r t M. M o r r i s , T r u s t e e
Dated: Rcsicmg<rADrTK 14, 1989

7

T

8

4
10

n
12

HARMON
fvidually and on behalf
6%/Hanuon City, Inc. , for itself
and as Plan Administrator
Dated:
Attorney for Terry Harmon and
Harmon city, inc.

13

Ddn S. C a r r o l l , T r u s t e e
Dated: Resfeqngd April 14, 1969
y
on behajnr"bf
Inc. ,
istrator

Harmon City, Ine_ Profit Sharing
14

Dated:

15 ' JEFFREY CLAYTON
Attorney
„
16 Dated: //?' /7/jZcf

^7
^-y
/>'

^

^

^

L

'KEY *BANK OF UTAH,/Successor Trustee

Dated: &~fz>y/gf

17
Approved as to form and content,
18
19

Dated!

1989

JERRY >G- THQ^RN, S o l i c i t o r of Labor
20

By: o^UxXX&J

JffJW

21 | DANIEL W. TEEHAN, Regional Solicitor
22 I UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
| Attorneys for Plaintiff
23
24
25
26
27
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
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HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON,
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON,
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah
corporation, MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON,
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah
corporation, TERRY HARMON and
MRS. TERRY HARMON,

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M.
JONES IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Civil No. 920901436CV
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Defendants.
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STATE OF UTAH
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JEFFREY M. JONES, being first duly sworn, deposes and states
as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years.

I have personal

knowledge of the facts set forth herein and would so testify if
called upon to do so.

2.

I am plaintiff's counsel and have reviewed the proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the defendants
in this action and find several portions to be in error.
3.

The delay in pursuing this case was due, in part, to my

attention to the case in which Mr. Boyd was sued by his previous
counsel of record in the present case, Mr. Isom.

Judge Frank

G.

Noel issued a memorandum decision in favor of Mr. Isom on June 16,
1993.

I filed Boyd's notice of appeal in Mr. Isom's action on

December 9, 1993.
4.

In February

1994, I contacted

Mr. Boyd

regarding

a

meeting which I had with Mr. Kay at court regarding this case. Mr.
Kay asked me to provide him with a settlement offer from Mr. Boyd.
I contacted Mr. Boyd and he authorized me to make a proposal to Mr.
Kay.

I then called Mr. Kay regarding the settlement terms proposed

by Mr. Boyd.

Mr. Kay never told me of his clients acceptance or

rejection of Mr. Boyd's settlement offer.
5.

On June 2, 1994, I filed Boyd's appellant's brief in the

Isom Action.

On or about July 26, 1994, while the matter was in

the process of being submitted to the Utah Supreme Court, Mr. Isom
and Mr. Boyd settled the Isom Action.
6.

Defendants in this action have only filed a motion to

dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. Further, with the exception
of Burbidge and Kirton's motion, these motions to dismiss were not
filed with respect to all claims in this action, but were only with
respect to the fourth cause of action for securities fraud.

2

7.

Accordingly,

defendants

Harmon

City,

Inc.,

Matthew

Hilton, Michael Gottfredson, Nielsen & Senior, Terry Harmon and
Mrs. Terry Harmon have taken no action with respect to plaintiff's
First, Second and Third Causes of Action other than to answer the
Amended Complaint.
8.

There is no evidence of defendants' expense or prejudice

that is currently before the Court.
9.

There

is

no

evidence

of

defendants' maintenance

of

professional liability coverage and insurance.
10.

Not all defendants have paid other outside attorneys to

defend them; lawyers associated with Nielsen & Senior represent
Nielsen & Senior in this action.
11.

Defendants have not previously requested a scheduling

conference in this action.
12.

No Orders to Show Cause have been issued or hearings held

in this case regarding a lack of prosecution until April 6, 1995.
13.
between

Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2 does not differentiate
the

defendants

regarding

their

separate

conduct

and

opportunity to move the case along.
14.

Only Kirton and Burbidge filed a Motion to Dismiss all

causes of action in this case.
15.

Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and Mrs. Terry Harmon's

motion to dismiss was only with respect to the Fourth Cause of
Action.

Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and Mrs. Terry Harmon

have done nothing with respect to defending or bringing motions

3
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regarding the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action until their
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was filed.
16.

Defendant Nielsen & Senior has done anything other than

file an Answer to the Complaint and request a partial judgment on
the pleadings with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action. Nielsen
& Senior has done nothing with respect to defending or bringing
motions regarding the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action
until its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was filed.
17.

Defendant

Hilton

has

done

nothing

but

answer

the

Complaint until his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was
filed.
18.

Defendant Gottfredson has never served an answer to the

Complaint.
19.

If given the opportunity, Mr. Boyd will aggressively

pursue discovery and his claims.

4
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

day of April, 1995.
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorney for Defendant
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas L. Kay, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER
Attorney for Defendant
111 East Broadway #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Michael Gottfredson, Esq.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; APRIL 6, 1995; P.M. SESSION
* * *

2

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

3

The motion

4

to dismiss is granted.

The court finds that the Meadow

5

Land, or Meadow Farm, excuse me, Meadow Fresh Farms case

6

is directly on point.
Specifically, the court finds that there is no

7
8

sufficiently reasonable or viable excuse for the lack of

9

diligence.

10

None has been given, and the court can find

none.

11

Given the significant length of time that has

12

passed since the cause of action occurred, and since the

13

litigation was filed—and I would indicate that there

14

appears to be even a two-year period between those two

15

dates—the court cannot, in good conscience, deny the

16

motion.

17

There is an old expression, "Justice delayed is

18

justice denied."

I am of the opinion that this is a

19

phrase that has real and significant meaning when applied

20

to actions pending in courts of law.

21

defendants, or is not on the defendants, to undertake

22

expensive discovery when there has been no action taken by

23

the plaintiffs.

24

in this complaint by the plaintiffs.

25

initiated in these files that I've got, in the three

The onus is on the

There has been no action after the filing
The only action
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volumes, since the filing of the complaint, has all been
on the defendants' part.
Common sense shows that there is prejudice to
attorneys in having this sort of thing hang over their
heads,

I take judicial notice of the fact that when six

attorneys are present in my courtroom and file numerous
pleadings, that their actions are not free, that their
actions involve an expenditure of time and energy, and
therefore prejudice to their respective clients.
I also take judicial notice of the fact that
attorneys have malpractice coverage and insurance, and
what the realities are in maintaining that insurance, and
in doing the reporting that was necessitated here.
Delayed resolutions are inherently unfair and
prejudicial to one defending the same.

There have been no

dispositive motions by the plaintiff, none have been
filed.

There has been no discovery initiated by the

plaintiff until these motions were before the court.
There have been no settlement discussions for over a year,
and no real activity in this case for over two years.
If the plaintiffs had a viable claim, they had,
or he had, I should say, three years to pursue the claim,
and has chosen not to do so.

I cannot conclude that the

plaintiff is, therefore, prejudiced.

He has had a forum

for resolution of the disputes and has chosen not to use

0 0 0 7 93
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it.

Despite all that has been said so articulately
by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff, it is clear to me
that the law does not favor unlimited viability of causes
of action.

It simply does not.

The action bringing us

here was not action renewed or brought by the plaintiff.
The defendants have, again, brought us to court, and it is
their activity that has generated the majority of the work
in this case, and all of the activity for the last several
years.
I find in favor of the plaintiffs, or excuse
me, the defendants, in favor of the movants on the three
motions to dismiss. Who wishes to file the findings and
the order of dismissal?
MR. KAY:

I'd be happy to, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right. And I would ask that

you're specific with reference to what I have alluded to.
Do not limit what you put to what I have said, but make it
consistent with what I have said.
MR. KAY:

If it would be all right, I would

just like to get a copy of the transcript of your ruling,
and order that after.
THE COURT:

I'll let you make your arrangements

with Cecilee, but that's certainly appropriate.

Yes,

counsel?
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MR. JONES:

Your Honor, if I just may clarify,

this dismissal is not on the merits of the case; is that
correct, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

I hadn't spoken to that issue.

Mr. Kay?
MR. KAY:

Our motion was under Rule 41-B, and

for failure of plaintiff to prosecute or comply, and we've
asked for it to be with prejudice.

And the rule itself,

41-B says that it operates as an adjudication upon the
merits unless you indicate otherwise.
doesn't make any difference.

And I think it

I mean it totally undercuts

your ruling if tomorrow he files a new case.
THE COURT:

Counsel?

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, there has been no

determination on the merits at all.

It cannot be on the

merits in this case.
THE COURT:

Do you want to speak to the rule?

MR. JONES:

Well, the court- -

what I'm trying to do in that sense.
"Unless the court finds otherwise."

Yes, that's

That the rule says,
There has been no

hearing with regard to any of the merits in this case.
This is not a hearing with regard to the evidence, this is
not a hearing on summary judgment where the court has
weighed the evidence in any fashion.
without prejudice.

And it should be

And not on the merits.
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THE COURT:

Counsel, do you want to approach

and let me look at that section of the code?
MR, KAY:

I'm looking particularly where it

says, "Unless the court, in its order."
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The rule says, and I'm

referring to the last sentence of subsection B, "Unless
the court, in its order for dismissal, otherwise specifies
the dismissal under the subdivision, and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits."
Based upon that, the dismissal will be with
prejudice.

Counsel, again, I appreciate the excellent

quality of the oral argument.
in waiting to be heard.

Thank you for your patience

Mr. Kay, it goes without saying

that you will submit to all of the counsel bringing the
motion, and to counsel for the plaintiff, the findings and
order you prepare before it comes to me.

Is there

anything further?
MR. KAY:
THE COURT:

I don't think so.
Thank you.
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)
)
)

I, CECILEE WILSON, an official court reporter
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stenographically the proceedings in the matter of SAMUEL
L. BOYD VS. HARMON CITY, INC., ET AL. , Case No. 920901436,
and that the above and foregoing is a true and correct
transcript of said proceedings.

Dated this 7th day of April, 1995.

Cecilee Wilson
Utah License No. 167
* * *
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; APRIL 6, 1995; P.M. SESSION
THE COURT:

2
3

I'm sorry to have kept the next

group of attorneys waiting.

I apologize.

I am now ready to hear argument on Boyd versus

4
5

Harmon City, et al., 920901436.

6

three different motions to dismiss, all, in essence,

7

arguing the same thing from the respective defendants.

8

And I understand it's opposed by the plaintiff, and I'm

9

happy to hear argument.
I think I'm generally conversant with the facts

10
11

and the law.

12

appearances for the record.

Let me get counsel to state their

MR. JONES:

13
14

Jeffrey Jones and Mark Gibb for the

plaintiffs, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. KAY:

17

I am aware that we have

Thank you, Mr. Jones, Mr. Gibb.

Tom Kay for Brinton Burbidge and

Kirton, McConkie.

18

MR. OSTLER:

Blake Ostler for Harmon.

19

MS. LARSON:

Catherine Larson for Matthew

MR. MANGUM:

John Mangum and Arthur Nielsen for

20
21
22

Hilton.

Nielson & Senior.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. KAY:

25

THE COURT:

Who's going to go first, Mr. Kay?

I filed the first motion.
In any event, you were on your feet
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1

first.
MR. KAY:

2

I have to admit, after listening to

3

this last argument, I'm going to quit writing poetry to my

4

wife.
THE COURT:

5

Well, let me just say this,

6

Mr. Kay.

Whatever the facts are that counsel allude to in

7

this case, I'll be happy to hear them after the last.
MR. KAY:

8
9
10

This is our motion under Rule 41-B

for an order dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint with
prejudice for failure to prosecute.

11

This case, Your Honor, was filed nearly three

12

years ago.

13

the time period from the spring of 1986 to September of

14

1988.

15

And it really makes allegations that relate to

After this complaint was filed, and this

16

complaint, the amended complaint was filed by David Isom,

17

then we moved to dismiss, and all of us moved to dismiss.

18

We had the hearing on January 15th, 1993.

19

Between the time that the case was filed and

20

the case was dismissed, Mr. Isom, for whatever reason,

21

withdrew as counsel, and for a period of time Samuel Boyd,

22

who's also an attorney, represented himself, before

23

Mr. Jones and his firm became involved.

24
25

After the motion to dismiss was argued, you
ruled in February of 1993, that plaintiff's fourth claim
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1

should be dismissed, and it was dismissed, and then the

2

parties were ordered to answer the amended complaint.

3

We filed our answer on March 12th, 1993, and

4

brought our current motion in January of 1995. We have

5

pointed out the factors that this court needs to look at

6

under Rule 41-B for dismissal with prejudice.

7

conduct of the parties, the opportunity to move the case

8

forward, what each party has done to move the case

9

forward, also the difficulty or prejudice to either side,

10

It's the

and whether injustice may result.
And Your Honor, I want to just say something

11
12

that we did not put in the briefs, but I think it's

13

important where we have a situation where lawyers are

14

sued, or other professionals are sued.
The facts of life, and I can represent the

15
16

facts of life, because I defend a lots of lawyers, the

17

facts of life, where you are sued for legal malpractice,

18

two things happen.

First thing, you have to put your

19

carrier on notice.

The next time, however long a case

20

pends, you have to then put on every application for

21

insurance that you have this case pending, that is suing

22

you for punitive damages, that it's suing you for untold

23

dollars.

24
25

What the underwriting departments of a Home
Insurance, or another insurance company then do is to set

000802

your premium for your insurance for the next year, they
look at pending claims and wondering, you know, like a
case like this, what is going to be involved.

They take

that into consideration.
It also puts a cloud on a lawyer's ability to
practice.

People come into court, they see that there's a

motion against Brinton Burbidge, or McConkie, or any of
these other attorneys involved in this case, and it sits
there.
Then they also have a deductible, Your Honor,
that they may pay the first thousand or $10,000 or $20,000
or $100,000 of any defense costs that are incurred in
defending this case.
Well, I bring those things up simply to say,
Your Honor, that when a lawyer is sued, and then the first
lawyer withdraws, for whatever reason, the plaintiff
lawyer represents himself for whatever reason, then a
third lawyer gets involved, and then, with all three
attorneys, Your Honor, for over three years, or nearly
three years, not one single thing happens.
We come forward, we move to- THE COURT:

What do you calculate, Mr. Kay, the

exact timing on the inactivity to be?
MR. KAY:

Well, I would say that from January

15th, 1993, when we argued our motion to, the motion to

oooso:i

dismiss, I do not know anything that the plaintiffs have
done in this case.
Now, Your Honor, one of the things they brought
up- THE COURT:

You filed- -

Pardon me for

interrupting, but you filed your motion when, again?

Was

in '95?
MR. KAY:

We filed our motion to dismiss early,

or in the summer, I can't remember.
THE COURT:
MR. KAY:

'94?

No, in '92. We were served in July

of '92, and so we filed it within thirty days of that
date.
THE COURT:

And then you reactivated it at what

point in time?
MR. KAY:

Well, no, then there was motions back

and forth, and it didn't come on for hearing until January
of '93. So there were motions back and forth for a period
of time, and when it got calendared, it was calendared for
January 15th.

So after January 15th, 1993, Your Honor,

there has been absolutely nothing done by the plaintiffs
besides coming here and arguing.
The thing that they brought up, and they said,
lf

0h, but we had settlement negotiations."

define what happened, Your Honor.

I want to

I saw Jeff Jones over

0 0 0 8 04
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here, we were over here, not before you, but before
another judge on separate cases, and I just happened to
see him.

And I said, "When are you going to dismiss that

lousey case against Kirton, McConkie?

You know, either

get on with it or dismiss." And that was in February of
1994.
And he says, "Well, I'll look into it and I'll
get back to you."

So after January of '93 to February of

'94, that's the only contact, saying they'll look into it
and they'll get going with it.

Nothing happens after

that, Your Honor.
We file this case, we file this motion now, in
January of this year.

And so what has occurred is

absolutely nothing has happened from the plaintiffs from
the date that this case was filed.
the motion to dismiss.

They only respond to

They don't bring any action, they

don't notice one deposition, they don't give any
interrogatories.
We're sitting here with what we think is a
frivolous case, and we're not going to spend all the time
and money to then move the case forward, take three years
of depositions, to then have them say in affidavit there
are issues of fact.

So we do what we do, and we sit there

and listen, and we ask them, you know, "Get on with it or
dismiss it," and they don't do anything.

And so that's

0 0 0 8 05
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what has happened, Your Honor.

And I think this is the

perfect case.
And so what happens after we file this motion,
Your Honor?

Is that then they file, you know, a hundred

interrogatories to everybody.
a scheduling order.
raring to go.11

Then they say, "Let's have

Let's get on with this thing.

We're

And I just think that that is so

inappropriate, to have this cloud- THE COURT: And so that everyone understands,
I'm not going to consider anything that occurred by way of
activity after the January of '95 motion was filed, for
purposes of resolving this motion.
MR. KAY:

But Your Honor, for all of the

criteria and factors that you have to look at under 41-B,
all of them weigh in favor.

Injustice would only occur if

the plaintiffs were allowed to do what they have done, or
lack of what they have done, for three years, and then to
prolong what these attorneys and other people who have
been sued in this case have to prolong, so we would submit
it on that basis.
THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

You may

proceed, Mr. Ostler.
MR. OSTLER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Mr. Kay, I

think, has done a very adequate job, but there are just
two other factors that I think the court ought to be aware
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of.
Mr. Kay, because he's been retained by the
firm, really hasn't been involved with all of the facts
that give rise to this case.

This is really something

that goes all the way back to 1986.

There have been

threats made since that time.
THE COURT:

Just so I'm clear, Mr. Ostler,

refresh me, I've obviously had a lot going on today.
MR. OSTLER:
THE COURT:
MR. OSTLER:

I represent Harmon City, Inc.
That's helpful.
The nature of this case was that

Mr. Boyd wanted to buy Harmon City, Inc., it never
happened, and he's complaining about a transaction that
never went through.
His real claim is, "Well, gee, you really
didn't intend to sell me your store, and I made trips to
Salt Lake City, and you owe me for all of the expenses
that I incurred in doing that.1' The claim is, is that my
clients were simply going through the motions for more
than eight months, and expending thousands and thousands
of dollars of their own, in something that they ;just had
no interest in, which is ludicrous on its face.
But shortly after this thing fell apart, after
intense negotiations over months, the claim is made,
"You'd better notify your carrier."

This is Mr. Boyd.
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"Notify your carrier, because I#m going to bring a suit.11
And we don't see a suit for several years.
THE COURT: When did this notice occur, verbal
notice?
MR. OSTLER:

In 1987, Your Honor.

And we have

a string of letters, one in '87, one in #89, telling us
again, we'd better pay or he's going to sue. And then in
'91 he finally does something.

And nothing has happened.

Now, there may have been even a
conversation—this is the second thing—between Mr. Kay
and the attorneys for the plaintiffs.

There has been

absolutely no conversations, we haven't been contacted
even once about this case on anything by the plaintiffs.
No settlement discussion, no request to see whether we can
get this thing moving, no request for depositions,
absolutely zero communication during that entire period of
time.
These plaintiffs have done nothing.

The only

action in this case has been taken by the defendants to
try to resolve the groundless suit, Your Honor.

And I

felt those two things were important for the court to
understand.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
MS. LARSON:

All right, thank you.
Thank you.

Ms. Larson.

Your Honor, I

represent Matthew Hilton in this matter.

And with respect
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to cocounsel's arguments, I don't have much more to offer.
Just to say that after the complaint in this matter was
filed in 1992, Matthew Hilton did respond by filing an
answer.

And with respect to Matthew Hilton's position, no

activity's taken place since that period of time.
To my knowledge, no settlement negotiations
have taken place- THE COURT:

And that's since what time, again,

Ms. Larson?
MS. LARSON:

Since our answer was filed in

August of 1993. We were not a party to the motion to
dismiss brought by Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie, and so
until the current motion to dismiss has come before the
court, no activity has taken place with respect to
Mr. Hilton.
THE COURT:

So while Mr. Kay has alluded to at

least one contact, from your client's perspective, there's
been no contact or discussion concerning settlement for
over two and a half years?
MS. LARSON:

Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else you'd like to say?
MS. LARSON:
THE COURT:

No, I do not.

Thank you.

All right, you've got three

illustrious attorneys in the back row, there.
MR. MANGUM:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Mr. Mangum?
And I will
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be brief,

I would submit that, really, for all of the

defendants, looking at it functionally, there has been no
activity initiated by plaintiff since the amended
complaint was filed in either January or July of 1992.
The only things that any defendant did, including Nielsen
and- -

Nielsen & Senior answered, then Nielsen & Senior

waited while Mr. Kay pursued his motion for dismissal of
one or more of the claims. When he prevailed, we filed
the same motion, it was not opposed, and then we sought
leave to amend the complaint, which Mr. Jones stipulated
to.

But plaintiff has not initiated anything in this

action since the amended complaint was filed, and that's
been nearly three years.
I do have to say, and the only thing that is
unique at all about Nielsen & Senior, is that Mr. Jones
was once a partner of ours at Nielsen & Senior.

And

perhaps more as an accommodation to us, he did make one
phone call for settlement.
ago.

That was more than two years

That was promptly rejected, if I'm not mistaken,

that was December of #92 or early January of '93.
THE COURT:

I guess if he stands up and makes a

brilliant argument you're going to take credit for having
trained him; is that right?
MR. MANGUM:

If we could.

But as I read the

case law, and the standards are set forth, there's not
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much doubt what plaintiff has to establish.
But let me just read one sentence from the
Meadow Fresh case, which we cited in addition, the Meadow
Fresh Farms case, in addition to the cases cited by the
other defendants.

One sentence.

"In sum, a plaintiff, in

attacking a dismissal for failure to prosecute, must offer
a reasonable excuse for its lack of diligence."

And while

that's the standard on appeal, I submit that it also has
relevance here at this level. We have not seen any
reasonable excuse for taking no initiative to move this
case forward.

Thank you.

THE COURT:
more.

Thank you.

Wait a minute, two

Are they going to say anything?
MR. NIELSEN:

Your Honor, I rest on what my

partner has said.
MR. BURBIDGE:

I likewise will rely on what

Mr. Kay, my attorney, has said.
THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

MR. JONES:

I am very grateful to take credit

for Mr. Nielsen's training, Your Honor, if the court
denies the motion, and I acknowledge that fine training.
THE COURT:

You're taking credit for training

Mr. Nielsen?
MR. JONES:

No, his training of me.

I'm

grateful to acknowledge his fine training.
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THE COURT: We all feel that way, even those of
us who have only watched him at work.
MR. JONES: As well we should, a fine teacher.
Your Honor, I'd like to address, I think, the
real substantive points, here. And I'd like to start
first with the issue of, have there been settlement
discussions?

Secondly, I'd like to address what has

actually happened in the interim.

Third, I'd like to

address whether or not there is any prejudice to the
defendants as a result of the delay.

And fourth, what

injustice would result if the court did dismiss the claim.
First of all, with regard to settlement
discussions, and with all due respect to Mr. Mangum's
recitation of the settlement discussions that took place
with Nielsen & Senior, those, in fact, did occur in
January of 1993.

I had two, excuse me, one telephone

conversation with Mr. Nielsen in which I discussed with
him the fact that I had been approached about taking this
case, and inquired of him his feelings if I were to do so.
THE COURT: And when was that, again?
MR. JONES: That was in January of 1993.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JONES:

Subsequently, after he expressed

absolutely no hesitation or concern vis-a-vis our prior
relationship, or my relationship formerly with his firm, I
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then had a meeting with him in his office where we
discussed the substance of a settlement proposal that
Mr. Boyd had authorized me to make to him.

I presented to

him a dollar amount, and terms under which Mr. Boyd would
be willing to settle.
Mr. Nielsen told me expressly that he would
discuss the matter with those that he, with whom he had
to, and that he would respond.
THE COURT:

And this was still January of '93?

MR. JONES:

I don't have the date of that.

believe it was probably February of '93.
later.

I

It was some time

And I've looked, Your Honor, I don't have notes

with regard to that particular conversation.

Except that

it did take place in his office, and I do have notes with
regard to the amounts that were authorized by Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Nielsen then called me back some time later, in
response to my telephone call, and declined the offer.
The second settlement discussions took place in
February of 1994. Those discussions took place with
Mr. Kay on behalf of Mr. Burbidge and the Kirton, McConkie
firm.

Mr. Kay is correct that he and I ran into each

other in court, we talked about the case.

He indicated

some interest in seeing if there was a way his clients
could be dismissed.

We talked about settlement then.

On February 10, 1994, I sent a memorandum to
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Mr. Boyd with regard to my conversation with Mr. Kay, and
asked that he call me about it.

He did so.

We discussed

again the terms under which Mr. Boyd would be willing to
dismiss Mr. Kay#s clients.
And I then called Mr. Kay.

And I related to

Mr. Kay what those terms were. Again, a precise dollar
amount which, if paid, Mr. Boyd would accept as
satisfaction of his claims. Mr. Kay's response to me was,
,f

I don't think so.

But I will get back to you."

I have

never heard back from Mr. Kay, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
you initiate discovery?

Let me ask you to follow up.
Did you call Mr. Kay?

Did

Did you

send follow up letters?
MR. JONES:

I did not, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

None of those things.

MR. JONES:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

And can you tell me why?

Because I

think it does come back, as counsel points out, to a
reasonable excuse for the lack of diligence.

And I

understand, counsel, that attorneys' actions are, in large
part, driven or dictated by what clients are willing to
pay for, and what clients direct you to do.

But can you

explain to me why nothing was done?
MR. JONES:
reasons.

Your Honor, I can give you two

The first is the fact that the lawsuit arose
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between Mr. Isom and Mr. Boyd.

Mr. Isom sued Mr. Boyd

with respect to his representation of Mr. Boyd in this
case initially.

That lawsuit took until approximately- -

I'm looking at Mr. Gibb, because I don't recall precisely.
I believe it was last summer, July or August, to resolve.
Frankly- THE COURT:

That's a separate action.

MR. JONES:

That's absolutely correct.

But in

terms of a reason, Your Honor, Mr. Boyd's attentions and
hours were focused on resolving that lawsuit, which was
tried in the early part of the year last year, and then
was resolved during the pendency of an appeal.

And my

best recollection is, is that would have been the late
s\immer or early fall of 1994.
THE COURT:

All right.

And at that point in

time did you initiate discovery, or additional settlement
discussions?
MR. JONES:
was resolved.

Did not, Your Honor.

That matter

We had some financial arrangements then to

make with Mr. Boyd with regard to proceeding with this
case.

Those were not accomplished, frankly, until

recently.
filed.

And clearly after the motion to dismiss was

So the substantive reason for the inactivity in

the case relates to the separate case brought by Mr. Isom.
I point out again, however, Your Honor, that
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been made, expressly in Mr. Kay's argument and in
Mr. Ostler's argument, both admitted that they simply
waited.

Both admitted that they did nothing to move

forward with the case.

Both admitted that they did not

undertake any action in the case at all to defend against
the claims, or try, if they believed the claims to be
meritorious, to assemble the evidence and establish that
for the court.
THE COURT:
motions.

Well, they have filed repeated

The motions that occurred several years ago and

then the most current motions, which bring us to the
hearing today.
MR. JONES:

But none of those go to the merits,

Your Honor, if they believe these are frivolous.
THE COURT:

It goes to the merits to move to

dismiss.
MR. JONES: Well, the dismissal has nothing to
do with the merits of the case.
THE COURT:

I understand what you're saying,

but if there is no case, that's fairly significant.
MR. JONES:
case as a whole.

I understand that in terms of the

But in terms of if they believed that

the claims are frivolous, and they can prove that, they
have undertaken nothing on their part.

And that, I

believe, is important, because that's what both
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Westinghouse and Meadow Fresh say, that the court should
take a look at what both sides have done.
If these claims really are lacking in merit, if
they're not substantive, then they can proceed, likewise,
to take depositions, obtain documents, and do, as was done
in the case just argued to the court, bring a motion for
summary judgment and show that the case is lacking in
merit.
That, of course, is different than the
procedural event that there has been two years of
inactivity in terms of pleadings or discovery process.
And that is a significant point.
In Westinghouse, the court said, "Consideration
should be given to the conduct of both parties, and the
opportunity each has had to move the case forward."

And

what they have done about it, and also what difficulty or
prejudice may have been caused to the other side. And
most important, whether injustice may result from
dismissal•
The court goes on to say, "We're not impressed
that the defendants themselves were overly diligent, or
manifest any particular haste in getting the pretrial
discovery procedures completed and on with trial."

The Supreme Court mandates a look at what has
happened on both sides.

The Supreme Court says, "We have
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to look at what both parties have done."

Granted, and

it's clear that there has been no pretrial discovery or
other process in this case for two years initiated by the
plaintiff.

But that needs to be balanced against what the

defendants have done, under Westinghouse.

And in this

case, they have likewise done nothing.
I make that point, Your Honor, because that
goes directly to their claim of prejudice.

If there were

prejudice that they were suffering, if there was some
significant damage or injury that was occurring to them as
a result of the pendency of these cases, one would expect
them to do something to prove that the claims against them
were meritless, or lacking in any substance in order to
remove, as Mr. Kay says, the cloud of this particular
litigation.
With regard to the claim of malpractice,
disclosure.

My experience is, whether or not you have

been the subject of a suit is the inquiry that is made in
connection with a malpractice application.

That is, every

malpractice application I have ever seen, or been asked to
fill out, says, "Have you ever been the subject of a
lawsuit?"

Not, "Are you now the subject of a lawsuit

dealing with professional negligence?"
The analysis that is made, in my experience, by
malpractice insurers, is, "What is a person's past
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history?H

And whatever is outstanding then is the subject

of the prior policy.

It's not going to make a

considerable or significant difference.
The inquiry with regard to what suits are now
pending or may have been pending in the past is to help
the underwriters understand whether that person is the
subject of many suits, or has been, and may give a greater
insight into the degree of care that is engaged in, or
utilized in that person's practice.

Whatever is then

pending is already the subject of an existing policy.
Now, with regard to this claim that one of the
other claims that was made in the pleadings is the
evidence is stale.

That's a conclusionary statement.

There are no facts to support that.

There's no claim that

a witness has died that cannot now testify.

There's no

claim that a warehouse containing documents has been
burned, there's, and documents destroyed.

There's no

claim that evidence isn't available.
There's no question that these claims arose
several years ago.

And fundamentally it's no more stale

today than it was two years, ago because the events took
place in the late 1980s.
And finally, Your Honor, with regard to their
claim of prejudice that they've suffered an unnecessary
delay, that, again, is a conclusionary statement that is
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belied by the fact that they have not affirmatively done
anything to remove that delay, or to cause the case to
move along in order to be relieved of the burden of this
litigation.
Now, if I may, I would turn, finally, to the
question of the injustice that will result.

Mr. Boyd

negotiated a deal with the Harmon shareholders to buy
Harmons for $20 million.

That deal included express

language, written by Mr. Hilton, that during, until the
closing they would not negotiate with anyone else for the
sale of their shares.

It also included the express

requirement that they disclose all material facts with
regard to Harmons, to its business, to its assets and
liabilities.
Based upon those representations, Mr. Boyd
engaged lawyers, accountants, and engaged Citicorp, an arm
of the Citicorp Bank in New York, to provide asset
financing, or asset-based financing for the transaction.
He paid very substantial fees in order to
pursue the due diligence necessary to close the
transactions to lawyers, accountants, and Citicorp.

On

the day of the closing he learned for the first time two
important facts.
First, that Mr. Terry Harmon had gone out and
purchased most of the shares from several of the
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1

shareholders during the term of the deal, in direct

2

violation of the provisions of the purchase agreement,

3

such that Mr. Harmon at that time, then, controlled a

4

majority of the shares of Harmons, and was taking a

5

position on behalf of Harmons that he would not close the

6

transaction.

7

Secondly, on that date, Mr. Boyd learned for

8

the first time that the Department of Labor was asserting

9

a significant violation of the ERISA statutes with regard

10

to the Harmons pension and profit sharing plan for a

11

liability in excess of from five to $6 million.

12

subsequently been admitted by the Harmons defendants.

13

a result of that, the Harmons defendants refused to

14

cooperate, and refused to close the transaction.

15

That has
As

Mr. Boyd is entitled to recover, has two

16

remedies, or seeks two kinds of damage.

17

the cost and expenses incurred, and the second being the

18

loss of the benefit of his bargain in this case.

19

he would have had, had he been able to purchase at the

20

time that he entered into the agreement.

21

The first being

The gain

Now, Your Honor, in summary, while there is no

22

question that the case has been inactive for two years,

23

and while there is no question that the plaintiff has not

24

moved the case along in that time period, there is also no

25

question that neither have the defendants.

And then when
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the court looks at the critical elements, the most
critical elements of prejudice and injustice, there is no
showing, I see no affidavits, I see no factual statements
that say, "We have been prejudiced by the pendency of this
lawsuit, and the failure to prosecute."
Secondly, there would be significant injustice
to Mr. Boyd.

He invested several hundred thousand dollars

in expenses, and he lost the benefit of a bargain that
could have meant many millions of dollars of profit and
gain to him and his family.
THE COURT:

Then why hasn't he done anything in

the last two years?
MR. JONES:

I've given the court the only

reasons that exist with regard to that.

But Your Honor,

that injustice to him is still significant.

It may be

delayed, he now may be gearing up in a delayed fashion to
move forward.

But what real damage has resulted?

real injury have they suffered?
real injury.

What

There is no showing of

And they have not proceeded.

THE COURT:

Let me ask you this, counsel.

If

somebody filed what amounts to a malpractice action
against you, and it was pending for some three, four, or
five years, would you feel that there was no disadvantage
to you in having that hanging over your head?
MR. JONES: Well, if it were five years, and I
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1

could measure that in terms of increases in my malpractice

2

premiums, or some other measurable and identifiable

3

defect, yes.

4

years, the last activity- -

But Your Honor, the claim's been pending two

5

THE COURT:

The claim's been pending two years?

6

MR. JONES:

I'm sorry, the suit has been

7

pending three years.

The last activity in terms of moving

8

this case forward was two years ago.

9

not believe, of inactivity is a sufficiently long time

And two years, I do

10

period.

Especially when they haven't produced affidavits

11

or other evidence to establish real prejudice or injury.
Yes, I understand their claim, and yes, I

12
13

understand that, and I would certainly acknowledge as a

14

lawyer that I would not want to have to disclose any

15

claims with regard to a malpractice application.

16

there are other defendants in this case.

17

the other individual Harmon defendants, who, in fact,

18

don't have that prejudice at all, and who can't make that

19

argument at all.
THE COURT:

20

But

Mr. Harmon and

With reference to the Harmons, or

21

maybe it's Hilton, there's no allegation that there was

22

even any settlement negotiations?
MR. JONES: With Mr. Hilton I believe that is

23
24

correct.

To my knowledge there have been no settlement

25

negotiations.
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2
3

THE COURT: What possible basis are you
providing me with to deny the notion as to the Hiltons?
MR. JONES:

Only, Your Honor, that there's no,

4

they have not shown any prejudice.

And again, if the

5

court is inclined to say, "Because it's two years, I'm

6

going to absolutely cut it off at two years, and that's

7

just fundamentally too long," then there's very little

8

that I think I can offer.

9

here and try to tell the court that something with regard

Because I'm not going to stand

10

to Hilton has happened in two years that is really

11

substantive.

12

certainly wouldn't try to.

I can't, the facts don't support it.

I

13

But what I'm suggesting to the court is, even

14

though there have been two years of inactivity, Mr. Boyd

15

is now committed to proceed forward, and there's evidence

16

of that in the record, despite the fact that the court is

17

not giving that particular consideration for purposes of

18

this motion.

19

But my point to the court is, if the defendants

20

cannot articulate elements of damage, prejudice, or loss

21

with more particularity than has been done, here, a cloud

22

of litigation, the annoyance of being named as a

23

defendant, and unnecessary delay, which is all that

24

they've said, I think that the court ought to give these

25

parties their day in court.

And that's what both Burnett
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and Meadow Fresh says. The very reason for the existence

2

of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be

3

heard, and to do justice between them.

4

The fact that there is some delay in this case

5

does not mean, even if it's two years, that that ought to

6

be, in and of itself, the basis for dismissal, when they

7

have not given the court any substantial reasons for

8

prejudice, injury, or loss. We'd submit it on that basis.
(REPORTER'S NOTE:

9

The Court's Ruling has been

10

previously transcribed, and can be found in another

11

volume.)

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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